Category Archives: Aristotelianism

Aristotle: Is “Non-feathered” a Genus of Animals?

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In the last post I primarily addressed Aristotle’s objection to dichotomous division, a taxonomic method that Platonists used to determine the kinds of animals there are and where any particular animal kind fits, an enterprise roughly equivalent to the animal-classification that for contemporary biology results in the designation of genus and species.  In particular, amongst Aristotle’s objections to dichotomous division, he says that grouping birds into, say, feathered and non-feathered, results in the absurdity that the latter does not exist

And yet it is necessary to divide by privation, and the dichotomists do divide [in this way].  But there is no difference of a privation qua privation.  For it is impossible for there to be species of what is not, for example of “non-footed” or of “non-winged” just as there are species of “footed” and “winged.”  Furthermore it is necessary that species belong to a generic difference.  For if they do not, why would they belong to a generic difference and not a specific difference? (Aristotle, Parts of Animals, 642b21-26).(1)

The objection substantively amounts to this: because a privation does not exist, e.g. “non-winged,” there cannot be any species subsequently derived from it.  And, as the concluding question makes clear, if in fact no pair of species can be divided from it, then this means that, e.g. “non-winged,” is a species.  This is evidently false, however, because “non-winged” is as indeterminate a species for ancient taxonomy as it would be for modern biology.

However, what if Platonists appealed to Aristotelian privation in making a case for dividing privation?   In his Physics Aristotle says this:

But white comes to be from the non-white, and not from everything [that happens to be non-white] but from black or from something between black and white, and an educated man comes to be from something that is not educated, but not just from anything that is not educated, but rather from an uneducated man, unless this happens incidentally.  Again the white turns into the non-white, and not into the chance non-white but into the black or an intermediate (Physics 188a36-188b6). (2)

Now Aristotle is clearly, in context, discussing how things come to be, and more particularly how this generation comes about from opposites.  A black beard, for example, comes to be white, where this whiteness is explicable by saying it comes to be from “non-white,” yet not just any non-white (as say, the number 1 is non-white), but from the opposite of white, black, or an intermediate, gray.

Nevertheless it seems plausible that this concept of privation, although employed to a very different purpose in the Physics than in our taxonomic concerns, establishes that we can use privation as a faithful ontological characterization of things.  If that is the case, there is no reason we cannot use “non-feathered” as a genus from which we can further dilineate more species.

Would Aristotle accept this understanding of privation from Physics for his work on animal classification?

More broadly, does this eliminate Aristotle’s original objection to privation as a method of division?

(1)
Translation mine:
Ἔτι στερήσει μὲν ἀναγκαῖον διαιρεῖν, καὶ διαιροῦσιν οἱ
διχοτομοῦντες. Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ διαφορὰ στερήσεως ᾗ στέρησις·
ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἴδη εἶναι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, οἷον τῆς ἀποδίας ἢ τοῦ
ἀπτέρου ὥσπερ πτερώσεως καὶ ποδῶν. Δεῖ δὲ τῆς καθόλου δια-
φορᾶς εἴδη εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔσται, διὰ τί ἂν εἴη τῶν καθόλου
καὶ οὐ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον;

(2)
Translation mine:
ἀλλὰ λευκὸν μὲν γίγνεται ἐξ οὐ λευκοῦ, καὶ τούτου οὐκ ἐκ παντὸς
ἀλλ’ ἐκ μέλανος ἢ τῶν μεταξύ, καὶ μουσικὸν οὐκ ἐκ μου-
σικοῦ, πλὴν οὐκ ἐκ παντὸς ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀμούσου ἢ εἴ τι αὐτῶν
ἐστι μεταξύ. οὐδὲ δὴ φθείρεται εἰς τὸ τυχὸν πρῶτον, οἷον
τὸ λευκὸν οὐκ εἰς τὸ μουσικόν, πλὴν εἰ μή ποτε κατὰ συμ-
βεβηκός, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὸ μὴ λευκόν, καὶ οὐκ εἰς τὸ τυχὸν ἀλλ’
εἰς τὸ μέλαν ἢ τὸ μεταξύ·

Why Do Aristotle’s Children Call All Men Fathers and All Women Mothers?

