Aristotle’s Rhetoric is thought by many to be among his most polished works, yet it still can be a dry read for the technical jargon and lengthy list-like discussions found within it. It also has, at least in part because of the poor, sophistical reputation that rhetoric, as a field, has acquired for itself, suffered a philosophical fate worse than it probably should have.
Nevertheless, because of the daunting enormity of the task in becoming virtuous according to Aristotelian rigor, in that one must possess all of the virtues and be virtuous in such a way that a given action is expressed spontaneously as a reflection of a developed character, I have begun to wonder if there is way to measure progress toward that goal.
One possibility occurred to me as I was reading the Rhetoric on the topic of pleasure. Aristotle says, in enumerating the things that are pleasurable, that:
For the habitual [is pleasurable] as if it has already become to be by nature. And a habit of a certain kind is like nature, for often is similar to always, and nature pertains to the always, while the habitual pertains to the often. Furthermore the non-compulsory [is pleasurable] (Rhetoric, 1370a6-10). [1]
One notion that is assumed in this discussion is that the natural is pleasurable,[2] as can be inferred from this passage, but also from Aristotle’s remark that the non-compulsory is pleasurable. Presumably then, the compulsory is not-pleasurable, nor natural, while the non-compulsory is natural, or can approach being natural (which always happens) by occurring “often” even if not “always.”
Thus for one practicing the Aristotelian virtues, a very pertinent question to ask oneself in making ethical progress is whether or not you are experiencing pleasure while doing it. If, during given instances of practicing character or intellectual virtues, you feel no pleasure, you have probably not achieved the ideal of virtue in that sphere. Do you feel no spark of joy while performing what you know to be a just action? Do you have no pleasure when an act of courage is called for? Are you not pleased when acting prudently, and in general, avoiding the extremes of ethical endeavors, as opposed to the mean? Then it is perhaps necessary to re-evaluate the status of your ethical condition in general and in particulars.
REFERENCES:
[1] καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἰθισμένον ὥσπερ πεφυκὸς ἤδη γίγνεται·
ὅμοιον γάρ τι τὸ ἔθος τῇ φύσει· ἐγγὺς γὰρ καὶ τὸ πολλάκις
τῷ ἀεί, ἔστιν δ’ ἡ μὲν φύσις τοῦ ἀεί, τὸ δὲ ἔθος τοῦ πολ-
λάκις καὶ τὸ μὴ βίαιον (παρὰ φύσιν γὰρ ἡ βία, διὸ τὸ
ἀναγκαῖον λυπηρόν…
[2] Perhaps a contentious notion. Also worth noting here is that although Aristotle will later deny that pleasure is a motion (NE 10.4.2), as he takes it to be here, I think this not relevant to the point I am making .
Hi Michael,
I’d translate the Rhetoric passage slightly differently: “For the habitual, too, comes about at once as if it were natural; for a habit is similar to nature, since the frequent is quite near to the inevitable, and nature is of the inevitable, habit of the frequent. Likewise, what is not forced…”
A.’s point about the habitual in this passage is that its occurrence is a likeness of the natural, which is why he explains the similarity in terms of the similarity of frequent and inevitable occurrence. It is in the preceding words, ἀνάγκη οὖν ἡδὺ εἶναι … καὶ τὰ ἔθη, that he asserts that habits are pleasant, for which these claims are the explanation. No need to infer indirectly that A. thinks that the natural is pleasant: he’s just said it, or more precisely, that “entering into a natural condition” (τό τε εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἰέναι) is pleasant, though he qualifies this with “for the most part” (ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ). This is naturally taken to be a reference to the pleasures of restoration that Plato discusses in several places (notably Republic IX and Philebus 31d ff.). It’s worth noting that Aristotle dismisses this as a general account of pleasure in Nicomachean Ethics X.3 on the grounds that the replenishment is bodily while being pleased is not an experience of the body, so the replenishment cannot itself be pleasure, though it may occasion pleasure.
It’s interesting to think about how the compulsory and the non-compulsory fit in to the experience of the virtuous agent. Aristotle takes this up in Ethics X.9 to some extent, saying that the laws exhort those who are ready to be possessed by virtue but can only restrain and threaten the vast majority who live according to passion and not reason and who therefore resent it when their desires are checked. I’m not sure whether this can be fit together neatly with the grades of voluntariness or deliberateness, which is what the reference to the non-compulsory or what is not forced must be.
~Dhananjay
Dhananjay,
Thanks for your helpful comments. I appreciate the insights someone working on the forefront of Aristotle and his Ethics can bring to the table.
Because I know Aristotle denies that pleasure is a “movement” in the soul in the Ethics, I was steering clear of the very sentence that you mentioned, ““entering into a natural condition” (τό τε εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἰέναι)” because it clearly incorporates that kind of understanding. For the purpose of my post though, I was changing Aristotle (illegitimately perhaps, to more accurately reflect what seems closer to his later view) from saying that “movement toward the natural is pleasant” to “the natural is pleasant.”
I am not sure about taking τοῦ ἀεί as “inevitable.” As I first read it, the point of comparison between nature and habit was one of consistency or steadfastness. (Though I don’t think you would disagree.) So insofar as habit reaches a level of constancy approximating nature (often), it will to that extent be pleasurable. For it would seem odd that in order to be pleasurable, habit has to be “always”– for this is not what Aristotle says nor is it what habit is, for that matter.
As an addition to your closing remark, I also think the relation between the natural and the compulsory is worth exploring. Perhaps I don’t know enough of Aristotle on this subject to speak about this, however.