Category Archives: Ancient Philosophy

More Questions Surrounding Infinite Regress

Posted on by

In the last post I was puzzled as to why in the very beginning of Lamda 3, Aristotle has chosen to say that, “if not only bronze comes to be round but also the round comes to be and the bronze comes to be,” then there will be an infinite regress as a consequence.  (Dhananjay has some helpful and clarifying things to say in the comments.)

After these things, [one must observe] that neither matter nor form comes to be, I mean the ultimate ones.  For everything undergoes change as something and by something and into something.  The by something is the initiating mover, the something is the matter, and the into which is the form.  Therefore they continue into an infinite regress, if not only bronze comes to be round but also the round comes to be and the bronze comes to be.  Indeed, these must stop. (My translation, Metaphysics 1069b35-1070a4) (1).

Note that I have changed the unwritten subject in the last line to, “Indeed, these must stop,” on the basis of Dhananjay’s translation.  This gives better sense, and “these” must refer to the round and the bronze.

On a related note, is the “Indeed, these must stop” simply a restatement of the first sentence, “After these things, [one must observe] that neither matter nor form comes to be, I mean the ultimate ones“?  That is, are the ultimate ones, usually translated as “proximate [form and matter]” simply the stopping point, from which (working backward as we are in the context of a supposed infinite regress) all change will occur?

More broadly, is the term τὰ ἔσχατα, “the proximate form and matter” simply a stipulation of definition?  On reflection I think the answer is no, for there is a argument for why this is so, by both explaining the necessary elements of the process of change, and of course, the infinite regress itself.

Are 1070a2-3, ὁ χαλκός and τὸ στρογγύλον, (bronze and the round) examples of 1069b35, ἡ ὕλη οὔτε τὸ εἶδος (matter and form)?  This seems to clearly be yes, but does little, for me, to clarify the intent of the first sentence in the passage.

Perhaps most intriguingly to me, why in the sentence, “For everything undergoes change as something and by something and into something” is the order subject, agent, form (SAF) while in the next, explanatory sentence, “The by something is the initiating mover, the something is the matter, and the into which is the form,” the order is agent, subject, form (ASF)?

———————————————————————————————-

Notes:

(1) Μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι οὐ γίγνεται οὔτε ἡ ὕλη οὔτε τὸ εἶδος,   (35)
λέγω δὲ τὰ ἔσχατα. πᾶν γὰρ μεταβάλλει τὶ καὶ ὑπό
(1070a) τινος καὶ εἴς τι· ὑφ’ οὗ μέν, τοῦ πρώτου κινοῦντος· ὃ δέ, ἡ
ὕλη· εἰς ὃ δέ, τὸ εἶδος. εἰς ἄπειρον οὖν εἶσιν, εἰ μὴ μόνον
ὁ χαλκὸς γίγνεται στρογγύλος ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ στρογγύλον
ἢ ὁ χαλκός· ἀνάγκη δὴ στῆναι.

Another Infinite Regress in Aristotle

Posted on by

After these things, [one must observe] that neither matter nor form comes to be, I mean the ultimate ones.  For everything undergoes change as something and by something and into something.  The by something is the initiating mover, the something is the matter, and the into which is the form.  Therefore they continue into an infinite regress, if not only bronze comes to be round but also the round comes to be and the bronze comes to be.  Indeed, there must be a stopping point (My translation, Metaphysics 1069b35-1070a4) (1).

This is how Lamda 3 begins.  Focus for a moment on the infinite regress which Aristotle offers as a consequence of this first paragraph. What line of reasoning is Aristotle following here?  Certainly if bronze has to come to be before it even serves as the subject of a transition into a bronze statue, then the process is pushed back one step.  But why should this be an infinite regress.  In other contexts, Aristotle uses eis apeiron to mean infinite regress, so I think it is solid to interpret it as such here.  

I believe that Aristotle is here already assuming a substratum or hypokeimenon. The idea of a substratum, or underlying thing, would seem to serve at least two purposes.  The first would be to explain the persistence of a thing through change and over time.  Secondly to avoid having to explain the antecedent coming to be of something in order to serve as the subject of a change.  It is perhaps this second idea that is motivating Aristotle’s infinite regress.  I will try to develop this idea in a second post.