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What is at first obvious and clear to us is rather jumbled together.  And later elements and principles come to be knowable from these things when we distinguish them.  Therefore it is necessary to proceed from universals to particulars: for the whole is more knowable in sense perception, and the universal is a certain whole, while the universal embraces many things as parts.  And the same thing occurs in this way also with names in relation to an account (logos).  For a whole signifies a something, i.e. indiscriminately, a circle, for example, but the definition of a circle divides it into particulars.  And small children (ta paidia) at first call all men fathers and all women mothers, and later they distinguish each one of these (Translation mine, Aristotle, Physics 184a21-184b14).      

It is “obvious,” to steal an overused term the all-seeing Aristotle often employs, to many readers that Aristotle’s “universal” and “particular” here must be different than his usage elsewhere.  What exactly is he getting at?  Since he gives two examples at the end of this section, we can probably gain the best interpretation by looking at them.  The first seems rather straightforward, it takes much less conceptually to understand the term “circle,” though it certainly conjures up something in even the most basic minds.  Yet, the definition of a circle will involve many constituent parts, as one of Euclid’s definitions demonstrates: “A circle is (1) a plane figure (2) contained by one line (3) such that all the straight lines (4) falling upon it from one point among those lying within the figure (5) equal one another.”  Alternatively, perhaps, maybe Aristotle’s point is there are many terms in the one: shape, round, etc.

More puzzling is his remark on children calling all men and women fathers and mothers.  In what sense do children “call” men and women fathers and mothers?
Here are some options on what he could mean:

A) Each child thinks that every man and woman is also a father and mother, because in his own case, obviously, his father is a man and a man is his father, and his mother is a woman and a woman is his mother.

B) Each child (a baby?) thinks that any adult it sees is a parent, in the loose, naive way such a mind would think this, possibly because the adult is a potential instrument of wish-granting.

I am also interested in the examples of the circle and the child-calling: are they supposed to be entirely analogous or are different points being made?   There is a difference but it is difficult to express exactly what the relevant distinction each example has for Aristotle’s purposes. It seems that the circle example is showing how a broad term or concept can also be understood as consisting of parts (though interpretation seems susceptible of taking this is many ways).  But the child-calling example, on first take, is about a child who displays only the first step of the circle example, and badly botching it at that, since it perceives men and fathers as “jumbled together.”

 

 

REFERENCES:

[1] ἔστι δ’ ἡμῖν τὸ πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ
συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλον· ὕστερον δ’ ἐκ τούτων γίγνεται γνώριμα
τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διαιροῦσι ταῦτα. διὸ ἐκ τῶν κα-
θόλου ἐπὶ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα δεῖ προϊέναι· τὸ γὰρ ὅλον κατὰ
τὴν αἴσθησιν γνωριμώτερον, τὸ δὲ καθόλου ὅλον τί ἐστι· (25)
πολλὰ γὰρ περιλαμβάνει ὡς μέρη τὸ καθόλου. πέπονθε δὲ
(184b) ταὐτὸ τοῦτο τρόπον τινὰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πρὸς τὸν λόγον· (10)
ὅλον γάρ τι καὶ ἀδιορίστως σημαίνει, οἷον ὁ κύκλος, ὁ δὲ
ὁρισμὸς αὐτοῦ διαιρεῖ εἰς τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα. καὶ τὰ παιδία τὸ μὲν πρῶτον προσαγορεύει πάντας τοὺς ἄνδρας πατέρας καὶ
μητέρας τὰς γυναῖκας, ὕστερον δὲ διορίζει τούτων ἑκάτερον.

Aristotle’s Categories: 10-Fold Division of Being

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(See here for the previous posts on the Categories: Chapter 1, Chapter 2, Chapter 3)

In this fourth chapter of the Categories Aristotle introduces a second division of being, classifying “things said without combination.”  When considered in their most elemental form, if they can be, on Aristotle’s view things will be organized into these 10 types of categories.  In J.A. Ackrill’s considered opinion Aristotle arrived at these categorial classifications, “by observing that different types of answer are appropriate to different questions.” [2]  However he discovered this system of classification, he introduces them very briefly by exampling them with 2 or 3 instances.

Each of the things said without combination signify either substance (ousia)[1], or quantity (poson), or quality (posos), or relation (pros ti) or where (pou) or when (pote) or being in a position (keisthai) or having (echein) or doing (poiein) or being affected (paschein). And substance is, to speak generally, for example a man, a horse; and quantity for example, two cubits long, three cubits long; and quality is for example, white, grammatical; and relation is for example, double, half, greater; and where is for example, in the Lyceum, in the market; and when for example is yesterday, a year ago; and being in a position for example, reclining, sitting; and having for example, having shoes on, being armored; and to do for example, cutting, burning; and to be affected for example, to be cut, to be burnt.

