Problems with Plato: Animal Diversity and Robust Division

Yesterday, I brought up some difficulties that occur in the first method of division presented in Aristotle’s Parts of Animals.

“Some construe the individual species by dividing the group into two differentiae.  In one way this is not easy, in another impossible.  For of some there will be only one differentia, but the other terms will be superfluous, such as in the case of footed, two-footed, footed with parted toes.  For this last differentia alone is proper” (Parts of Animals, 642b5-9)?

Before discussing the difficulties again, it must be taken into consideration, of course, that since he is embarking on a criticism of Academic methodology, any philosophical difficulties arising from this process of division might in fact owe to chinks in the armor which Aristotle himself was trying to illuminate.  He might very well be bringing some of these difficulties to light without proceeding to explain them.

A couple of the difficulties I brought up yesterday were:

“It is not true that the concept of “footed with parted toes” includes “two footed” and “footed.” viz. lizards

It is also clear from his use of the term elsewhere, that “footed with parted toes (σχιζόπους)” is not meant to designate any particular species alone, such as humans (cf. HA 593a28, concerning birds).”

A mistake one could make, at least in Aristotle’s construal of the division, is failing to recognize that at every point of the division a particular animal is being guided through each step of the division.  So, in this example, one has to have in mind a particular animal which one leads through each “gate” of the division.  There is no abstracted “two-footed,” in other words; differentiae always belong to real animals.  (This is one reason why Aristotle says shortly that there cannot be divisions of non-being, for no animals correspond to such a division.)

In fact, Aristotle will return to this division at 643b29 ff.  He says there two interesting things.  He affirms that with this method both (a) that only one differentia will be arrived at (b) it is impossible for one differentia to be adequate for a species.  In light of this he brings up the same “footed, two-footed, footed with parted toes,” tri-partite division.  Only this time he applies it to “man” (ἄνθρωπος).  He points out that man is many other things besides possessing parted toes.

Both of these judgments merge into a single criticism: there is a need for there to be multiple differentia, although the Academic method cannot allow for it, it is not so much wrong, as it is inadequate.  One reason for a need for more lines of division is that there are many homologous features in animals.  Similar body plans, parts, and functions means that there will be many animals with split-toed feet.  Because of this diversity there will be a corresponding need for a robust method of division.

Socrates’ Swan Song

In the maddening swirl of language, we seldom reflect on the meaning of individual words or phrases.  It is not so surprising then, when we pass by even more obscure idioms and metaphors, although this paradoxically does not prevent us from using them again in turn!

One of these phrases is “swan song”, often meaning the last effort or final production coming from someone in his respective field before retirement, or sometimes, death.  This idea has a long pedigree in Western thought.  It first appears in literature in Aeschylus (Agamemnon, 1444), and has not performed its own swan song in our communal imagination since.  The idea behind the myth was that the swan is silent its entire life save the prescience it is granted of its oncoming death, then the swan pours out the first and final charming melodies from its soul.

Socrates himself alludes to this myth, albeit not without commenting on what he sees as its probable origin:

But I seem to you more common than the swans regarding prophecy, which when they sense that it necessary that they die, they sing in the interval before death, indeed, at that time, especially and most beautifully do they sing, rejoicing that they are about to go to the divine, the very thing they serve.  And men, because of their own fear of death, they both slander the swans and they say that the swans lament their death singing because of pain, and they do not consider that no bird sings when in hunger or cold or during any other pain it undergoes, nor does the nightingale, the swallow, nor the hoopoe, which they say laments singing because of its pain.  But these do not appear to me to sing because they are pained, nor do the swans, but I think, since they are prophetic, being from Apollo, and foreknowing the good things in Hades they sing and rejoice during that day more than in the time before.  I myself think I am a co-laborer of the swans and a priest of the same god, and I have the gift of prophecy from my master not worse than theirs, nor do I think I am freed from a life more melancholy than theirs.

