Monthly Archives: July 2015

Problems with Plato: Animals in Plato’s Procrustean Method

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I would like to continue writing about the problems Aristotle sees in certain kinds of Platonic division.  In this particular section of Parts of Animals, Aristotle continues to focus on the notion of privation in bifurcatory division, that is, when animals are divided into a category such as wingless (i.e. a privation of wings) and winged.  First we will look at the text:

There are differences of the general kind and they have forms, such as winged.  For there are both unsplit and split wings.  And with regards to footedness also there is the many splitted, or the two splitted, such as the cloven-hoofed, and the uncloven and undivided, such as the single-hoofed animals.  And it is difficult to divide also into such differences of which there are species, so that whatever animal fits under these differences and the same animal does not fit among many animals (for example winged and unwinged.  For both [winged and unwinged] are the same animal [sometimes], for example an ant and a glowworm and some other animals [are both winged and unwinged.]  But it is most difficult of all or impossible to divide animals into bloodless.  For it is necessary for each of the differences to belong to one of the particular animals, so that its opposite also belongs to a particular animal.  And if it is impossible that one single form of essence (εἶδός τι τῆς οὐσίας ἄτομον καὶ ἕν) belongs to those animals differing in form (τοῖς εἴδει διαφέρουσιν) but that the form will always possess a difference (for example bird differs from man— for the two-footedness is other and different.  Even in the case of bloodedness, either the blood [of bird and man] differs or one must discount the blood as belonging to the essence) and if this is so, one difference will belong to two animals.  But if this is so, it is clear that it is impossible for a privation to be a [proper] difference (Aristotle, Parts of Animals, 642b30-643a6). 1)Translation mine. 642b τῶν δὲ διαφορῶν αἱ μὲν καθόλου εἰσὶ καὶ ἔχουσιν εἴδη, οἷον πτερότης· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄσχιστον τὸ δ᾿ ἐσχισμένον ἐστὶ πτερόν. καὶ ποδότης ὡσαύτως ἡ μὲν πολυσχιδής, ἡ δὲ δισχιδής, οἷον τὰ δίχαλα, ἡ δ᾿ 30 ἀσχιδὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος, οἷον τὰ μώνυχα. χαλεπὸν μὲν οὖν διαλαβεῖν καὶ εἰς τοιαύτας διαφορὰς ὧν ἔστιν εἴδη, ὥσθ᾿ ὁτιοῦν ζῷον ἐν ταύταις ὑπάρχειν καὶ μὴ ἐν πλείοσι ταὐτόν (οἷον πτερωτὸν καὶ ἄπτερον· ἔστι γὰρ ἄμφω ταὐτόν, οἷον μύρμηξ καὶ λαμπυρὶς καὶ ἕτερά τινα), πάντων δὲ χαλεπώτατον ἢ ἀδύνατον 35 εἰς τὰ ἄναιμα. ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκαστον 643a ὑπάρχειν τινὶ τῶν διαφορῶν ἑκάστην, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ἀντικειμένην. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεται τοῖς εἴδει διαφέρουσιν ὑπάρχειν εἶδός τι τῆς οὐσίας ἄτομον καὶ ἕν, ἀλλ᾿ ἀεὶ διαφορὰν ἕξει (οἷον ὄρνις ἀνθρώπου—ἡ διποδία γὰρ ἄλλη καὶ διάφορος· κἂν εἰ ἔναιμα, τὸ αἷμα διάφορον, ἢ οὐδὲν τῆς οὐσίας τὸ αἷμα θετέον)—εἰ δ᾿ οὕτως ἐστίν, ἡ μία διαφορὰ δυσὶν ὑπάρξει· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι ἀδύνατον στέρησιν εἶναι διαφοράν.

