Category Archives: Philosophy

Does Aristotle’s Nature have One or Many Uses?

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In one of the many memorable passages in the first book of the Politics Aristotle is making the case for what we might call a division of labor.  Aristotle says that men and women are disposed such that men are the natural leaders while women are naturally subservient, similar to the relationship between master and slave.  On his understanding one must rule and another must be subject, the former belonging to intellect and the master while the body and the slave represent the subservient element.

Additionally, as part of promoting this argument, Aristotle says that things are made by nature so as to be distinct (and presumably complementary).

Therefore the feminine and the slavish are distinguished (for Nature makes no such thing as the blacksmiths make the Delphic knife, in need of something, but Nature makes one thing for one thing.  For in this way each tool will turn out most splendidly, not serving many functions but one) (1252b1-5).1)οὖν διώρισται τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον (οὐθὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσιςποιεῖ τοιοῦτον οἷον οἱ χαλκοτύποι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν,πενιχρῶς, ἀλλ’ ἓν πρὸς ἕν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἀποτελοῖτο κάλλιστα τῶν ὀργάνων ἕκαστον, μὴ πολλοῖς ἔργοις ἀλλ’ ἑνὶ δουλεῦον.

Now unfortunately, we do not know the exact utility or makeup of this “Delphic knife,” so we have to make some guesses as to its exact use.  Walter Burkert notes, “the Delphic knives were made in a special form which we are unable to construct with certainty in spite of numerous ironical allusions.”2)Homo Necans, 1984, pg. 119  There is also the proverbial saying that, “When you sacrifice at Delphi, you will have to bring extra meat for yourself.”3)Com.adesp. 460; Plut. Q. conv. 709a  This may imply that not only does the knife cut, but, as a second function, it takes away the meat.

So, with one line of interpretation, we might say that the Delphic knife is like that uniquely American contraption, the spork, half-spoon, half-fork, serving as both that which cuts the sacrificial victim and that which serves this meat as a kind of spatula.  (It matters little which two particular roles the knife is serving in this scenario, as long as we ascribe to it more than one).  Now keep in mind, on analogy with either the man/woman or master/slave dynamic, in those relations the man is retaining a single role in that as both husband and master he is the ruling element, in virtue of his intellect.  In the case of the Delphic knife, it tries to do too much, and, incurs the contempt of Aristotle just as much as a Swiss Army knife would.

There is another passage in the Parts of Animals however, which, in enumerating the uses of tails, makes this statement:

There are many differences of tails, and nature makes use of it in the following ways, not only as a protection and covering of the bottom, but also as a help and use for those possessing it (690a1-4).4)No Greek as the TLG does not yet have this text!

Previously Aristotle had also mentioned the various functions of the Elephant’s trunk.

Therefore the elephant has for breathing a nostril [i.e. trunk], just as each of the other animals having a lung, but because he spends his time in water and his torpid egress from water the nostril is lengthened and able to wrap around things.  And with his [fore]feet being deprived of their use, Nature, as we said, uses the nostril as a help toward that help which the feet normally supplies (659a30-37).5)No Greek as the TLG does not yet have this text!

So in these two passages from the Parts of Animals we see that Aristotle does not have a problem in granting that different parts of animals, at least, can and do have multiple functions.

Where does this leave us with regard to the statement above in the Politics, that “Nature makes one thing for one thing.  For in this way each tool will turn out most splendidly, not serving many functions but one?”  Does Nature make one thing for one thing or many things?  Is the elephant not “splendid” because its trunk is used for many purposes instead of just one?  But doesn’t Nature also make the elephant?

Perhaps the overarching purpose of an organism is what Aristotle means when he talks about Nature making one thing for one thing.  That is, nature makes men to rule (even though their hands, or eyebrows, etc serve many ends) and elephants to serve X role (even though their trunks can be used both to breathe and as hands).

Or is Aristotle just changing his mind on the subject, or inconsistent, or most frustrating of all, is he just being brilliantly opaque, as he so often can be?

References   [ + ]

1. ↑ οὖν διώρισται τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον (οὐθὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσιςποιεῖ τοιοῦτον οἷον οἱ χαλκοτύποι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν,πενιχρῶς, ἀλλ’ ἓν πρὸς ἕν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἀποτελοῖτο κάλλιστα τῶν ὀργάνων ἕκαστον, μὴ πολλοῖς ἔργοις ἀλλ’ ἑνὶ δουλεῦον.
2. ↑ Homo Necans, 1984, pg. 119
3. ↑ Com.adesp. 460; Plut. Q. conv. 709a
4. ↑ No Greek as the TLG does not yet have this text!
5. ↑ No Greek as the TLG does not yet have this text!

