Here is an intriguing text found in Diogenes Laertius. It is retold by Diogenes who apparently found it in Alcimus, a certain Greek rhetorician, who relates how Plato owes an intellectual debt to Epicharmus, a poet. What is certainly bizarre about this relation is that Epicharmus was a comic poet, and the passages of Epicharmus brought forward here concerns the theory of the Forms. I do not wish to speculate on the likelihood of whether Plato would borrow from a comic poet, or in fact, if these fragments even belong to Epicharmus. Rather, I am interested in the Platonist conception of forms which this passage is attempting to illuminate.
Yet Alcimus also says this: “Wise men say the soul perceives some things through the body such as a sound, a sight, but other things the soul intuits itself through itself (αὐτὴν καθ’ αὑτὴν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι) while not making use of the body. Therefore, of the things that are, some are sensibles, others are intelligibles. And on account of these things, Plato used to say that it is necessary for those who desire to comprehend the principles of the universe first of all to distinguish the Forms among themselves, for example, likeness and singularity and plurality and magnitude and rest and motion. Secondly, it is necessary to comprehend as many of the forms as are in relation to each other, for example knowledge or magnitude or mastership. (For we must keep in mind that the names in usage [properly] belong to the Forms because they participate in the Forms. I mean, for example, that just things are just insofar as they participate in justness, and beautiful things are beautiful insofar as they participate in beauty). Furthermore, each one of the Forms is eternal and a thought, and in addition, does not undergo change. Therefore he also says that the Forms by their nature stand as paradigms, and other things resemble these because they were established as likenesses of the Forms. Therefore, Epicharmus speaks in this way concerning the good and the Forms:
A: So is flute-playing a certain thing?
B: Yes, entirely.
A: Then is a flute-playing a man?
B: Of course not.
A: Come see then, what is a flute-player? Who does he seem to you to be? A man? Or not a man?
B: Entirely a man.
A: Therefore do you think that it would also be this way concerning the good?
The good is a certain thing in itself, and whoever learns that would know, and is already become a good man. For just as there is a flute-player because he learns flute-playing, or a dancer because he learns dancing or a weaver because he learns weaving, or any such thing in like manner, whatever you could wish to come up with, so the man himself would not be the craft, but in fact he would be the craftsman (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, Plato, bk. III. ch. 12-14). [1]
I will refrain here from commenting on the possible comedic merit of this excerpted dialogue, except to say that I would personally very much enjoy a comedy involving Platonic Form! I want to focus on A’s point in leading B to the conclusion that a craftsman is not a craft. I take it that the last paragraph above is also part of A’s dialogue, since Diogenes has said that Epicharmus will speak about the good and Forms, and Epicharmus has not, so far at least, spoken of the good.
A establishes that flute-playing is not a flute player (or grammatically, the reverse is likely as well). The path that leads to this conclusion, or what we are to take from this conclusion, however, are less than clear to me. Perhaps the idea is that, keeping in mind the language of ‘paradigm’ used to describe the Forms in the first paragraph, we could force a sharp distinction as to the origin of the flute-player’s craft. What I mean is that, from the untutored perspective, it appears that the flute-player looks to another flute-player to learn his craft. However, this would be fruitless if what he is looking at is not flute-playing, while A’s interlocutor has already agreed that a flute-player is not a flute-playing. Therefore, it must be the case that the would-be flute-player is observing something. This something is the paradigm of the Platonic Form of flute-playing, to which he must turn to see flute playing not as something perceivable, but entirely intelligible.
In addition, there might be an emphasis on the priority of the Form as against its particular instantiations. That is, ‘flute-playing’ comes before a flute-player, even though one might mistakenly think that flute-playing is entirely dependent on a flute-player. But in fact, it is the flute-player who must turn to the already existing, eternal, intelligible Form of flute-playing, as the paradigm from which he learns.
Is there perhaps some other line of thought that Epicharmus, the erstwhile Platonist, is conveying?