Aristotle begins with the very obvious point that wings and feet come in easily identifiable and separable categories, such as split and hoofed.  Aristotle’s explanation of the method here is clearly being guided by a concern that each animal has some distinctive difference which is (1) discernible by this process of division and (2) belongs to that animal alone.  Perhaps 2 is a claim made by Platonists themselves for this method of division. However, I think the more likely possibility is that Aristotle construes division in such a way that unless the end of the process results in an actual individual species, it is worthless.  If a terminus of division is two-footed, for example, then this applies to many animals and is unsuccessful in picking any one single animal out. This also makes sense in light of the purpose of Aristotle’s criticisms.  He began (PA 642b5 ff.) by saying how sticking to bifurcatory division alone is either difficult or impossible.  (His alternative is to begin with many lines of division, instead of one.)

Another avenue to get at what Aristotle is saying is this.  When there is no further division possible, we have arrived at a specific difference, i.e., a species or animal, at least on the expectations of a Platonist.  This, as Aristotle shows, is not always so easy, as some differences result in more than one animal belonging to them, such as ants belonging both to the winged and unwinged species.

On the same line of thinking that requires a unique animal for each termination of the division, it also follows that any given termination of a division cannot end in a privation.  For there is no such animal as a “non-footed.”  For there is no existence for non-being.  In Peck’s Loeb translation he notes that the reason why Aristotle does not allow privation in division is that this will result in more than one animal belonging to the species, e.g. non-footed.  If this is so, then non-footed has to be divided to get to individuals, but this cannot occur because non-being cannot be divided (legitimately at least).

Questions:

1. If the process of bifurcatory division does not (always) end in one species, what is it the point?  Could the point be to “narrow down” the candidates, or perhaps this kind of dead end means one has to start over again?

2. Is Aristotle’s use of εἶδός (eidos) consistent in this passage?  (Not necessarily A’s fault, perhaps a difficulty in translation.)  Can it mean body plan, species, shape, body part?

3. Why is “footless, featherless” discounted on the grounds that such things are non-being, while “uncloven, undivided” in Aristotle’s examples are legitimate?  Is it because the latter is merely accidental, or one may even say adjectival, while the former is not?

 

References   [ + ]

1. ↑ Translation mine. 642b τῶν δὲ διαφορῶν αἱ μὲν καθόλου εἰσὶ καὶ ἔχουσιν εἴδη, οἷον πτερότης· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄσχιστον τὸ δ᾿ ἐσχισμένον ἐστὶ πτερόν. καὶ ποδότης ὡσαύτως ἡ μὲν πολυσχιδής, ἡ δὲ δισχιδής, οἷον τὰ δίχαλα, ἡ δ᾿ 30 ἀσχιδὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος, οἷον τὰ μώνυχα. χαλεπὸν μὲν οὖν διαλαβεῖν καὶ εἰς τοιαύτας διαφορὰς ὧν ἔστιν εἴδη, ὥσθ᾿ ὁτιοῦν ζῷον ἐν ταύταις ὑπάρχειν καὶ μὴ ἐν πλείοσι ταὐτόν (οἷον πτερωτὸν καὶ ἄπτερον· ἔστι γὰρ ἄμφω ταὐτόν, οἷον μύρμηξ καὶ λαμπυρὶς καὶ ἕτερά τινα), πάντων δὲ χαλεπώτατον ἢ ἀδύνατον 35 εἰς τὰ ἄναιμα. ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκαστον 643a ὑπάρχειν τινὶ τῶν διαφορῶν ἑκάστην, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ἀντικειμένην. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεται τοῖς εἴδει διαφέρουσιν ὑπάρχειν εἶδός τι τῆς οὐσίας ἄτομον καὶ ἕν, ἀλλ᾿ ἀεὶ διαφορὰν ἕξει (οἷον ὄρνις ἀνθρώπου—ἡ διποδία γὰρ ἄλλη καὶ διάφορος· κἂν εἰ ἔναιμα, τὸ αἷμα διάφορον, ἢ οὐδὲν τῆς οὐσίας τὸ αἷμα θετέον)—εἰ δ᾿ οὕτως ἐστίν, ἡ μία διαφορὰ δυσὶν ὑπάρξει· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι ἀδύνατον στέρησιν εἶναι διαφοράν.