Problems with Plato: Animals in Plato’s Procrustean Method

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I would like to continue writing about the problems Aristotle sees in certain kinds of Platonic division.  In this particular section of Parts of Animals, Aristotle continues to focus on the notion of privation in bifurcatory division, that is, when animals are divided into a category such as wingless (i.e. a privation of wings) and winged.  First we will look at the text:

There are differences of the general kind and they have forms, such as winged.  For there are both unsplit and split wings.  And with regards to footedness also there is the many splitted, or the two splitted, such as the cloven-hoofed, and the uncloven and undivided, such as the single-hoofed animals.  And it is difficult to divide also into such differences of which there are species, so that whatever animal fits under these differences and the same animal does not fit among many animals (for example winged and unwinged.  For both [winged and unwinged] are the same animal [sometimes], for example an ant and a glowworm and some other animals [are both winged and unwinged.]  But it is most difficult of all or impossible to divide animals into bloodless.  For it is necessary for each of the differences to belong to one of the particular animals, so that its opposite also belongs to a particular animal.  And if it is impossible that one single form of essence (εἶδός τι τῆς οὐσίας ἄτομον καὶ ἕν) belongs to those animals differing in form (τοῖς εἴδει διαφέρουσιν) but that the form will always possess a difference (for example bird differs from man— for the two-footedness is other and different.  Even in the case of bloodedness, either the blood [of bird and man] differs or one must discount the blood as belonging to the essence) and if this is so, one difference will belong to two animals.  But if this is so, it is clear that it is impossible for a privation to be a [proper] difference (Aristotle, Parts of Animals, 642b30-643a6). 1)Translation mine. 642b τῶν δὲ διαφορῶν αἱ μὲν καθόλου εἰσὶ καὶ ἔχουσιν εἴδη, οἷον πτερότης· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄσχιστον τὸ δ᾿ ἐσχισμένον ἐστὶ πτερόν. καὶ ποδότης ὡσαύτως ἡ μὲν πολυσχιδής, ἡ δὲ δισχιδής, οἷον τὰ δίχαλα, ἡ δ᾿ 30 ἀσχιδὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος, οἷον τὰ μώνυχα. χαλεπὸν μὲν οὖν διαλαβεῖν καὶ εἰς τοιαύτας διαφορὰς ὧν ἔστιν εἴδη, ὥσθ᾿ ὁτιοῦν ζῷον ἐν ταύταις ὑπάρχειν καὶ μὴ ἐν πλείοσι ταὐτόν (οἷον πτερωτὸν καὶ ἄπτερον· ἔστι γὰρ ἄμφω ταὐτόν, οἷον μύρμηξ καὶ λαμπυρὶς καὶ ἕτερά τινα), πάντων δὲ χαλεπώτατον ἢ ἀδύνατον 35 εἰς τὰ ἄναιμα. ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκαστον 643a ὑπάρχειν τινὶ τῶν διαφορῶν ἑκάστην, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ἀντικειμένην. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεται τοῖς εἴδει διαφέρουσιν ὑπάρχειν εἶδός τι τῆς οὐσίας ἄτομον καὶ ἕν, ἀλλ᾿ ἀεὶ διαφορὰν ἕξει (οἷον ὄρνις ἀνθρώπου—ἡ διποδία γὰρ ἄλλη καὶ διάφορος· κἂν εἰ ἔναιμα, τὸ αἷμα διάφορον, ἢ οὐδὲν τῆς οὐσίας τὸ αἷμα θετέον)—εἰ δ᾿ οὕτως ἐστίν, ἡ μία διαφορὰ δυσὶν ὑπάρξει· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι ἀδύνατον στέρησιν εἶναι διαφοράν.

Aristotle begins with the very obvious point that wings and feet come in easily identifiable and separable categories, such as split and hoofed.  Aristotle’s explanation of the method here is clearly being guided by a concern that each animal has some distinctive difference which is (1) discernible by this process of division and (2) belongs to that animal alone.  Perhaps 2 is a claim made by Platonists themselves for this method of division. However, I think the more likely possibility is that Aristotle construes division in such a way that unless the end of the process results in an actual individual species, it is worthless.  If a terminus of division is two-footed, for example, then this applies to many animals and is unsuccessful in picking any one single animal out. This also makes sense in light of the purpose of Aristotle’s criticisms.  He began (PA 642b5 ff.) by saying how sticking to bifurcatory division alone is either difficult or impossible.  (His alternative is to begin with many lines of division, instead of one.)