REFERENCES:
[1] Ἔτι φησὶν ὁ Ἄλκιμος καὶ ταυτί· “φασὶν οἱ σοφοὶ τὴν ψυχὴν
τὰ μὲν διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἰσθάνεσθαι οἷον ἀκούουσαν, βλέπουσαν,
τὰ δ’ αὐτὴν καθ’ αὑτὴν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι μηδὲν τῷ σώματι χρωμένην·
διὸ καὶ τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ νοητά. ὧν ἕνεκα
καὶ Πλάτων ἔλεγεν ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς συνιδεῖν τὰς τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὰς (5)
ἐπιθυμοῦντας πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὰς καθ’ αὑτὰς διελέσθαι τὰς ἰδέας,
οἷον ὁμοιότητα καὶ μονάδα καὶ πλῆθος καὶ μέγεθος καὶ στάσιν
καὶ κίνησιν· δεύτερον αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ
(13.) δίκαιον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὑποθέσθαι. τρίτον τῶν ἰδεῶν συνιδεῖν
ὅσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλας εἰσίν, οἷον ἐπιστήμην ἢ μέγεθος ἢ δεσποτείαν
(ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τὰ παρ’ ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ μετέχειν ἐκείνων ὁμώ-
νυμα ἐκείνοις ὑπάρχει· λέγω δὲ οἷον δίκαια μὲν ὅσα τοῦ δικαίου,
καλὰ δὲ ὅσα τοῦ καλοῦ). ἔστι δὲ τῶν εἰδῶν ἓν ἕκαστον ἀίδιόν τε (5)
καὶ νόημα καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἀπαθές. διὸ καί φησιν
ἐν τῇ φύσει τὰς ἰδέας ἑστάναι καθάπερ παραδείγματα, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα
ταύταις ἐοικέναι τούτων ὁμοιώματα καθεστῶτα. ὁ τοίνυν Ἐπί-
χαρμος περί τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν οὕτω λέγει· (10)
(14.) {—} ἆρ’ ἔστιν αὔλησίς τι πρᾶγμα;
{—} πάνυ μὲν ὦν.
{—} ἄνθρωπος ὦν αὔλησίς ἐστιν; {—} οὐθαμῶς.
{—} φέρ’ ἴδω, τί δ’ αὐλητάς; τίς εἶμέν τοι δοκεῖ;
ἄνθρωπος; ἢ οὐ γάρ;
{—} πάνυ μὲν ὦν.
{—} οὐκῶν δοκεῖς οὕτως ἔχειν <κα> καὶ περὶ τἀγαθοῦ;
τὸ μὲν (5)
ἀγαθόν τι πρᾶγμ’ εἶμεν καθ’ αὕθ’, ὅστις δέ κα
εἰδῇ μαθὼν τῆν’, ἀγαθὸς ἤδη γίγνεται.
ὥσπερ γάρ ἐστ’ αὔλησιν αὐλητὰς μαθὼν
ἢ ὄρχησιν ὀρχηστάς τις ἢ πλοκεὺς πλοκάν,
ἢ πᾶν γ’ ὁμοίως τῶν τοιούτων ὅ τι τὺ λῇς, (10)
οὐκ αὐτὸς εἴη κα τέχνα, τεχνικός γα μάν.
>”I would personally very much enjoy a comedy involving Platonic Form! ”
Are you familiar with the fragment 11 of Epicrates, in which there is a comical report of the attempt to define the pumpkin by Plato and other academy members?
(It’s in Edmonds v.2, 354-7) or Athenaeus’ *Deipnosophistes* Βk. 2 ¶54.
Believe it or not, this spoof, along with *Parts of Animals* I.2-3 is an important – albeit highly problematic – source for the way that the Academy –Speusippus especially– were developing the method of dichotomous division, as modeled in Plato’s *Sophist* and *Statesman*, for application to biological kinds.
“Ἐπικράτης ὁ κωμῳδιοποιός:
A:τί Πλάτων
καὶ Σπεύσιππος καὶ Μενέδημος;
πρὸς τίσι νυνὶ διατρίβουσιν;
ποία φροντίς, ποῖος δὲ λόγος
διερευνᾶται παρὰ τούτοισιν; (5)
τάδε μοι πινυτῶς, εἴ τι κατειδὼς
ἥκεις, λέξον, πρὸς Γᾶς …..
B: ἀλλ’ οἶδα λέγειν περὶ τῶνδε σαφῶς.
Παναθηναίοις γὰρ ἰδὼν ἀγέλην
μειρακίων . . . . . . (10)
ἐν γυμνασίοις Ἀκαδημείας
ἤκουσα λόγων ἀφάτων, ἀτόπων.
περὶ γὰρ φύσεως ἀφοριζόμενοι
διεχώριζον ζῴων τε βίον (15)
δένδρων τε φύσιν λαχάνων τε γένη.
κᾆτ’ ἐν τούτοις τὴν κολοκύντην
ἐξήταζον τίνος ἐστὶ γένους.
Α: καὶ τί ποτ’ ἄρ’ ὡρίσαντο καὶ τίνος γένους
εἶναι τὸ φυτόν; δήλωσον, εἰ κάτοισθά τι.
Β: πρώτιστα μὲν πάντες ἄναυδοι (20)
τότ’ ἐπέστησαν καὶ κύψαντες
χρόνον οὐκ ὀλίγον διεφρόντιζον.
κᾆτ’ ἐξαίφνης, ἔτι κυπτόντων
καὶ ζητούντων τῶν μειρακίων,
λάχανόν τις ἔφη στρογγύλον εἶναι, (25)
ποίαν δ’ ἄλλος, δένδρον δ’ ἕτερος.
ταῦτα δ’ ἀκούων ἰατρός τις
Σικελᾶς ἀπὸ γᾶς
κατέπαρδ’ αὐτῶν ὡς ληρούντων.