Aristotle’s Nicomachean Arguments against Forms: “Former and Latter”

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In the process of setting forth the project that will consume the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle sketches a description for what is the ultimate good, that which all our actions aim to achieve.  He describes the possibility of finding such an action (or whatever it will turn out to be), in these terms:

Indeed, if there is some end of practical affairs which we wish in itself, but all the rest because of this one thing, and we do not wish for everything because of some other thing (for then everything proceeds to infinity, and so desire would be empty and vain), it is obvious that this would be the good and the best.  As archers possessing a target, should we attain what is needed, since the knowledge of this has great importance in life?  If this is so, one must attempt to grasp it in outline at least, what it is and of what kind of knowledge and capacity it belongs (NE 1094a18-26). 1

As Aristotle vividly sets forth, we need some “target,” that ultimate good, at which we can aim our arrows, our lives.  One possibility is the “good” so envisaged by Plato.  Aristotle will then embark on an investigation of this candidate for the “good.”  Before the first of many criticism of Forms, however, Aristotle offers a peace offering of good will to Platonists.

It is fitting to perhaps to investigate and deal with the difficulties of how the universal [good] (to katholou) is said, even though such an investigation courts controversy because the men who introduced Forms (ta eide) are friends.  It would seem that it is fitting, in fact necessary for the preservation of truth even to destroy one’s own work, both generally and because we are philosophers.  For, although both [Platonists and truth] are dear, it is sacred to preferentially honor the truth (NE 1096a11-17). 2

After this shrewdly irenical, even poetical, preface, Aristotle gets into the meat of his first objection by informing us that Platonists do not have forms of those things which have a “former” and “latter.”

Indeed those who introduced this opinion did not place the Forms among those things in which they said there was a former (to proteron) and latter (hysteron); therefore they did not make a Form of numbers.  And the good is said in the categories of “what is” (ti esti) and in quantity (to poion) and in relation (pros ti), but that which is by itself (to kath’ hauto), that is, being or substance (ousia), is prior (proteron) by nature to relation. (For relation seems like an offshoot and incident of being (tou ontos).  So that there would not be some Form in addition to these (NE 1096a17-23). 3

After the mention of numbers, Aristotle brings in talk of his own Categories, noting that the “good” can be predicated in many different ways.  This presents a problem for believers in the Forms.  If “good” is in one of the three categories of “what is,” or quantity, or relation, then in virtue of being in both the category of “what is” and relation it is involved in the “former and latter.”  However remember that the “former and latter” is prohibited as things there are Forms of, as Aristotle just mentioned at NE 1096a17.  The reason that the good is involved in the former and the latter is because “what is” precedes, i.e. is  ontologically prior to, the category of relation, although both “what is” and relation are said of the good.  Therefore logically either there are Forms for things that are involved in “former and latter,” or, as Aristotle prefers, there are no forms since even the paradigmatic Form of them all, the Form of the good, necessarily must (illlogically) involve the “former and latter.”

Questions:

  1. Why does Aristotle bring up two categories in this objection to forms?  That is, he doesn’t seem to need the category of “what is.”  Isn’t the category of relation, in itself, sufficient to show that the good, if it is involved in that category (and it is) concerns the “former and latter.”  Because it seems that at least some forms of relation concern the former and latter.
  2. What is the motivation in Platonists avoiding Forms in the case of the former and latter?  Is it because this is a form of relation, in which one is before the other, and thus would undermine the atemporality and transcendence of Forms?
  3. In light of NE 1094a18-26 (quoted above), is it fair of Aristotle to ask Platonists for an explanation of good in the different ways Aristotle enumerates?  After all, if per Aristotle’s argument in NE 1094a18-26, there is one single “good” at which everything aims, then insofar as there is more than one “good,” they are only derivatively so, and it is plausible that there must be some one single good over and above all these.