Another avenue to get at what Aristotle is saying is this.  When there is no further division possible, we have arrived at a specific difference, i.e., a species or animal, at least on the expectations of a Platonist.  This, as Aristotle shows, is not always so easy, as some differences result in more than one animal belonging to them, such as ants belonging both to the winged and unwinged species.

On the same line of thinking that requires a unique animal for each termination of the division, it also follows that any given termination of a division cannot end in a privation.  For there is no such animal as a “non-footed.”  For there is no existence for non-being.  In Peck’s Loeb translation he notes that the reason why Aristotle does not allow privation in division is that this will result in more than one animal belonging to the species, e.g. non-footed.  If this is so, then non-footed has to be divided to get to individuals, but this cannot occur because non-being cannot be divided (legitimately at least).

Questions:

1. If the process of bifurcatory division does not (always) end in one species, what is it the point?  Could the point be to “narrow down” the candidates, or perhaps this kind of dead end means one has to start over again?

2. Is Aristotle’s use of εἶδός (eidos) consistent in this passage?  (Not necessarily A’s fault, perhaps a difficulty in translation.)  Can it mean body plan, species, shape, body part?

3. Why is “footless, featherless” discounted on the grounds that such things are non-being, while “uncloven, undivided” in Aristotle’s examples are legitimate?  Is it because the latter is merely accidental, or one may even say adjectival, while the former is not?

 

References   [ + ]

1. ↑ Translation mine. 642b τῶν δὲ διαφορῶν αἱ μὲν καθόλου εἰσὶ καὶ ἔχουσιν εἴδη, οἷον πτερότης· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄσχιστον τὸ δ᾿ ἐσχισμένον ἐστὶ πτερόν. καὶ ποδότης ὡσαύτως ἡ μὲν πολυσχιδής, ἡ δὲ δισχιδής, οἷον τὰ δίχαλα, ἡ δ᾿ 30 ἀσχιδὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος, οἷον τὰ μώνυχα. χαλεπὸν μὲν οὖν διαλαβεῖν καὶ εἰς τοιαύτας διαφορὰς ὧν ἔστιν εἴδη, ὥσθ᾿ ὁτιοῦν ζῷον ἐν ταύταις ὑπάρχειν καὶ μὴ ἐν πλείοσι ταὐτόν (οἷον πτερωτὸν καὶ ἄπτερον· ἔστι γὰρ ἄμφω ταὐτόν, οἷον μύρμηξ καὶ λαμπυρὶς καὶ ἕτερά τινα), πάντων δὲ χαλεπώτατον ἢ ἀδύνατον 35 εἰς τὰ ἄναιμα. ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκαστον 643a ὑπάρχειν τινὶ τῶν διαφορῶν ἑκάστην, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ἀντικειμένην. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεται τοῖς εἴδει διαφέρουσιν ὑπάρχειν εἶδός τι τῆς οὐσίας ἄτομον καὶ ἕν, ἀλλ᾿ ἀεὶ διαφορὰν ἕξει (οἷον ὄρνις ἀνθρώπου—ἡ διποδία γὰρ ἄλλη καὶ διάφορος· κἂν εἰ ἔναιμα, τὸ αἷμα διάφορον, ἢ οὐδὲν τῆς οὐσίας τὸ αἷμα θετέον)—εἰ δ᾿ οὕτως ἐστίν, ἡ μία διαφορὰ δυσὶν ὑπάρξει· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι ἀδύνατον στέρησιν εἶναι διαφοράν.

Aristotle’s Nicomachean Arguments against Forms: “Former and Latter”

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In the process of setting forth the project that will consume the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle sketches a description for what is the ultimate good, that which all our actions aim to achieve.  He describes the possibility of finding such an action (or whatever it will turn out to be), in these terms:

Indeed, if there is some end of practical affairs which we wish in itself, but all the rest because of this one thing, and we do not wish for everything because of some other thing (for then everything proceeds to infinity, and so desire would be empty and vain), it is obvious that this would be the good and the best.  As archers possessing a target, should we attain what is needed, since the knowledge of this has great importance in life?  If this is so, one must attempt to grasp it in outline at least, what it is and of what kind of knowledge and capacity it belongs (NE 1094a18-26). 1

As Aristotle vividly sets forth, we need some “target,” that ultimate good, at which we can aim our arrows, our lives.  One possibility is the “good” so envisaged by Plato.  Aristotle will then embark on an investigation of this candidate for the “good.”  Before the first of many criticism of Forms, however, Aristotle offers a peace offering of good will to Platonists.

