Category Archives: Ancient Greek Philosopher

Ethnographic “Racism” in Ancient Philosophy

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There can be very little, except the evergreen pride of modernity, that gives us hope that our beliefs and practices are exempt from some future condemnation in a world so distant our comprehension of it could hardly be distinguished from loathing.  When it comes to our own canon of sins, foremost among them appear to be those forms of discrimination that are lodged against certain groups or classes.  As an analog to these prohibitions, social propriety has, probably correctly, identified among the chief causes stereotypes and accordingly speaking of the general characteristics of a people is deemed off-color and brutish.  There are occasional and accepted forays into the generic, though.  Despite the mild import of such thoughts as, “The French have wonderful cuisine,” it is a curious thing to distinguish what exactly it is we object to when we hear a generalism about a culture or race.  Before I ask a few questions about that, it may be helpful to look at a couple things said, by way of example, by Hippocrates and Plato.

And concerning the listlessness and cowardice of peoples, the seasons are especially the cause why Asians are less martial than the Europeans and more tame in their character,for making no dramatic shift either to the hot nor to the cold their seasons are temperate. For there are no mental disturbances nor strong change of the body, from which it is more likely that the passion is roused and indulges the senseless and high-spirited rather than when it is in a steady state.  For it is change of everything which wake the disposition of men and do not allow it to rest.  For these aforesaid reasons it seems to me that that the Asian race is weak and yet further so because of their customs.  For much of Asia is ruled by a king.  And where men do not rule themselves nor are autonomous, but are ruled by a despot, there is no reason for them to concern themselves over this.  So that they do not practice the military disciplines, but they work to seem pacifistic (Hippocrates, Airs, Waters, Places, XVI). (1)

 

For it would be absurd if someone should think that spiritedness does not occur in our cities from private citizens, who indeed have this reputation, such as those who live throughout Thrace and Scythia and nearly all the northern areas, or love of learning, which indeed someone would say is especially prevalent in the area around us, or as someone would say that the love of money is not least among the Phoenicians or Egyptians (Plato, Republic 435e3-436a3). (2)

Setting aside the accuracy of Hippocrates’ description of Asians, his explanation appealing to geographical and sociological causes is less jarring than Plato’s, whose opinion appears informed only by a cryptic Athenian prejudice.  Both cases, however, are less egregious than when a comparison is made between groups wherein one is deemed superior, one inferior, such as in the following from Aristotle.

Therefore the poets say, “It is fitting that the Greeks rule barbarians,” on the grounds that the barbarian and slave are the same in nature (Politics 1252b7-9). (3)

A few questions:

What makes the above offensive to contemporary attitudes?  Is it that a group is generalized?  Or is it that a group is generalized negatively?  (That is, a positive characterization would be acceptable.)  Or is it that a group is generalized negatively and untruly? (But this would imply that a negative generalization, if true, would be acceptable. Or on the other hand perhaps, does this mean true, negative generalizations are ruled out a priori?)

 

 

REFERENCES:

Translations mine

(1)
περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀθυμίης τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῆς ἀνανδρείης, ὅτι ἀπολεμώτεροί εἰσι τῶν Εὐρωπαίων οἱ Ἀσιηνοὶ καὶ ἡμερώτεροι τὰ ἤθεα αἱ ὧραι αἴτιαι μάλιστα, οὐ μεγάλας τὰς μεταβολὰς ποιεύμεναι οὔτε ἐπὶ τὸ θερμὸν οὔτε ἐπὶ τὸ ψυχρόν, ἀλλὰ παραπλησίως. οὐ γὰρ γίνονται ἐκπλήξιες τῆς γνώμης οὔτε μετάστασις ἰσχυρὴ τοῦ σώματος, ἀφ᾿ ὅτων εἰκὸς τὴν ὀργὴν ἀγριοῦσθαί τε καὶ τοῦ ἀγνώμονος καὶ θυμοειδέος μετέχειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ αἰεὶ ἐόντα. αἱ γὰρ μεταβολαί εἰσι τῶν πάντων αἱ ἐπεγείρουσαι τὴν γνώμην τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ οὐκ ἐῶσαι ἀτρεμίζειν. διὰ ταύτας ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ τὰς προφάσιας ἄναλκες εἶναι τὸ γένος τὸ Ἀσιηνὸν καὶ προσέτι διὰ τοὺς νόμους. τῆς γὰρ Ἀσίης τὰ πολλὰ βασιλεύεται. ὅκου δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἑωυτῶν εἰσι καρτεροὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι μηδὲ αὐτόνομοι, ἀλλὰ δεσπόζονται, οὐ περὶ τούτου αὐτοῖσιν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, ὅκως τὰ πολέμια ἀσκήσωσιν, ἀλλ᾿ ὅκως μὴ δόξωσι μάχιμοι εἶναι.

