Category Archives: Soul

The Dynamics of Thought: “The Soul is All Things”

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(This post assumes that thought or perception is self-cognizant, that is, that to have a perception or thought is to be aware of it, as a function of the perception or thought itself, and that awareness does not owe to some capacity over and above perception or thought itself.  See this post for Aristotle’s position.)

As an addendum to the idea that awareness is concomitant with all thought insofar as as it is thought, it is important to discuss the overall flexibility of the soul as a capacity par excellence. In contrast to some readings of the Platonic account which has all knowledge somehow latent within us in Recollection, the Aristotelian account maintains that thought is something entirely plastic and receptive to its objects. This is the case to such a degree that Aristotle can make the seemingly shocking statement that, “Let us now summarize our results about soul, and repeat that the soul is in a way all existing things” (De Anima 431b21, trans. Smith). This may in fact be the explanation for why Aristotle does not need to appeal to some feature over and above the mere presence of a thought to account for an awareness of that thought. For if the soul were not an all-accommodating capacity, a potentiality, then this would mean it would have only a capacity determinate for certain thoughts; it could only have an awareness of those objects for which it was a determinate capacity. This would entail that if the soul were to meet anything outside the confines of its proscribed capacity, it would not be aware of them.  Yet this is absurd; anything we think of, we are aware of. Therefore, if we want to preserve the feature of psychology that thought brings with it an awareness of itself, we would do well by also maintaining, with Aristotle, that the “soul is all things.”

Are Philosophers and Philosophy Useful to a City?

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Several hundred years before the birth of Socrates, Thales the philosopher was said to have fallen into a well while observing the heavens.  Thus the impractical and detached reputation of philosophers was born.  In Books 6 and 7 of the Republic the issue of the usefulness of either the philosopher or philosophy is brought up several times.  What is this uselessness, and how does the philosopher become useful?  In that earlier book Socrates admits that philosophy is indeed useless, but blames this “uselessness on those who don’t use [philosophers], not on decent men” (489b).  Later, in Book 7, we return to the usefulness of philosophy.  Socrates, although himself noting that the study of geometry has as its ‘“useful byproduct” war, chastises Glaucon for wishing to highlight the practical benefits of astronomy (527c-d).  Socrates insists that the real significance of these studies is the cultivation of the eye of the mind. 

What this points to is that if there is going to be a conversion from “uselessness to usefulness” by the study of philosophy, this change cannot come about by pandering to the currently perceived needs of the city.  Rather the city must come to see its need for something beyond the daily worries attendant on activities like farming and warfare.  And we must additionally keep in mind that Socrates is proposing a city that has the general welfare in mind, not the concerns of any individual or one group.  Yet it is precisely at this point that this concern for the welfare of the city makes it most shocking demand, according the allegory of the cave. 

In the cave, the cave-dweller, let us remember, was not liberated by his own devices, but Socrates tells us that he was released and “compelled to stand up,” “compelled to answer [what the shadows] are,” “compelled…to look at the light itself” (515c-e).  On the other hand, the philosopher, himself a liberated cave-dweller, must not live the care-free life of contemplation, he too has to return to the cave to liberate and educate the remaining captives (520b).  So for the betterment of the city, both the philosopher and “cave-dweller” must, in some sense, submit to a course of life other than what they would have normally chosen, had they not been looking to the betterment of the city.  What informs this decision and what is the guiding principle of their lives if it is not the oracle of mere personal preference? 

The answer, as it turns out, is a paradox.  Normally we expect that if we are to attend to the betterment of say, our garden, we put on our overalls in order to focus on the garden.  This is not so with the case of the polis.  In the case of the city we must fix our attention outside of the city, to things seen only by the inner eye, intellection.  Recall that in Book VI Socrates’ initial response to the charge of uselesness is to give us an image of men on a ship. He tells us that when the true pilot navigates, he looks to, “year, seasons, heaven, stars, winds, and everything that is proper to the art” (488d).  But he does not look at the ship. Nor does the philosopher in the cave look at the cave, but he attempts to focus the attention of the cave-dwellers to eventually look at the sun.  Thus it turns out that the philosopher and philosophy are extremely useful; without him and it, the entire city is unable to see or even to learn to see what they should really be fixing their gaze upon, the Form of the Good.           