It is fitting to perhaps to investigate and deal with the difficulties of how the universal [good] (to katholou) is said, even though such an investigation courts controversy because the men who introduced Forms (ta eide) are friends.  It would seem that it is fitting, in fact necessary for the preservation of truth even to destroy one’s own work, both generally and because we are philosophers.  For, although both [Platonists and truth] are dear, it is sacred to preferentially honor the truth (NE 1096a11-17). 2

After this shrewdly irenical, even poetical, preface, Aristotle gets into the meat of his first objection by informing us that Platonists do not have forms of those things which have a “former” and “latter.”

Indeed those who introduced this opinion did not place the Forms among those things in which they said there was a former (to proteron) and latter (hysteron); therefore they did not make a Form of numbers.  And the good is said in the categories of “what is” (ti esti) and in quantity (to poion) and in relation (pros ti), but that which is by itself (to kath’ hauto), that is, being or substance (ousia), is prior (proteron) by nature to relation. (For relation seems like an offshoot and incident of being (tou ontos).  So that there would not be some Form in addition to these (NE 1096a17-23). 3

After the mention of numbers, Aristotle brings in talk of his own Categories, noting that the “good” can be predicated in many different ways.  This presents a problem for believers in the Forms.  If “good” is in one of the three categories of “what is,” or quantity, or relation, then in virtue of being in both the category of “what is” and relation it is involved in the “former and latter.”  However remember that the “former and latter” is prohibited as things there are Forms of, as Aristotle just mentioned at NE 1096a17.  The reason that the good is involved in the former and the latter is because “what is” precedes, i.e. is  ontologically prior to, the category of relation, although both “what is” and relation are said of the good.  Therefore logically either there are Forms for things that are involved in “former and latter,” or, as Aristotle prefers, there are no forms since even the paradigmatic Form of them all, the Form of the good, necessarily must (illlogically) involve the “former and latter.”

Questions:

  1. Why does Aristotle bring up two categories in this objection to forms?  That is, he doesn’t seem to need the category of “what is.”  Isn’t the category of relation, in itself, sufficient to show that the good, if it is involved in that category (and it is) concerns the “former and latter.”  Because it seems that at least some forms of relation concern the former and latter.
  2. What is the motivation in Platonists avoiding Forms in the case of the former and latter?  Is it because this is a form of relation, in which one is before the other, and thus would undermine the atemporality and transcendence of Forms?
  3. In light of NE 1094a18-26 (quoted above), is it fair of Aristotle to ask Platonists for an explanation of good in the different ways Aristotle enumerates?  After all, if per Aristotle’s argument in NE 1094a18-26, there is one single “good” at which everything aims, then insofar as there is more than one “good,” they are only derivatively so, and it is plausible that there must be some one single good over and above all these.

 

1 Εἰ δή τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν
πρακτῶν ὃ δι’ αὑτὸ βουλόμεθα, τἆλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ
πάντα δι’ ἕτερον αἱρούμεθα (πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ’ εἰς ἄπειρον,    (20)
ὥστ’ εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὄρεξιν), δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ’ ἂν
εἴη τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον. ἆρ’ οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ
γνῶσις αὐτοῦ μεγάλην ἔχει ῥοπήν, καὶ καθάπερ τοξόται
σκοπὸν ἔχοντες μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δέοντος; εἰ δ’
οὕτω, πειρατέον τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτὸ τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ καὶ   (25)
τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων

2  Τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον ἴσως ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ διαπο-
ρῆσαι πῶς λέγεται, καίπερ προσάντους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητή-
σεως γινομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἴδη.
δόξειε δ’ ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς
ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους   (15)
ὄντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν φίλοιν ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλή-
θειαν.

3 οἱ δὴ κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οὐκ ἐποίουν ἰδέας
ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἔλεγον, διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν
ἀριθμῶν ἰδέαν κατεσκεύαζον· τὸ δ’ ἀγαθὸν λέγεται καὶ ἐν
τῷ τί ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρός τι, τὸ δὲ καθ’   (20)
αὑτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρός τι (παρα-
φυάδι γὰρ τοῦτ’ ἔοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος)· ὥστ’ οὐκ
ἂν εἴη κοινή τις ἐπὶ τούτοις ἰδέα.