———————————————————————————————————

Notes:

(1) Μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι οὐ γίγνεται οὔτε ἡ ὕλη οὔτε τὸ εἶδος,   (35)
λέγω δὲ τὰ ἔσχατα. πᾶν γὰρ μεταβάλλει τὶ καὶ ὑπό
(1070a) τινος καὶ εἴς τι· ὑφ’ οὗ μέν, τοῦ πρώτου κινοῦντος· ὃ δέ, ἡ
ὕλη· εἰς ὃ δέ, τὸ εἶδος. εἰς ἄπειρον οὖν εἶσιν, εἰ μὴ μόνον
ὁ χαλκὸς γίγνεται στρογγύλος ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ στρογγύλον
ἢ ὁ χαλκός· ἀνάγκη δὴ στῆναι.

Misreading Aristotle’s “Leisurely Philosophy” in Cicero

Posted on by

In the fifth book of the Tusculan Disputations (concerning the self sufficiency of virtue) there are, it seems, several parallels or echoes of Aristotelian philosophy.  It is commonly accepted that Cicero read Aristotle, so this is not surprising.  Further, it is likewise not so shocking that Cicero might have misread Aristotle as well.  Aristotle famously says in the first book of Metaphysics that,

It is therefore probable that at first the inventor of any art which went further than the ordinary sensations was admired by his fellow-men, not merely because some of his inventions were useful, but as being a wise and superior person.  And as more and more arts were discovered, some relating to the necessities and some to the pastimes of life, the inventors of the latter were always considered wiser than those of the former, because their branches of knowledge did not aim at utility. Hence when all the discoveries of this kind were fully developed, the sciences which relate neither to pleasure nor yet to the necessities of life were invented, and first in those places where men had leisure (Metaphysics A.1, trans. Rackham) (1).

Cicero takes this as meaning that the first philosophers willingly put aside the distractions of a pragmatic life in order to give total devotion to philosophy:

Those who first directed themselves to the study of philosophy, so that, with all things being put aside, they were positioning themselves to whole-heartedly inquire into the best state of life (my translation) (2).  

This interpretation suggests the image of a retiring gentlemen leaning back in his recliner to focus his attention on the finer, and more pleasing, aspects of the intellect.  Although this may, in fact, have some of the intent of Aristotle’s account, and perhaps in no small part may explain his exaltation of the contemplative life, it strikes me as an oddly individualistic account. 

I have always read the account in the Metaphysics as at least a partial attempt at explaining a historical phenomenon.  When mankind had reached only so far in the ascent of science, it did not yet reach to the non-productive realm of the theoretical science, philosophy.  When it did, it philosophy was born, not of necessity, but of leisure. This is not an account of a single man, but of mankind,or at least the Greeks.

———————————————————————————————————————

Notes:

  1.  Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον εἰκὸς τὸν ὁποιανοῦν εὑρόντα τέχνην παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς αἰσθήσεις θαυμάζεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, μὴ μόνον διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναί τι τῶν εὑρεθέντων, ἀλλ᾿ ὡς σοφὸν καὶ διαφέροντα τῶν ἄλλων· πλειόνων δ᾿ εὑρισκομένων τεχνῶν, καὶ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα, τῶν δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν οὐσῶν, ἀεὶ σοφωτέρους τοὺς τοιούτους ἐκείνων ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι,1 διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν εἶναι τὰς ἐπιστήμας αὐτῶν. ὅθεν ἤδη πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κατεσκευασμένων αἱ μὴ πρὸς ἡδονὴν μηδὲ πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εὑρέθησαν, καὶ πρῶτον ἐν τούτοις τοῖς τόποις οὗπερ ἐσχόλασαν (~981b13 ff). 
  2. …qui primi se ad philosophiae studium contulerunt, ut omnibus rebus posthabitis totos se in optimo vitae statu exquirendo collocarent… (Tusculan Disputations 5.1).