Tag Archives: Ancient Greek Philosopher

Plotinus: How Does the Universe See?, Part 1

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But whether perception is of χρεία (chreia) alone one must investigate in this way.  If there could not be a perception for the soul when it is alone, but perceptions are with the body, [perception] would be because of the body, from which also perceptions come, and perception is given because of the association [of the soul] with the body, and indeed it follows necessarily—for whatever undergoes an affection with respect to the body, also reaches as far as the soul, if it is a stronger affection—or it has been contrived [that we perceive] so as to guard ourselves from that thing causing the affection to destroy [our body] before it becomes greater or closer to us.  But if, indeed, this is so, perceptions would be for χρεία (chreia). For if they are also for knowledge, [they would be] for a being not in knowledge but which is ignorant because of circumstance, and in order to remember because of forgetfulness, not for a being not in need nor in forgetfulness.  But if this is the case, there must be an investigation not only about the earth alone, but also about all the stars and especially concerning all the heaven and universe.
(translation mine, Plotinus, Enneads, IV.4.24 lines 1-14) (1)

Plotinus has here introduced the concept of perception and, more particularly, whether it proceeds by χρεία (chreia).  This investigation, as I shall comment on in the next few posts, will be expanded upon by Plotinus to also include the universe.

However, in Plotinus there are in fact two main understandings of this term: χρεία-use and χρεία-need.(2)  An acknowledgment of this distinction allows us to properly appreciate that the initial question, whether perception concerns χρεία, is not a yes or no question, but one involving the ways in which perception can be said to deal with χρεία.  The first option, χρεία-use, is proposed in very abstract terms: whenever there is a thing with (at least) two parts, one part, when it is affected, transmits it affections to the other part by necessity, if it is a sufficiently strong affection.(3)  The second option, χρεία-need, is simpler: perception occurs to protect the body (or perhaps the soul-body union) from harm.(4)  After briefly introducing these two options, Plotinus will deny that χρεία-need can apply to the perception of the universe.  The rest of 24 and relevant parts of chapters 25 and 26 will explore whether, and in what ways χρεία-use can apply to the universe, as well as including discussion, in parallel inquiries, about the sun, stars and the earth.

When Plotinus denies perception for the universe, I claim that what he intends to deny is perception of external things.  We are left with internal perception.  These two types of internal perception are συναίσθησις (synaisthesis), or perception by the whole, and perception of part by part.  Once these two types of perception have been distinguished, Plotinus will focus on perception of part by part in the case of the universe.  Plotinus will later pick up the “by necessity” clause which was initially included with the first option of the opening of chapter 24, that affections are given from one part to another.  But he will deny that anything, including the universe, sees by merely having the requisite parts in place, as a matter of necessity.  For sight to take place something else needs to be in place.

This something else, as Plotinus points out, is an inclination towards sensibles.  I argue that in the case of the universe this inclination is provided by συμπάθεια.  The role συμπάθεια serves in providing inclination arises from the shared interests and concerns which attend it.  I will explore this more in the following posts.

 

REFERENCES:

 

