In the last post I was puzzled as to why in the very beginning of Lamda 3, Aristotle has chosen to say that, “if not only bronze comes to be round but also the round comes to be and the bronze comes to be,” then there will be an infinite regress as a consequence. (Dhananjay has some helpful and clarifying things to say in the comments.)
After these things, [one must observe] that neither matter nor form comes to be, I mean the ultimate ones. For everything undergoes change as something and by something and into something. The by something is the initiating mover, the something is the matter, and the into which is the form. Therefore they continue into an infinite regress, if not only bronze comes to be round but also the round comes to be and the bronze comes to be. Indeed, these must stop. (My translation, Metaphysics 1069b35-1070a4) (1).
Note that I have changed the unwritten subject in the last line to, “Indeed, these must stop,” on the basis of Dhananjay’s translation. This gives better sense, and “these” must refer to the round and the bronze.
On a related note, is the “Indeed, these must stop” simply a restatement of the first sentence, “After these things, [one must observe] that neither matter nor form comes to be, I mean the ultimate ones“? That is, are the ultimate ones, usually translated as “proximate [form and matter]” simply the stopping point, from which (working backward as we are in the context of a supposed infinite regress) all change will occur?
More broadly, is the term τὰ ἔσχατα, “the proximate form and matter” simply a stipulation of definition? On reflection I think the answer is no, for there is a argument for why this is so, by both explaining the necessary elements of the process of change, and of course, the infinite regress itself.
Are 1070a2-3, ὁ χαλκός and τὸ στρογγύλον, (bronze and the round) examples of 1069b35, ἡ ὕλη οὔτε τὸ εἶδος (matter and form)? This seems to clearly be yes, but does little, for me, to clarify the intent of the first sentence in the passage.
Perhaps most intriguingly to me, why in the sentence, “For everything undergoes change as something and by something and into something” is the order subject, agent, form (SAF) while in the next, explanatory sentence, “The by something is the initiating mover, the something is the matter, and the into which is the form,” the order is agent, subject, form (ASF)?
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Notes:
(1) Μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι οὐ γίγνεται οὔτε ἡ ὕλη οὔτε τὸ εἶδος, (35)
λέγω δὲ τὰ ἔσχατα. πᾶν γὰρ μεταβάλλει τὶ καὶ ὑπό
(1070a) τινος καὶ εἴς τι· ὑφ’ οὗ μέν, τοῦ πρώτου κινοῦντος· ὃ δέ, ἡ
ὕλη· εἰς ὃ δέ, τὸ εἶδος. εἰς ἄπειρον οὖν εἶσιν, εἰ μὴ μόνον
ὁ χαλκὸς γίγνεται στρογγύλος ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ στρογγύλον
ἢ ὁ χαλκός· ἀνάγκη δὴ στῆναι.
Just to carry on our conversation about this passage, M.A.D., I think the implicit subject of στῆναι in the last sentence is not logically the same as the proximate matter and form as mentioned initially, but rather matter and form considered as the principles of any given change. If we must posit matter M1 or form F1 of a distinct change to explain why the proximate matter M achieved form F, then that allows for reapplication and the regress to be generated (we’ll need M2 to explain how M1 came to be, etc.). So for a given change, “these” – the matter and form of that change – must themselves not come to be in that very change. I take it that “these” could just as easily refer to M1 and F1 as to the original M and F. So Aristotle is expressing a general principle: the matter and form do not themselves come to be when the matter becomes the form. That brings the reductio to a close and proves the original claim about the proximate matter and form. But the proof also holds good of any of the prior changes leading up to the proximate matter and form.
This interpretation also offers an answer to another of your excellent questions: are τὸ στρογγύλον and ὁ χαλκὸς the matter and form? Not quite, I think. I translated the former ‘sphericity’ to capture the thought that this is the form, not considered as the ultimate form, but as itself the product of a change, throwing us back from the original change into the regress. Likewise, the latter is just ‘bronze’ taken generally, not as the bronze of _this_ thing, but as itself something that is coming to be.
The upshot: if we allow the proximate matter and form to themselves come to be, then we lose our grip on them as the matter and form of _this_ thing. They stop being terms of analysis and start being things in their own right, which robs them of their explanatory utility.