Aristotle’s Essence: τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι

τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι is an odd phrase, common to Aristotelian diction, used when the philosopher wishes to speak about the essence of a particular thing. Most students translate the phrase as “essence” by rote, because they have not the faintest conception on how to penetrate the meaning of this four-word hieroglyphic.

Let us begin by discussing what this construction consists of at its most basic level. Fundamentally the phrase is an articular infinitive. Dr. Smyth tells us that, “The articular infinitive, while having the character of a substantive, retains the functions of a verb” (See Smyth, 2025 and following). The “character” of a substantive means that we are able to decline the infinitive as a neuter singular noun, if we place the appropriately declined definite article (τό, τοῦ, τῷ, τό) in front of it. Thus, τὸ ποιεῖν can be translated not merely as “to make,” but also as “making.” With this in mind, τὸ εἶναι, is “to be” or “being,” often simplified by most translators to “essence.”

This leaves us with the two inner terms, τί ἦν. First let us look at the imperfect ἦν. In Smyth 1901-1902 we are told that the imperfect can be used for the present tense. Liddell and Scott (εἰμί F. bottom of entry) inform us that ἦν is sometimes used as the present, corroborating the account given by Smyth. Liddell and Scott also make mention of Aristotle’s exact phrase, remarking that, “τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι expresses the essential nature of a thing.” Thus the ἦν is actually an ἐστί, at least for translation purposes.

The LSJ entry is further helpful in determining the meaning of τί ἦν as a two-word phrase. It points out that τί ἦν, in the phrase τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, takes the place of a very similar articular infinitive, but with a dative phrase, such as τὸ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι, which can be seen in Prior Analytics 67b12 and De Anima 429b10. τί ἦν is therefore really (τῷ) τί ἦν. τί, of course, is the interrogative pronoun, “what.” The phrase τί ἦν means, “what is it?” or as an indirect interrogative, which it could also be, “what it is.”

Putting it all together in a different order we have, τὸ εἶναι “being,” (τῷ) τί ἦν “for what is it?” or as an indirect interrogative, “for what it is.” Very often when there is a dative with a verb like εἰμί, it is construed as a dative of possession, which can be translated as a genitive. We could translate τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι as, “The essence/being of what it is.” The mystery of the phrase is solved. We are nevertheless saddled with an uncharacteristically unwieldy phrase to describe a common Greek philosophical term.

Perception Between Sleep & Waking

First of all, this is obvious, that waking and sleep belong to the same part of the animal. For they are opposites and sleep appears to be a kind of privation of sleep. For opposites always, both in natural cases and otherwise, happen in the same receptive part, and are affections of the same thing. I mean, for example, health and sickness, beauty and homeliness, strength and weakness, seeing and blindness, and hearing and deafness. And yet also it is obvious from these. For by whatever means we distinguish an awake man, by this same means we distinguish a sleeping man. For we consider a a man who is perceiving to be awake, and every one who is awake either perceives something outside himself or motions in himself. If therefore, waking is in nothing other than perceiving, it is obvious that by the same means there is perception, by this same means both waking things are awake and sleeping things sleep. On Sleep and Waking 453b25-454a7

On Sleep and Waking is a small treatise by Aristotle. The starting point of the philosopher’s inquiry is, as good Aristotelian precedent would often tell us, to begin with what is obvious. Waking and sleep are opposites, because sleep is a lack of waking. Presumably, waking could also be described as a lack of sleep, as every insomniac well knows. In general, that is, in every case, opposites occur in the same faculty, with Aristotle providing examples of health and sickness (the faculty of the body) and hearing and deafness (the faculty of the ear). Since we already know that sleeping and waking are opposites, we have merely to determine in which faculty or place they share their common origin. The perceptive ability is this shared “location” when it comes to waking and sleeping. Waking then, is the use or disuse of the perceptive faculty. We will have to wait, when it comes to defining dreams (in his On Dreams), how Aristotle is able to come up with a definition which avoids overlap between the meaning of waking which I just gave, and dreaming.

Four Predicables: Accident

    An accident is that which is none of these, not a definition, property or genus, but it belongs to the thing, and which is admitted to belong to one and the same thing, and also not belong, such as “sitting” is admitted as belonging to one and the same thing and also not belonging. Likewise “whiteness” is also an example. There is nothing to hinder the same thing being at one time white and another time not-white. The second of the definitions of accident is better. For with the first definition being said, it is necessary, if someone is going to understand, to know beforehand what a definition and genus and property are, but the second is self-sufficient for knowing what the thing said is by itself. The things compared with one another are also placed as among the category of “accident,” if they are spoken of in any way owing to the accident, such as whether the noble or fitting is more choice-worthy, and whether the life of virtue or pleasure is more pleasing, and if anything else happens to be said resembling these questions. In all these cases an investigation begins as to which of the two does the predicate preferably belong to. And it is evident from these that nothing hinders the accident from becoming a property in relation to something else, such as “sitting” is an accident, whenever someone sits, but it will be at another time a property, namely the property of not being the only one sitting in relation to others not sitting. The result is that nothing hinders an accident from becoming a property in relation to a certain thing or time. But it will never be a pure property.1

