Author Archives: M.A.D. Moore

10 Things You Need To Know About Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

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1.  Why is it called the Nicomachean Ethics?
The Nicomachean Ethics is a book written by Aristotle named for Nicomachus (Νικόμαχος), which in keeping with the Greek practice of boys being named after their grandfathers, was the name of both Aristotle’s father and his son.  Accordingly, we are unsure if the book was dedicated to or inspired by either Aristotle’s father or son, or perhaps his grandfather, who was confusingly also named Nicomachus.1)See Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of Famous Philosophers, Book V, Aristotle, for more (though perhaps dubious) information on the biography of Aristotle  There is a tradition that holds, though, that the book was named after Aristotle’s son.

2.  The “Hidden Meaning” of Nicomachus
Nicomachus means “victor in the battle,” so it perhaps is no surprise that courage is the very first virtue discussed in detail, as Aristotle makes it a point to say that the prime exemplification of courage is courage in battle.  He further contends that the other uses of the word courage are really an extension of this primary usage from war.

3.  The Chief Good
The inquiry which serves to guide the entire enterprise of the Nichomachean Ethics is answering the question as to what is the chief human good.  The chief good, still familiar to us today through use of the Latin term, summum bonum, is that thing at which all people aim, and for which all other things are done.  Aristotle says that happiness is the chief good, and famously says that happiness is an “activity of reason in accordance with virtue… and this is in a full life” (1098a16-18).2)τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ’ ἀρετήν… ἔτι δ’ ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ.  This last point is meant to emphasize that in order to achieve the chief good one must live a complete life of excellence, all the way unto death.

4.  Did Aristotle write anything else on ethics?
The Nicomachean Ethics is not the only work by Aristotle on the subject of ethics, or practical living.  There is also the Eudemian Ethics and the Magna Moralia, sometimes also called the Great Ethics.  While the Eudemian Ethics is considered genuine, many scholars cast doubt on the Aristotelian authorship of the Magna Moralia, and most believe the comparatively small On Virtues and Vices is not by Aristotle.

5.  Don’t forget politics…
In our modern world, we seldom expect politics and ethics to go together.  However, this was exactly the layout in Aristotle’s plan for the Ethics.  Near the end of the treatise, he makes a point to say that in order to complete this discussion of human affairs, a study of the constitutions of different cities must be undertaken.  Although the human good, i.e. happiness, is something that is pursued by an individual, it is actualized within the confines of a Greek city-state (polis).  Thus, the important and appropriate conditions of virtue must be cultivated by those knowledgable about politics; only in such a system can the virtuous man live.

6.  Many Virtues in Two Divisions
Aristotle divided up his virtues into two main kinds, though this is not to say that he believed the virtues were in fact separable from each other.  On the one hand there are virtues of character: courage (andreia), moderation (sophrosyne),  generosity (eleutheriotes), munificence (megaloprepeia), magnanimity (megalopsuchia), mildness (praotes), and justice (dikaiosyne), as well as others dealing with sociability.  While the intellectual virtues are scientific knowledge (episteme), craftsmanship (techne), prudence (phronesis), intelligence (nous), wisdom (sophia), understanding (synesis), and sense (gnome).

7.  Eudaimonia
A word that often causes non-Greek readers of the Ethics problems is eudaimonia.  This is often translated as “happiness.”  The root of the word means something like “well-favored by a god.”  It is literally “well-demoned,” except that “demon” here is a rather positive term, unlike our English usage, and it means something like a demigod or divine being.  Furthermore, this “happiness” does not correspond to a feeling, as our word does, but it confers a type of status on someone, what we might call flourishing or a blessed state.  More helpful than this Greek term is what was said in point 3 above: happiness or eudaimonia is an “activity of reason in accordance with virtue… and this is in a full life.”

8.  Virtue and Ethics
The Greek word arete is often translated virtue or excellence.  In fact, what this second translation demonstrates is that for an ancient Greek, arete covered excellence in any area, such as a horse, a hammer or a human.  In our day, we could even extend this usage and say there is an arete of a car, i.e., that excellence which good cars demonstrate when they are being driven.  Our word “ethics” derives from the Greek word ethike, meaning those things “pertaining to and expressing traits of character.”  We should be wary, then, of attributing to Aristotle a moral system in our modern understanding of that term.

9.  Aristotle and Virtue Ethics
Aristotle, in writing the Nicomachean Ethics, initiated the school of theorizing today called Virtue Ethics.  In this system, more emphasis is placed on cultivating the character and virtues of an individual so that one becomes a virtuous person, whereas other major ethical theories tend to focus on either rules or outcomes.

10.  NE or EN?
Often either the initials NE or EN are used to refer to the Nicomachean Ethics.  The reason for this is that NE stands for the English Nicomachean Ethics, while EN stands for Latin Ethica Nicomachea.  Both refer to the same book, yet Latin observes a different word order from English.  Why the Latin title?  Many of Aristotle’s treatises have a Latin name, some of which are more popular than the English title, such as De Anima (On the Soul) while other times the English name is the only one most people are familiar with, e.g. Parts of Animals (De Partibus Animalium). 