(1)
Τὸ δὲ εἰ τῆς χρείας μόνον ἡ αἴσθησις, ὧδε σκεπτέον.
Εἰ δὴ ψυχῇ μὲν μόνῃ οὐκ ἂν αἴσθησις γίνοιτο, μετὰ δὲ
σώματος αἱ αἰσθήσεις, διὰ σῶμα ἂν εἴη, ἐξ οὗπερ καὶ αἱ
αἰσθήσεις, καὶ διὰ τὴν σώματος κοινωνίαν δοθεῖσα, καὶ
ἤτοι ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπακολουθοῦσα—ὅ τι γὰρ πάσχει τὸ   (5)
σῶμα, καὶ φθάνει τὸ πάθος μεῖζον ὂν μέχρι ψυχῆς—ἢ καὶ
μεμηχάνηται, ὅπως καὶ πρὶν μεῖζον γενέσθαι τὸ ποιοῦν,
ὥστε καὶ φθεῖραι, ἢ καὶ πρὶν πλησίον γενέσθαι, φυλάξασθαι.
Εἰ δὴ τοῦτο, πρὸς χρείαν ἂν εἶεν αἱ αἰσθήσεις. Καὶ γὰρ εἰ
καὶ πρὸς γνῶσιν, τῷ μὴ ἐν γνώσει ὄντι ἀλλ’ ἀμαθαίνοντι    (10)
διὰ συμφοράν, καὶ ἵνα ἀναμνησθῇ διὰ λήθην, οὐ τῷ μήτε
ἐν χρείᾳ μήτε ἐν λήθῃ. Ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο, οὐ περὶ τῆς γῆς ἂν
μόνον εἴη σκοπεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ἄστρων ἁπάντων καὶ
μάλιστα περὶ παντὸς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ κόσμου.

(2)
Whether Plotinus was consciously aware of this ambiguity, or it simply slipped his mind as he was focused on χρεία, I do not know.  The Lexicon Plotinianum even acknowledges the flexibility of this term, giving both “a) need” and “b) use, utility, service” as definitions, while adding, “Some of the instances in b) might equally well be put under a), and vice versa” (Sleeman 1111-12).

(3)
I will avoid stating an exact relation between affection and perception, and say that affection and perception can mostly be treated as the same.  Perceptions are not the same as affections, but perceptions involves affections.

(4)
Perhaps the instigation for this investigation is the need to pursue the ramifications of the relation between body and soul.  See O’Meara, Chapter 2: The Relation between Sensible and Intelligible Reality, for the importance of developing this idea (O’Meara, Dominic J. Plotinus: An Introduction to the Enneads. Oxford: Clarendon, 1993).

Ethnographic “Racism” in Ancient Philosophy

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There can be very little, except the evergreen pride of modernity, that gives us hope that our beliefs and practices are exempt from some future condemnation in a world so distant our comprehension of it could hardly be distinguished from loathing.  When it comes to our own canon of sins, foremost among them appear to be those forms of discrimination that are lodged against certain groups or classes.  As an analog to these prohibitions, social propriety has, probably correctly, identified among the chief causes stereotypes and accordingly speaking of the general characteristics of a people is deemed off-color and brutish.  There are occasional and accepted forays into the generic, though.  Despite the mild import of such thoughts as, “The French have wonderful cuisine,” it is a curious thing to distinguish what exactly it is we object to when we hear a generalism about a culture or race.  Before I ask a few questions about that, it may be helpful to look at a couple things said, by way of example, by Hippocrates and Plato.

And concerning the listlessness and cowardice of peoples, the seasons are especially the cause why Asians are less martial than the Europeans and more tame in their character,for making no dramatic shift either to the hot nor to the cold their seasons are temperate. For there are no mental disturbances nor strong change of the body, from which it is more likely that the passion is roused and indulges the senseless and high-spirited rather than when it is in a steady state.  For it is change of everything which wake the disposition of men and do not allow it to rest.  For these aforesaid reasons it seems to me that that the Asian race is weak and yet further so because of their customs.  For much of Asia is ruled by a king.  And where men do not rule themselves nor are autonomous, but are ruled by a despot, there is no reason for them to concern themselves over this.  So that they do not practice the military disciplines, but they work to seem pacifistic (Hippocrates, Airs, Waters, Places, XVI). (1)

 

For it would be absurd if someone should think that spiritedness does not occur in our cities from private citizens, who indeed have this reputation, such as those who live throughout Thrace and Scythia and nearly all the northern areas, or love of learning, which indeed someone would say is especially prevalent in the area around us, or as someone would say that the love of money is not least among the Phoenicians or Egyptians (Plato, Republic 435e3-436a3). (2)

Setting aside the accuracy of Hippocrates’ description of Asians, his explanation appealing to geographical and sociological causes is less jarring than Plato’s, whose opinion appears informed only by a cryptic Athenian prejudice.  Both cases, however, are less egregious than when a comparison is made between groups wherein one is deemed superior, one inferior, such as in the following from Aristotle.