Plotinus: How Does the Universe See? Part 2 of 2

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But whether perception is of χρεία alone one must investigate in this way.  If there could not be a perception for the soul when it is alone, but perceptions are with the body, [perception] would be because of the body, from which also perceptions come, and perception is given because of the association [of the soul] with the body, and indeed it follows necessarily—for whatever undergoes an affection with respect to the body, also reaches as far as the soul, if it is a stronger affection—or it has been contrived [that we perceive] so as to guard ourselves from that thing causing the affection to destroy [our body] before it becomes greater or closer to us.  But if, indeed, this is so, perceptions would be for χρεία. For if they are also for knowledge, [they would be] for a being not in knowledge but which is ignorant because of circumstance, and in order to remember because of forgetfulness, not for a being not in need nor in forgetfulness.  But if this is the case, there must be an investigation not only about the earth alone, but also about all the stars and especially concerning all the heaven and universe.
(Plotinus, Enneads, IV.4.24 lines 1-14) (1).

In the previous post on this topic, I introduced two ways we are to understand Plotinus’ use of the work chreia— need and use.  In the text we are examining, we are especially applying these two meanings to the case of the universe as a subject of perception, particularly sight. When it comes to determining when and if the universe can see, we can dismiss chreia-need because this would imply a lack on the part of the universe.  That is, the universe would lack knowledge, but Plotinus rules this out by saying, “For if [perceptions] are also for knowledge, [they would be] for a being not in knowledge but which is ignorant because of circumstance, and in order to remember because of forgetfulness, not for a being not in need nor in forgetfulness.”  Yet the universe is not ignorant nor in need of remembering, so this possibility is ruled out: perception cannot be for need.  Furthermore, if the universe is all there is and yet perceives something outside of itself, then the universe would not be all there is.  Thus a second reason for dismissing need as an explanation for the universe’s perception.

Perhaps then, perception is for the use of the universe.  Remember that in the text, Plotinus has said that whenever there is a thing with (at least) two parts, one part, when it is affected, transmits it affections to the other part, if it is a sufficiently strong affection. (2)  In this more opaque language it was first presented as the initial option of the disjunction concerning the chreia of perception.  As it is applied less broadly, the parts being discussed are the body and the soul.  In the case of the universe under investigation, when one part undergoes an affection (sphere of the planets), then this is transmitted to the soul of the universe by necessity (resulting in sight).

Although it is true that the universe does not see for the purpose of gaining new information, it can, as we can look at our own hand, nevertheless look at itself with a part of itself.  On first glance, it would appear that the universe looking at itself would be vain, to no effect (μάτην).  But if looking at itself just happens as a matter of course, then, Plotinus’ line of thought goes, looking at itself is not vain, because this is not the purpose of its looking, but is the necessary consequence of the way the universe is set up.

(1)
Τὸ δὲ εἰ τῆς χρείας μόνον ἡ αἴσθησις, ὧδε σκεπτέον.
Εἰ δὴ ψυχῇ μὲν μόνῃ οὐκ ἂν αἴσθησις γίνοιτο, μετὰ δὲ
σώματος αἱ αἰσθήσεις, διὰ σῶμα ἂν εἴη, ἐξ οὗπερ καὶ αἱ
αἰσθήσεις, καὶ διὰ τὴν σώματος κοινωνίαν δοθεῖσα, καὶ
ἤτοι ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπακολουθοῦσα—ὅ τι γὰρ πάσχει τὸ   (5)
σῶμα, καὶ φθάνει τὸ πάθος μεῖζον ὂν μέχρι ψυχῆς—
ἢ καὶμεμηχάνηται, ὅπως καὶ πρὶν μεῖζον γενέσθαι τὸ ποιοῦν,
ὥστε καὶ φθεῖραι, ἢ καὶ πρὶν πλησίον γενέσθαι, φυλάξασθαι.
Εἰ δὴ τοῦτο, πρὸς χρείαν ἂν εἶεν αἱ αἰσθήσεις. Καὶ γὰρ εἰ
καὶ πρὸς γνῶσιν, τῷ μὴ ἐν γνώσει ὄντι ἀλλ’ ἀμαθαίνοντι    (10)
διὰ συμφοράν, καὶ ἵνα ἀναμνησθῇ διὰ λήθην, οὐ τῷ μήτε
ἐν χρείᾳ μήτε ἐν λήθῃ. Ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο, οὐ περὶ τῆς γῆς ἂν
μόνον εἴη σκοπεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ἄστρων ἁπάντων καὶ
μάλιστα περὶ παντὸς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ κόσμου.

(2)
Plotinus is here likely taking up a line of thought from Plato, “Assume that some of the affections of our body are extinguished in the body before they reach the soul, leaving the soul unaffected, and that other affections permeate both body and soul and cause a vibration in both conjointly and in each individually” (Trans. Fowler, Philebus, 33d).