References   [ + ]

1. ↑ See Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of Famous Philosophers, Book V, Aristotle, for more (though perhaps dubious) information on the biography of Aristotle
2. ↑ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ’ ἀρετήν… ἔτι δ’ ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ.

Aristotle’s Courage: A Clear and Short Explanation

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Aristotle defines, defends and explains a number of virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics, invoking examples and arguments to make a case for what is his understanding of the virtue in question, taking for granted that the virtue in question is in fact a virtue and worthy of cultivation.

One such virtue, I expect, that none would object to is the virtue of courage.  And this, in fact, is the first virtue Aristotle speaks about in detail.

Now, like all virtues, the virtue of courage (andreia, literally ‘manliness’)1)ἀνδρεία deals with a mean, that is, a midpoint of moderation between two extreme points, which should both be avoided as they either involve excess or deficiency.  On the side of excess there is boldness (tharsos),2)1115a7 θάρσος while the result of a deficiency is fear (phobos).3)((φόβος))  Lastly, harkening back to the language of moderation, Aristotle says that the one who exceeds in fearlessness is rash (thrasus)4)θρᾰσύς 1115b29 while he who exceeds in fearing is a coward (deilos).5)δειλός 1115b34

In order to describe the domain in which courage is operative, Aristotle next makes the rather obvious point that we fear all bad things6)1115a10 πάντα τὰ κακά so that it is commonly said that fear is an expectation7)1115a9 προσδοκία of bad things.  However, merely not fearing fearful things is not sufficient to call someone courageous.  For example, a virtuous man should rightly fear the loss of a good reputation; it would be absurd to suggest he is not courageous because he fears the loss of his reputation.  As this example shows, the appropriateness or not, of courage in the right circumstances ought to inform us as to whether someone is actually courageous or not.

Aristotle does not, as we just said, simply bestow the title of courageous upon anyone, so long as they lack fear, no matter the situation.  Rather, he defines the courageous person thus:

The courageous man withstands and fears those things which it is necessary [to fear and withstand] and on account of the right reason, and how and when it is necessary [to fear or withstand] them, and likewise in the case of being bold (1116b17-19)8)ὁ μὲν οὖν ἃ δεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος·

This passage illuminates several points.  The most obvious is that the man of courage acts courageously in a qualified way: at the right time, in the right manner, with the right motivation, etc.  This is why Aristotle also says that those who do not fear being poor (i.e. they waste their money) are not courageous and those who commit suicide to escape certain things are behaving cowardly (1116a13).  This passage also tells us the courageous man is both fearful AND bold, but he is such in the right time, right manner, for the right reason. This right reason, or the correct motivation, as Aristotle repeats or implies several times,9)see also: 1116a15, 1116b3, 1117b20 is that courageous acts are conducted with an eye on the correct purpose, or what is commonly translated as the “final cause.”10)οὗ ἕνεκα  As he helpfully tells us at 1115b, the purpose for which courageous acts are done is the “fine” or “noble” (kalon).11)καλόν  Aristotle, at this point, does not explain the fine sufficiently, but he does offer this up to reinforce its centrality, “Indeed, on account of the fine the courageous man withstands and does what he does in accordance with courage.”12)καλοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν.

Perhaps to better understand Aristotle’s conception of the fine as it relates to the courageous, we should look to the paradigmatic case of courage.  For Aristotle, as for many of us, the soldier in battle is the best example of courage.  He gives us a couple of reasons to believe this is so.  The first is that death, of all things, is the most frightening.13)1115a26  Yet, it is not just any kind of death, but death in war, for this is the finest.14)Strongly implied, as the answer to the question, “Is it in the finest?” (1115a29-30)  What this shows is that courage is shown best in situations in which “there is a fight” (1115b4).15)ἀλκή  The fact also, Aristotle thinks, that we most publicly honor those who either die in battle or successfully overcome the enemy, is a proof that this is the highest type of courage.  In light of this, he also notes that courage has more to do with fearful things than bold things, although of course it involves both.  What he means is that we praise the courageous man because he is able to withstand the painful and not because he restrains himself from the pleasurable, for the first is more difficult.

 

 

References   [ + ]

1. ↑ ἀνδρεία
2. ↑ 1115a7 θάρσος
3. ↑ ((φόβος))
4. ↑ θρᾰσύς 1115b29
5. ↑ δειλός 1115b34
6. ↑ 1115a10 πάντα τὰ κακά
7. ↑ 1115a9 προσδοκία
8. ↑ ὁ μὲν οὖν ἃ δεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος·
9. ↑ see also: 1116a15, 1116b3, 1117b20
10. ↑ οὗ ἕνεκα
11. ↑ καλόν
12. ↑ καλοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν.
13. ↑ 1115a26
14. ↑ Strongly implied, as the answer to the question, “Is it in the finest?” (1115a29-30)
15. ↑ ἀλκή

Does Aristotle’s Nature have One or Many Uses?