(2)
γελοῖον
γὰρ ἂν εἴη εἴ τις οἰηθείη τὸ θυμοειδὲς μὴ ἐκ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν
ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐγγεγονέναι, οἳ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσι ταύτην τὴν
αἰτίαν, οἷον οἱ κατὰ τὴν Θρᾴκην τε καὶ Σκυθικὴν καὶ σχεδόν
τι κατὰ τὸν ἄνω τόπον, ἢ τὸ φιλομαθές, ὃ δὴ τὸν παρ’ ἡμῖν
μάλιστ’ ἄν τις αἰτιάσαιτο τόπον, ἢ τὸ φιλοχρήματον τὸ περὶ
τούς τε Φοίνικας εἶναι καὶ τοὺς κατὰ Αἴγυπτον φαίη τις ἂν
οὐχ ἥκιστα.

(3)
διό φασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ
βαρβάρων δ᾿ Ἕλληνας ἄρχειν εἰκός,
ὡς ταὐτὸ φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δοῦλον ὄν.

Aristotle: Is “Non-feathered” a Genus of Animals?

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In the last post I primarily addressed Aristotle’s objection to dichotomous division, a taxonomic method that Platonists used to determine the kinds of animals there are and where any particular animal kind fits, an enterprise roughly equivalent to the animal-classification that for contemporary biology results in the designation of genus and species.  In particular, amongst Aristotle’s objections to dichotomous division, he says that grouping birds into, say, feathered and non-feathered, results in the absurdity that the latter does not exist

And yet it is necessary to divide by privation, and the dichotomists do divide [in this way].  But there is no difference of a privation qua privation.  For it is impossible for there to be species of what is not, for example of “non-footed” or of “non-winged” just as there are species of “footed” and “winged.”  Furthermore it is necessary that species belong to a generic difference.  For if they do not, why would they belong to a generic difference and not a specific difference? (Aristotle, Parts of Animals, 642b21-26).(1)

The objection substantively amounts to this: because a privation does not exist, e.g. “non-winged,” there cannot be any species subsequently derived from it.  And, as the concluding question makes clear, if in fact no pair of species can be divided from it, then this means that, e.g. “non-winged,” is a species.  This is evidently false, however, because “non-winged” is as indeterminate a species for ancient taxonomy as it would be for modern biology.

However, what if Platonists appealed to Aristotelian privation in making a case for dividing privation?   In his Physics Aristotle says this:

But white comes to be from the non-white, and not from everything [that happens to be non-white] but from black or from something between black and white, and an educated man comes to be from something that is not educated, but not just from anything that is not educated, but rather from an uneducated man, unless this happens incidentally.  Again the white turns into the non-white, and not into the chance non-white but into the black or an intermediate (Physics 188a36-188b6). (2)

Now Aristotle is clearly, in context, discussing how things come to be, and more particularly how this generation comes about from opposites.  A black beard, for example, comes to be white, where this whiteness is explicable by saying it comes to be from “non-white,” yet not just any non-white (as say, the number 1 is non-white), but from the opposite of white, black, or an intermediate, gray.

Nevertheless it seems plausible that this concept of privation, although employed to a very different purpose in the Physics than in our taxonomic concerns, establishes that we can use privation as a faithful ontological characterization of things.  If that is the case, there is no reason we cannot use “non-feathered” as a genus from which we can further dilineate more species.

Would Aristotle accept this understanding of privation from Physics for his work on animal classification?

More broadly, does this eliminate Aristotle’s original objection to privation as a method of division?