Α. ἦ που δεινῶς ὠργίσθησαν χλευάζεσθαί τ’ (30)
ἐβόησαν;
τὸ γὰρ ἐν λέσχαις [ταῖσδε] τοιαῦτα ποιεῖν ἀπρε-
πές . . . . . . .
Β. οὐδ’ ἐμέλησεν τοῖς μειρακίοις.
ὁ Πλάτων δὲ παρὼν καὶ μάλα πρᾴως, (35)
οὐδὲν ὀρινθείς, ἐπέταξ’ αὐτοῖς
πάλιν
ἀφορίζεσθαι τίνος ἐστὶ γένους.
οἳ δὲ διῄρουν. ”
I’m *mostly* joking about it as a source on Speusippean division. If memory serves, though, it has actually been cited as “evidence” of interest in biological classification in the Academy.
Thank you for the comment. I have run across the Epicratic pumpkin episode a couple of times, but maybe I need to revisit it. I think I looked at it about a year and a half ago. My general thinking is this, but maybe you disagree: If a comic is parodying or satirizing a view, it can be difficult or impossible to determine the original view, after all, chuckles is the coin of the realm in comedy, and both truth and distortion can be used to that end. On the other hand, D. Laertius cites Alcimus citing Epicharmus works (far from the source, I know!) that are supposedly representative of some proto-Platonic views. I take the claim to be that Plato borrowed, elaborated on or otherwise extended the ideas found in Epicharmus. This seems to me then more valuable than the Epicrates’ testimony. Maybe you think they are both poor evidence?
Also, my site is currently not conducive to looking around–– it is probably tedious to look any further than the last two week’s blogposts–– but I am also blogging through the Parts of Animals discussing division. Problems with Plato Knowledge of Animal Kinds is an Empirical, not a Logical, Enterprise Problems with Plato: Animal Diversity and Robust Division Parts of Animals: Dividing Feet, Divided Opinions
I quite agree that funniness, is the coin of the realm in comedy, not truth per se, and certainly not exegetical precision or accuracy. The only limitations on the verisimilitude (or lack thereof) of a parody that comedy itself imposes on it are the requirements of intelligibility and familiarity to the audience and of sufficient aptness in cases of *highly familiar* targets.
So, for all we know, all that we can *probably* gather from the fragment I quoted is that Plato (and to a lesser extent Speusippus and Menedemus) was a (well?)known person, and the academy was an institution most Athenians knew of. Beyond that, all that we can guess is that 1. classifying or defining things is something that was in some way associated with the activity of philosophers, not necessarily the academy specifically; 2. a kind of arbitrary speculation or rationalistic bent (contrasted with the Sicilian doctor) was a foible associated with philosophers (as well, perhaps, as taking themselves too seriously).
The comic portrayal of philosophers being long on theory and short on fact (or knowledge) was hardly new. And that might be all that this exchange is playing upon. But – and this is admittedly speculative – it would have been even funnier for Epicrates or his audience if, like Menander, they were familiar with the Peripatetic and/or Cynic critiques of the Academy’s “heads in the clouds” kind of approach (e.g. “Here is Plato’s man”). I submit that it is much funnier (to me, at least) that this is in the Academy rather than the Lyceum, since it’s really not an apt characterization of the groundbreaking and highly empirical work that Aristotle and his associates were doing/inventing in the natural sciences and the life sciences especially.
Maybe it is specifically relevant that the critic is a doctor (and a Sicilian?) given that the definiendum is ‘pumpkin’, since pumpkins are everywhere in Greek medical treatises. [If you’re at U of C you should ask Liz Asmis about that.]
In any case, if we didn’t have any other independent evidence, I would never feel confident concluding on the basis of this fragment anything about the specifics of Academic classification nor even that the Platonists were interested in defining biological kinds at all. We do have some such independent evidence (a little bit), and it’s enough such that I think it is interesting just how *not off the mark* Epicrates might be. (Contrast that to the fantasy -so far as we know- of the Thinkatorium in the *Clouds*.)
Regarding the Epicharmus material:
there is a lot of other philosophical content in Epicharmus and I suspect that – in addition to the occasional references to Epicharmus in Plato – other bits of E.’s philosophical thinking gave rise to the trope that Plato borrowed from Epicharmus. This might just be Alcmius’ (or even D.L.’s ?) pet example of Plato borrowing from Epicharmus, or D.L.’s pet example of Alcmius’ point about the Epicharmian inspiration for the theory of paradigms, specifically.
If I can find the time, I’ll try to dig up some of the other Epicharmian philosophical fragments that seem relevant.
For what it’s worth, recall Aristotle’s claim that in his youth Plato was a Heraclitean (also an inspiring dramatist/poet). Cratylus is the figure we associate with P.’s supposed tutelage in Heracliteanism, but IMHO Epicharmus should not be discounted or overlooked in this respect as being another possible source for young Plato of Heraclitean ideas.
sc. “aspiring” for “inspiring”