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In one of the many memorable passages in the first book of the Politics Aristotle is making the case for what we might call a division of labor.  Aristotle says that men and women are disposed such that men are the natural leaders while women are naturally subservient, similar to the relationship between master and slave.  On his understanding one must rule and another must be subject, the former belonging to intellect and the master while the body and the slave represent the subservient element.

Additionally, as part of promoting this argument, Aristotle says that things are made by nature so as to be distinct (and presumably complementary).

Therefore the feminine and the slavish are distinguished (for Nature makes no such thing as the blacksmiths make the Delphic knife, in need of something, but Nature makes one thing for one thing.  For in this way each tool will turn out most splendidly, not serving many functions but one) (1252b1-5).1)οὖν διώρισται τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον (οὐθὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσιςποιεῖ τοιοῦτον οἷον οἱ χαλκοτύποι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν,πενιχρῶς, ἀλλ’ ἓν πρὸς ἕν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἀποτελοῖτο κάλλιστα τῶν ὀργάνων ἕκαστον, μὴ πολλοῖς ἔργοις ἀλλ’ ἑνὶ δουλεῦον.

Now unfortunately, we do not know the exact utility or makeup of this “Delphic knife,” so we have to make some guesses as to its exact use.  Walter Burkert notes, “the Delphic knives were made in a special form which we are unable to construct with certainty in spite of numerous ironical allusions.”2)Homo Necans, 1984, pg. 119  There is also the proverbial saying that, “When you sacrifice at Delphi, you will have to bring extra meat for yourself.”3)Com.adesp. 460; Plut. Q. conv. 709a  This may imply that not only does the knife cut, but, as a second function, it takes away the meat.

So, with one line of interpretation, we might say that the Delphic knife is like that uniquely American contraption, the spork, half-spoon, half-fork, serving as both that which cuts the sacrificial victim and that which serves this meat as a kind of spatula.  (It matters little which two particular roles the knife is serving in this scenario, as long as we ascribe to it more than one).  Now keep in mind, on analogy with either the man/woman or master/slave dynamic, in those relations the man is retaining a single role in that as both husband and master he is the ruling element, in virtue of his intellect.  In the case of the Delphic knife, it tries to do too much, and, incurs the contempt of Aristotle just as much as a Swiss Army knife would.

There is another passage in the Parts of Animals however, which, in enumerating the uses of tails, makes this statement:

There are many differences of tails, and nature makes use of it in the following ways, not only as a protection and covering of the bottom, but also as a help and use for those possessing it (690a1-4).4)No Greek as the TLG does not yet have this text!

Previously Aristotle had also mentioned the various functions of the Elephant’s trunk.

Therefore the elephant has for breathing a nostril [i.e. trunk], just as each of the other animals having a lung, but because he spends his time in water and his torpid egress from water the nostril is lengthened and able to wrap around things.  And with his [fore]feet being deprived of their use, Nature, as we said, uses the nostril as a help toward that help which the feet normally supplies (659a30-37).5)No Greek as the TLG does not yet have this text!

So in these two passages from the Parts of Animals we see that Aristotle does not have a problem in granting that different parts of animals, at least, can and do have multiple functions.

Where does this leave us with regard to the statement above in the Politics, that “Nature makes one thing for one thing.  For in this way each tool will turn out most splendidly, not serving many functions but one?”  Does Nature make one thing for one thing or many things?  Is the elephant not “splendid” because its trunk is used for many purposes instead of just one?  But doesn’t Nature also make the elephant?

Perhaps the overarching purpose of an organism is what Aristotle means when he talks about Nature making one thing for one thing.  That is, nature makes men to rule (even though their hands, or eyebrows, etc serve many ends) and elephants to serve X role (even though their trunks can be used both to breathe and as hands).

Or is Aristotle just changing his mind on the subject, or inconsistent, or most frustrating of all, is he just being brilliantly opaque, as he so often can be?

References   [ + ]

1. ↑ οὖν διώρισται τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον (οὐθὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσιςποιεῖ τοιοῦτον οἷον οἱ χαλκοτύποι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν,πενιχρῶς, ἀλλ’ ἓν πρὸς ἕν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἀποτελοῖτο κάλλιστα τῶν ὀργάνων ἕκαστον, μὴ πολλοῖς ἔργοις ἀλλ’ ἑνὶ δουλεῦον.
2. ↑ Homo Necans, 1984, pg. 119
3. ↑ Com.adesp. 460; Plut. Q. conv. 709a
4. ↑ No Greek as the TLG does not yet have this text!
5. ↑ No Greek as the TLG does not yet have this text!