(1)
Translation mine:
Ἔτι στερήσει μὲν ἀναγκαῖον διαιρεῖν, καὶ διαιροῦσιν οἱ
διχοτομοῦντες. Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ διαφορὰ στερήσεως ᾗ στέρησις·
ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἴδη εἶναι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, οἷον τῆς ἀποδίας ἢ τοῦ
ἀπτέρου ὥσπερ πτερώσεως καὶ ποδῶν. Δεῖ δὲ τῆς καθόλου δια-
φορᾶς εἴδη εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔσται, διὰ τί ἂν εἴη τῶν καθόλου
καὶ οὐ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον;

(2)
Translation mine:
ἀλλὰ λευκὸν μὲν γίγνεται ἐξ οὐ λευκοῦ, καὶ τούτου οὐκ ἐκ παντὸς
ἀλλ’ ἐκ μέλανος ἢ τῶν μεταξύ, καὶ μουσικὸν οὐκ ἐκ μου-
σικοῦ, πλὴν οὐκ ἐκ παντὸς ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀμούσου ἢ εἴ τι αὐτῶν
ἐστι μεταξύ. οὐδὲ δὴ φθείρεται εἰς τὸ τυχὸν πρῶτον, οἷον
τὸ λευκὸν οὐκ εἰς τὸ μουσικόν, πλὴν εἰ μή ποτε κατὰ συμ-
βεβηκός, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὸ μὴ λευκόν, καὶ οὐκ εἰς τὸ τυχὸν ἀλλ’
εἰς τὸ μέλαν ἢ τὸ μεταξύ·

Aristotelian Objections to Platonic Animal Classification

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Deep into his criticism of the dichotomist method of division, Aristotle and his opponents are deciding what genera and species of animals truly exist.  To discover these natural kinds of animals, the appropriate method of division, that is, a way of separating animals from each other into categories precisely representative of species, is under contentious dispute.

And yet it is necessary to divide by privation, and the dichotomists do divide [in this way].  But there is no difference of a privation qua privation.  For it is impossible for there to be species of what is not, for example of “non-footed” or of “non-winged” just as there are species of “footed” and “winged.”  Furthermore it is necessary that species belong to a generic difference.  For if they do not, why would they belong to a generic difference and not a specific difference? (Aristotle, Parts of Animals, 642b21-26).(1)

Some say that species should be divided into two with each of the two branches always branching off into two more, until the point where a termination results in an actual species.  For example, if we begin by dividing animals into footed and non-footed, and then the footed into bi-pedal and poly-pedal, we can then divide bi-pedal into split-toed and web-toed, etc.  Advocates of this process of dichotomy are called dichotomists.

Aristotle, on the other hand, advocates opening more than one line of division, not limiting himself to the dichotomist method which follows only one of two branches at every step.  In this section of the text, Aristotle, believing that dichotomists commit themselves to “privation” as well, argues that privation is incompatible with dichotomy.  By privation Aristotle simply means a negation of some difference, such as in the example above, “non-footed” as contrasted with “footed.”  The privation objection demonstrates Aristotle’s characteristic subtlety and insight as he, perhaps ironically, forces his opponents into a logical dichotomy: Either the privation is an actual species of animal or it is not, and further division must continue.

Now if we continue with the first option, that there is an actual species of privative animal, say, non-footed, then this seems precluded for the following reasons.  Most obviously, something which is not cannot be said to be.(2) It is also the case that being non-footed would not pick out a species, as it could generically apply to a worm, a whale and a snake, not to mention the variations of each animal.  And yet, even if it were that case that “non-footed” faithfully picked out only a single animal (pretend that earthworms are the only non-footed animals), it is unclear how non-footed is an essential property of earthworms.  After all, earthworms are also furless, wingless, knuckle-less, eyelash-less, and money-less, to name just a few things.

On the other hand, if the privation is not a species, but must be further divided, then Aristotle clearly precludes this possibility in the above text.  Why this is so is unclear, but I will have a preliminary answer in the next post, as well as offer up a Platonic solution which could perhaps stand up under Aristotle’s scrutiny.

 

REFERENCES:

 

(1)
Translation mine:
Ἔτι στερήσει μὲν ἀναγκαῖον διαιρεῖν, καὶ διαιροῦσιν οἱ
διχοτομοῦντες. Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ διαφορὰ στερήσεως ᾗ στέρησις·
ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἴδη εἶναι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, οἷον τῆς ἀποδίας ἢ τοῦ
ἀπτέρου ὥσπερ πτερώσεως καὶ ποδῶν. Δεῖ δὲ τῆς καθόλου δια-
φορᾶς εἴδη εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔσται, διὰ τί ἂν εἴη τῶν καθόλου
καὶ οὐ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον;

(2)
I assume A. would approve this, for he says something logically analogous in the case where we suppose that privations are divided into further species.