ὡς ἔοικε, τῶν κύκνων δοκῶ φαυλότερος ὑμῖν εἶναι τὴν μαντικήν, οἳ ἐπειδὰν αἴσθωνται ὅτι δεῖ αὐτοὺς ἀποθανεῖν, ᾁδοντες καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, τότε δὴ πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα ᾁδουσι, γεγηθότες ὅτι μέλλουσι παρὰ τὸν θεὸν ἀπιέναι οὗπέρ εἰσι θεράποντες. οἱ δ᾽ ἄνθρωποι διὰ τὸ αὑτῶν δέος τοῦ θανάτου καὶ τῶν κύκνων καταψεύδονται, καί φασιν αὐτοὺς θρηνοῦντας τὸν θάνατον ὑπὸ λύπης ἐξᾴδειν, καὶ οὐ λογίζονται ὅτι οὐδὲν ὄρνεον ᾁδει ὅταν πεινῇ ἢ ῥιγῷ ἤ τινα ἄλλην λύπην λυπῆται, οὐδὲ αὐτὴ ἥ τε ἀηδὼν καὶ χελιδὼν καὶ ὁ ἔποψ, ἃ δή φασι διὰ λύπην θρηνοῦντα ᾁδειν. ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε ταῦτά μοι φαίνεται λυπούμενα ᾁδειν οὔτε οἱ κύκνοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἅτε οἶμαι τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ὄντες, μαντικοί τέ εἰσι καὶ προειδότες τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου ἀγαθὰ ᾁδουσι καὶ τέρπονται ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν διαφερόντως ἢ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ. ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡγοῦμαι ὁμόδουλός τε εἶναι τῶν κύκνων καὶ ἱερὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ οὐ χεῖρον ἐκείνων τὴν μαντικὴν ἔχειν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου, οὐδὲ δυσθυμότερον αὐτῶν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. ἀλλὰ τούτου γ᾽ ἕνεκα λέγειν τε χρὴ καὶ ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι ἂν βούλησθε, ἕως ἂν Ἀθηναίων ἐῶσιν ἄνδρες ἕνδεκα. Phaedo 84e-85b

The old Euthyphro trick gets the polytheist every time…

The Euthyphro dilemma, as it has been deemed, has never seemed to me to be a threat to traditional western monotheism. I will within the next few weeks address the reason why I think this is so. But I wish to be upfront: I think it obviously only presents a problem to a certain set of theological beliefs. Thus, I am offering an observation, not an argument. Implicit to this take on the Euthyphro dilemma however, is the possibility that Plato was arguing on behalf of some sort of monotheism, by way of denying the moral authority of a plurality of gods. Deity by committee, perhaps, did not appeal to Plato. I am not convinced of this possibility, but I am open to it.

In the meantime I have translated the first portion of the relevant dialogue.

Socrates:
Quickly, good man, we will become better men. For consider such a thing: Regarding the holy, is the holy what is loved by the gods, or that what is loved by them is holy?

Euthyphro:
I do not know what you mean, Socrates.

Socrates:
But I will attempt to say it more clearly. We speak a certain way of “something being carried and something carrying it” and “something being lead and something leading” and “something being seen and something seeing” and you know that they are different from each other in all such things and in this way they differ?

Euthyphro:
I think I am learning.

Socrates:
So also is there something loved and the thing different from it, the thing doing the loving?

Euthyphro:
How could it not be so?

Socrates:
Tell me, whether the thing that is carried is a carried thing because it is carried, or because of something else?

Euthyphro:
No, but because it is carried.

Socrates:
And the thing lead because it is lead, and the thing seen because it is seen?

Euthyphro:
Entirely.

Socrates:
And not because it is a “seen thing”, and because of this, it is seen, but the opposite, it is seen, and through this it is a “seen thing”…

Σωκράτης
τάχ᾽, ὠγαθέ, βέλτιον εἰσόμεθα. ἐννόησον γὰρ τὸ τοιόνδε: ἆρα τὸ ὅσιον ὅτι ὅσιόν ἐστιν φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἢ ὅτι φιλεῖται ὅσιόν ἐστιν;

Εὐθύφρων
οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σωκράτης
ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ πειράσομαι σαφέστερον φράσαι. λέγομέν τι φερόμενον καὶ φέρον καὶ ἀγόμενον καὶ ἄγον καὶ ὁρώμενον καὶ ὁρῶν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μανθάνεις ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐστὶ καὶ ᾗ ἕτερα;

Εὐθύφρων
ἔγωγέ μοι δοκῶ μανθάνειν.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν καὶ φιλούμενόν τί ἐστιν καὶ τούτου ἕτερον τὸ φιλοῦν;

Εὐθύφρων
πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Σωκράτης
λέγε δή μοι, πότερον τὸ φερόμενον διότι φέρεται φερόμενόν ἐστιν, ἢ δι᾽ ἄλλο τι;

Εὐθύφρων
οὔκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο.

Σωκράτης
καὶ τὸ ἀγόμενον δὴ διότι ἄγεται, καὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον διότι ὁρᾶται;

Εὐθύφρων
πάνυ γε.

Σωκράτης
οὐκ ἄρα διότι ὁρώμενόν γέ ἐστιν, διὰ τοῦτο ὁρᾶται, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντίον διότι ὁρᾶται, διὰ τοῦτο ὁρώμενον…
Euthyphro 10A-B