Therefore the poets say, “It is fitting that the Greeks rule barbarians,” on the grounds that the barbarian and slave are the same in nature (Politics 1252b7-9). (3)

A few questions:

What makes the above offensive to contemporary attitudes?  Is it that a group is generalized?  Or is it that a group is generalized negatively?  (That is, a positive characterization would be acceptable.)  Or is it that a group is generalized negatively and untruly? (But this would imply that a negative generalization, if true, would be acceptable. Or on the other hand perhaps, does this mean true, negative generalizations are ruled out a priori?)

 

 

REFERENCES:

Translations mine

(1)
περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀθυμίης τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῆς ἀνανδρείης, ὅτι ἀπολεμώτεροί εἰσι τῶν Εὐρωπαίων οἱ Ἀσιηνοὶ καὶ ἡμερώτεροι τὰ ἤθεα αἱ ὧραι αἴτιαι μάλιστα, οὐ μεγάλας τὰς μεταβολὰς ποιεύμεναι οὔτε ἐπὶ τὸ θερμὸν οὔτε ἐπὶ τὸ ψυχρόν, ἀλλὰ παραπλησίως. οὐ γὰρ γίνονται ἐκπλήξιες τῆς γνώμης οὔτε μετάστασις ἰσχυρὴ τοῦ σώματος, ἀφ᾿ ὅτων εἰκὸς τὴν ὀργὴν ἀγριοῦσθαί τε καὶ τοῦ ἀγνώμονος καὶ θυμοειδέος μετέχειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ αἰεὶ ἐόντα. αἱ γὰρ μεταβολαί εἰσι τῶν πάντων αἱ ἐπεγείρουσαι τὴν γνώμην τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ οὐκ ἐῶσαι ἀτρεμίζειν. διὰ ταύτας ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ τὰς προφάσιας ἄναλκες εἶναι τὸ γένος τὸ Ἀσιηνὸν καὶ προσέτι διὰ τοὺς νόμους. τῆς γὰρ Ἀσίης τὰ πολλὰ βασιλεύεται. ὅκου δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἑωυτῶν εἰσι καρτεροὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι μηδὲ αὐτόνομοι, ἀλλὰ δεσπόζονται, οὐ περὶ τούτου αὐτοῖσιν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, ὅκως τὰ πολέμια ἀσκήσωσιν, ἀλλ᾿ ὅκως μὴ δόξωσι μάχιμοι εἶναι.

(2)
γελοῖον
γὰρ ἂν εἴη εἴ τις οἰηθείη τὸ θυμοειδὲς μὴ ἐκ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν
ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐγγεγονέναι, οἳ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσι ταύτην τὴν
αἰτίαν, οἷον οἱ κατὰ τὴν Θρᾴκην τε καὶ Σκυθικὴν καὶ σχεδόν
τι κατὰ τὸν ἄνω τόπον, ἢ τὸ φιλομαθές, ὃ δὴ τὸν παρ’ ἡμῖν
μάλιστ’ ἄν τις αἰτιάσαιτο τόπον, ἢ τὸ φιλοχρήματον τὸ περὶ
τούς τε Φοίνικας εἶναι καὶ τοὺς κατὰ Αἴγυπτον φαίη τις ἂν
οὐχ ἥκιστα.

(3)
διό φασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ
βαρβάρων δ᾿ Ἕλληνας ἄρχειν εἰκός,
ὡς ταὐτὸ φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δοῦλον ὄν.

Aristotle: Is “Non-feathered” a Genus of Animals?