Topica 102b4-b26

In this section Aristotle offers two definitions for accident. The first is that an accident is not a definition, property or genus. This is problematic, as he admits, for one must first know what these later three are before one can create a conceptual category that accommodates their negation. His clearer definition is that an accident is something, as an attribute or property, which can apply or not apply to something at different times. This definition tracks well with our English understanding of accident, for instance when we say that something is ‘accidental,’ we mean that things could have turned out differently than they did. There is no necessary correspondence between what could have happened and what did happen.

Also related to accidents are questions regarding the assignment of an accident, such as, “Does x or y have more of z?” In Aristotle’s examples, he asks which of two things are “more choice-worthy” or “more pleasant.” Of the “choice-worthy,” he asks to which of two types of life, the life of virtue or the life of leisure, is the term properly predicated. Given our external knowledge of Aristotle, such as that the life of virtue is indisputably more choice-worthy than the life of leisure (viz. Nicomachean Ethics) we can assume that Aristotle is making a grammatical point here, more so than a philosophical one. This is further corroborated by the fact that he follows this up by saying, “In all these cases an investigation begins as to which of the two does the predicate (τὸ κατηγορούμενον) preferably belong to.” I take Aristotle then, to mean that the assignment of an accident– as the predicate of a sentence– also occurs when there is a comparison of terms where one thing has more or less of the accident than another thing. For example, “Is the shoe or pencil heavier?,” has the answer, “The shoe.” Thus we say, “The shoe is heavier.” In so far as this can be said, it is said of the shoe accidentally, as this could change to, “The shoe is is not heavier,” if we were to ask, “Is the shoe or chair heavier?”

Returning to his previous definition of property, Aristotle notes that some accidents can be a property. But reiterating his previous distinction between real properties and quasi or contingent properties (see 102a18), he informs us that an accident can only be of the former type.

1 Συμβεβηκὸς δέ ἐστιν ὃ μηδὲν μὲν τούτων ἐστί, μήτε
ὅρος μήτε ἴδιον μήτε γένος, ὑπάρχει δὲ τῷ πράγματι, (5)
καὶ ὃ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν ὁτῳοῦν ἑνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ
ὑπάρχειν· οἷον τὸ καθῆσθαι ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν τινὶ τῷ
αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ λευκόν· τὸ γὰρ
αὐτὸ οὐθὲν κωλύει ὁτὲ μὲν λευκὸν ὁτὲ δὲ μὴ λευκὸν εἶναι.
ἔστι δὲ τῶν τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ὁρισμῶν ὁ δεύτερος βελτίων· (10)
τοῦ μὲν γὰρ πρώτου ῥηθέντος ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ μέλλει τις συν-
ήσειν, προειδέναι τί ἐστιν ὅρος καὶ ἴδιον καὶ γένος· ὁ δὲ
δεύτερος αὐτοτελής ἐστι πρὸς τὸ γνωρίζειν τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ τὸ
λεγόμενον καθ’ αὑτό. προσκείθωσαν δὲ τῷ συμβεβηκότι
καὶ αἱ πρὸς ἄλληλα συγκρίσεις ὁπωσοῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ συμ- (15)
βεβηκότος λεγόμεναι, οἷον πότερον τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ συμφέρον
αἱρετώτερον, καὶ πότερον ὁ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἢ ὁ κατ’ ἀπόλαυ-
σιν ἡδίων βίος, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο παραπλησίως τυγχάνει τού-
τοις λεγόμενον· ἐπὶ πάντων γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων ποτέρῳ μᾶλ-
λον τὸ κατηγορούμενον συμβέβηκεν ἡ ζήτησις γίνεται. δῆ- (20)
λον δ’ ἐξ αὐτῶν ὅτι τὸ συμβεβηκὸς οὐθὲν κωλύει ποτὲ καὶ
πρός τι ἴδιον γίνεσθαι· οἷον τὸ καθῆσθαι, συμβεβηκὸς ὄν,
ὅταν τις μόνος καθῆται, τότε ἴδιον ἔσται, μὴ μόνου δὲ καθ-
ημένου πρὸς τοὺς μὴ καθημένους ἴδιον. ὥστε καὶ πρός τι καὶ
ποτὲ οὐθὲν κωλύει τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἴδιον γίνεσθαι. ἁπλῶς δ’ (25)
ἴδιον οὐκ ἔσται.