 

1 Εἰ δή τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν
πρακτῶν ὃ δι’ αὑτὸ βουλόμεθα, τἆλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ
πάντα δι’ ἕτερον αἱρούμεθα (πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ’ εἰς ἄπειρον,    (20)
ὥστ’ εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὄρεξιν), δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ’ ἂν
εἴη τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον. ἆρ’ οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ
γνῶσις αὐτοῦ μεγάλην ἔχει ῥοπήν, καὶ καθάπερ τοξόται
σκοπὸν ἔχοντες μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δέοντος; εἰ δ’
οὕτω, πειρατέον τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτὸ τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ καὶ   (25)
τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων

2  Τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον ἴσως ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ διαπο-
ρῆσαι πῶς λέγεται, καίπερ προσάντους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητή-
σεως γινομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἴδη.
δόξειε δ’ ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς
ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους   (15)
ὄντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν φίλοιν ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλή-
θειαν.

3 οἱ δὴ κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οὐκ ἐποίουν ἰδέας
ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἔλεγον, διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν
ἀριθμῶν ἰδέαν κατεσκεύαζον· τὸ δ’ ἀγαθὸν λέγεται καὶ ἐν
τῷ τί ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρός τι, τὸ δὲ καθ’   (20)
αὑτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρός τι (παρα-
φυάδι γὰρ τοῦτ’ ἔοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος)· ὥστ’ οὐκ
ἂν εἴη κοινή τις ἐπὶ τούτοις ἰδέα.

Aristotle’s Categories, Chapter 1

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Famous Passages is an ongoing series explaining notable or influential passages in ancient philosophy.

Aristotle’s Categories is often the first of his works that one should study.  It lays the groundwork for all the philosophizing to follow, and it begins with analysis at its most basic: things and the words we attach to things.

Aristotle introduces three important terms in Categories 1a.

1. The first is what is often more helpfully translated equivocal, but literally in the Greek is homonymous.  This term designates those things which share only a name in common, yet the definition or essence of each thing differs.  The example which Aristotle uses for equivocal terms is a little confusing, since, as can be expected when dealing with ambiguities in language, the Greek does not translate nicely into English.  In Greek the word zoon (ζῷον) can mean either “animal” (it usually means this and this word is where we get English zoo, zoology, etc) or it can also mean “painting.”  Perhaps the meaning “painting” derived from the original meaning of “animal” because animals (including humans) were predominately the subject of paintings.  His example then, is that both a man and the Mona Lisa are both zoon, where in the first instance an animal is intended and in the latter a painting.

2. The second is often termed, in consistency of use with the first term, univocal, though in Greek it is synonomous.  When talking of two things which are univocal, in the Aristotelian sense, we are saying that they share the same name and same definition.  This is not saying something very obvious and simplistic however, such as “table” is the same as “table.”  What Aristotle is driving at here is that a man and an ox are both “animal.”  What does this mean?  That man and an ox are both “animal” in that a) they both can be called “animal” b) they both share the same definition.  This latter part might seem surprising; after all, man and ox are two different types of animals.  But what Aristotle intends here is that the definition of animal, viz. a living creature with metabolism, etc. equally and properly applies to both man and ox.

3. The last term is not of a same piece with the first two.  In Greek the word used is paronymous, although the term derivative is much clearer.  These are those things which can gain their name from something else yet can differ in their endings.  Aristotle gives as his examples “grammarian” as deriving from “grammar” and “bravery” deriving from “brave.”  But this is no mere linguistic point nor Aristotle wishing to point out the dependence of some words on others.  As J.A. Ackrill brings up in his translation, we should be aware that grammar and grammarian both deal with the domain or genus of grammar, but we express this linguistically by saying grammar and grammarian, while understanding that a grammarian is one who deals in grammar.  As he puts it, “If we wish to ascribe generosity to Callias we do not say that he is generosity, but that he is generous” (Ackrill, Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione, 1963, p. 72).