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In the last post I primarily addressed Aristotle’s objection to dichotomous division, a taxonomic method that Platonists used to determine the kinds of animals there are and where any particular animal kind fits, an enterprise roughly equivalent to the animal-classification that for contemporary biology results in the designation of genus and species.  In particular, amongst Aristotle’s objections to dichotomous division, he says that grouping birds into, say, feathered and non-feathered, results in the absurdity that the latter does not exist

And yet it is necessary to divide by privation, and the dichotomists do divide [in this way].  But there is no difference of a privation qua privation.  For it is impossible for there to be species of what is not, for example of “non-footed” or of “non-winged” just as there are species of “footed” and “winged.”  Furthermore it is necessary that species belong to a generic difference.  For if they do not, why would they belong to a generic difference and not a specific difference? (Aristotle, Parts of Animals, 642b21-26).(1)

The objection substantively amounts to this: because a privation does not exist, e.g. “non-winged,” there cannot be any species subsequently derived from it.  And, as the concluding question makes clear, if in fact no pair of species can be divided from it, then this means that, e.g. “non-winged,” is a species.  This is evidently false, however, because “non-winged” is as indeterminate a species for ancient taxonomy as it would be for modern biology.

However, what if Platonists appealed to Aristotelian privation in making a case for dividing privation?   In his Physics Aristotle says this:

But white comes to be from the non-white, and not from everything [that happens to be non-white] but from black or from something between black and white, and an educated man comes to be from something that is not educated, but not just from anything that is not educated, but rather from an uneducated man, unless this happens incidentally.  Again the white turns into the non-white, and not into the chance non-white but into the black or an intermediate (Physics 188a36-188b6). (2)

Now Aristotle is clearly, in context, discussing how things come to be, and more particularly how this generation comes about from opposites.  A black beard, for example, comes to be white, where this whiteness is explicable by saying it comes to be from “non-white,” yet not just any non-white (as say, the number 1 is non-white), but from the opposite of white, black, or an intermediate, gray.

Nevertheless it seems plausible that this concept of privation, although employed to a very different purpose in the Physics than in our taxonomic concerns, establishes that we can use privation as a faithful ontological characterization of things.  If that is the case, there is no reason we cannot use “non-feathered” as a genus from which we can further dilineate more species.

Would Aristotle accept this understanding of privation from Physics for his work on animal classification?

More broadly, does this eliminate Aristotle’s original objection to privation as a method of division?

(1)
Translation mine:
Ἔτι στερήσει μὲν ἀναγκαῖον διαιρεῖν, καὶ διαιροῦσιν οἱ
διχοτομοῦντες. Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ διαφορὰ στερήσεως ᾗ στέρησις·
ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἴδη εἶναι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, οἷον τῆς ἀποδίας ἢ τοῦ
ἀπτέρου ὥσπερ πτερώσεως καὶ ποδῶν. Δεῖ δὲ τῆς καθόλου δια-
φορᾶς εἴδη εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔσται, διὰ τί ἂν εἴη τῶν καθόλου
καὶ οὐ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον;

(2)
Translation mine:
ἀλλὰ λευκὸν μὲν γίγνεται ἐξ οὐ λευκοῦ, καὶ τούτου οὐκ ἐκ παντὸς
ἀλλ’ ἐκ μέλανος ἢ τῶν μεταξύ, καὶ μουσικὸν οὐκ ἐκ μου-
σικοῦ, πλὴν οὐκ ἐκ παντὸς ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀμούσου ἢ εἴ τι αὐτῶν
ἐστι μεταξύ. οὐδὲ δὴ φθείρεται εἰς τὸ τυχὸν πρῶτον, οἷον
τὸ λευκὸν οὐκ εἰς τὸ μουσικόν, πλὴν εἰ μή ποτε κατὰ συμ-
βεβηκός, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὸ μὴ λευκόν, καὶ οὐκ εἰς τὸ τυχὸν ἀλλ’
εἰς τὸ μέλαν ἢ τὸ μεταξύ·