In any affirmation though, none of the things mentioned is said by itself; rather in the combination of these with each other an affirmation comes about. Each affirmation seems either to be true or false, but none of the things said without combination is true or false, for example man, white, runs, wins (translation mine, Categories, 1b25-2a10). [3]

So we have rather straightforwardly, a classification that looks like this:

Substance (ousia) example: horse, man
Quantity (poson) example: two cubits long, three cubits long
Quality (posos) example: white, grammatical
Relation (pros ti) example: double, half, greater
Where (pou) example: in the Lyceum, in the market
When (pote) example: yesterday, a year ago
Being in a position (keisthai) example: reclining, sitting
Having (echein) example: having shoes on, being armoured
Doing (poiein) example: cutting, burning
Being affected (paschein) example: to be cut, to be cut

It should be noted that when Aristotle both earlier and in this chapter spoke of “things said without combination,” he must have intended this to mean the objects to which the words refer.  We can be confident of this because he gives as an example of one his categories, which are by definition said without combination, “in the Lyceum” which is two words in Greek.  Yet, on the supposition that Aristotle was referring to linguistic terms alone, of course using two words is an example of combination.  Thus, Aristotle must be referring to the concrete items for which these terms are merely used as designations.

It is mnemonically suggestive that 8 of the 10 categories begin with the letter p (Greek π).  This might be similar to the journalistic admonition to remember the “W questions,” i.e. who, when, why, where, what.  If so, this might cynically incline us to believe that these categories were chosen because they were easily accessible to Aristotle.

In the second half of this passage, Aristotle wants to emphasis that while these categorial uses are building blocks, they are not of any use when discussing truth or falsity.  We cannot discover the truth value of “horse.” In order to make it truth-evaluable we must say, “horse is white” or “horse is grammatical,” for example.

Some interpretative questions:

Is “in accordance with no combination” κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν used by Aristotle as a circumlocution to avoid adding another predicate, i.e. things that are without combination are either, etc.?

Why does Aristotle preface his introduction with “to speak generally” ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν about substance (or maybe all the categories, it seems ambigious)?  Is this just to say the examples he is about to give are not exhaustive, typical, or that we should refrain from inferring too much from limited examples?

Does Aristotle want us to understand, in the second paragraph, translating more literally, “In no affirmation is each of the things mentioned predicated of itself?”  Viz. “Horse is horse”  If this is so, what does this mean for how he intended his theory of predication to be employed, since we are excluding this meaning?

 

REFERENCES:

[1] Could be translated ‘being.’
[2] Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione, Oxford, 1963, pg. 79
[3] Τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων ἕκαστον ἤτοι (25)
οὐσίαν σημαίνει ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ πρός τι ἢ ποὺ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ
κεῖσθαι ἢ ἔχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. ἔστι δὲ οὐσία μὲν ὡς
τύπῳ εἰπεῖν οἷον ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος· ποσὸν δὲ οἷον δίπηχυ,
τρίπηχυ· ποιὸν δὲ οἷον λευκόν, γραμματικόν· πρός τι δὲ
(2a.) οἷον διπλάσιον, ἥμισυ, μεῖζον· ποὺ δὲ οἷον ἐν Λυκείῳ, ἐν
ἀγορᾷ· ποτὲ δὲ οἷον χθές, πέρυσιν· κεῖσθαι δὲ οἷον ἀνάκειται,
κάθηται· ἔχειν δὲ οἷον ὑποδέδεται, ὥπλισται· ποιεῖν δὲ οἷον
τέμνειν, καίειν· πάσχειν δὲ οἷον τέμνεσθαι, καίεσθαι.

ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων αὐτὸ μὲν καθ’ αὑτὸ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ κατα- (5)
φάσει λέγεται, τῇ δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα τούτων συμπλοκῇ
κατάφασις γίγνεται· ἅπασα γὰρ δοκεῖ κατάφασις ἤτοι
ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς εἶναι, τῶν δὲ κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμ-
πλοκὴν λεγομένων οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδός ἐστιν,
οἷον ἄνθρωπος, λευκόν, τρέχει, νικᾷ. (10)