Tag Archives: Aristotle

Aristotle’s Case Against Vegetarianism: Predator and Prey

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If it is a given that man is an animal, as is so famously articulated in Aristotle’s famous dictum that man is a social animal, then there should be no good reason to exclude ideas which, in general, are meant to apply to man as an animal, from animals.  So in the case of vegetarianism: if there is an argument suitably argued against vegetarianism for animals qua animals then it will apply to man insofar as he is an animal as well.

This is the case in an interesting passage from the first book of Aristotle’s Politics.

For some animals, when they are created, at the outset bring forth with them in the process of creation (τοῖς γεννωμένοις) so much nourishment as is adequate until the time when the animal itself is able to provide for itself; for example those animals which have larvae or eggs. As many animals as give birth to live young, they have nourishment in themselves for a given time, the substance called milk.  So that clearly one must think that [there is nourishment] for the things which have been created (γενομένοις), plants on account of animals and the other animals for the sake of humans.  The tame animals are for the use and nourishment of mankind, while the wild ones, if not all, most of them, are on account of nourishment and help, in order that clothes and other tools come to be from these.  And therefore, if nature does nothing in vain or without a purpose, it is necessary that nature made all of these on account of humans (Translation mine, Aristotle, Politics, 1256b10-22) [1]

Aristotle, not uncharacteristically, is running together lines of thought, arguments and assumptions.  He begins from the idea that in nature when an animal is in the process of being former, it is supplied by nature with some form of physical sustenance, such as an egg providing not only a type of shelter but also some nutrition for the growing embryo.  To Aristotle, this is a universal feature for animal life; even in the case of animals which give birth to live young, their mothers are capable of lactation to provide this same sustenance in a different manner.  Thus, the thinking goes, when an animal is past the initial stage of life, nature would likewise still provide it with nourishment as when it has reached the point of maturity.

Latent within this passage is the idea that once nature has delivered an animal into its full physical maturity, it will have come to possess capabilities to procure food by its own means.[2]  Thus, there is still a need for food, but the initial form of food, such as a lactating mother, is not longer present for the animal.  The animal feels the urge to continue feeding, and in Aristotle’s mind, it has a natural instinct to seek those things which will best suit its appetite.  Among those things are both plants and animals.  Thus vegetarianism is ruled out, albeit Aristotle does need some detail work in explaining the nuances of this idea in full.

Lastly, there is the point made about nature doing nothing in vain.  What does he mean in applying that thought in this case?  (1) Either that nature does not bring an animal into maturity to just let it die since it has no way to get food (e.g. a human baby dies because it cannot find food); but this would be absurd.  (2) Or nature does not bring an animal into existence for it not be used in the proper way (i.e. cows are made for hamburgers, for leather, and for milk) (3) Or both, to put it somewhat directly, the predator and prey are made for a purpose, and both fulfill their roles.

REFERENCES:

[1]  καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν τὰ μὲν συνεκ- (10)
τίκτει τῶν ζῴων τοσαύτην τροφὴν ὥσθ’ ἱκανὴν εἶναι μέχρις
οὗ ἂν δύνηται αὐτὸ αὑτῷ πορίζειν τὸ γεννηθέν, οἷον ὅσα
σκωληκοτοκεῖ ἢ ᾠοτοκεῖ· ὅσα δὲ ζῳοτοκεῖ, τοῖς γεννωμένοις
ἔχει τροφὴν ἐν αὑτοῖς μέχρι τινός, τὴν τοῦ καλουμένου γά-
λακτος φύσιν. ὥστε ὁμοίως δῆλον ὅτι καὶ γενομένοις οἰη- (15)
τέον τά τε φυτὰ τῶν ζῴων ἕνεκεν εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα
τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάριν, τὰ μὲν ἥμερα καὶ διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν
καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφήν, τῶν δ’ ἀγρίων, εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ
τά γε πλεῖστα τῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἄλλης βοηθείας ἕνεκεν, ἵνα
καὶ ἐσθὴς καὶ ἄλλα ὄργανα γίνηται ἐξ αὐτῶν. εἰ οὖν ἡ (20)
φύσις μηθὲν μήτε ἀτελὲς ποιεῖ μήτε μάτην, ἀναγκαῖον
τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἕνεκεν αὐτὰ πάντα πεποιηκέναι τὴν φύσιν.

[2]  Unsurprisingly, Aristotle will include hunting among the means.

10 Things You Need To Know About Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

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1.  Why is it called the Nicomachean Ethics?
The Nicomachean Ethics is a book written by Aristotle named for Nicomachus (Νικόμαχος), which in keeping with the Greek practice of boys being named after their grandfathers, was the name of both Aristotle’s father and his son.  Accordingly, we are unsure if the book was dedicated to or inspired by either Aristotle’s father or son, or perhaps his grandfather, who was confusingly also named Nicomachus.1)See Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of Famous Philosophers, Book V, Aristotle, for more (though perhaps dubious) information on the biography of Aristotle  There is a tradition that holds, though, that the book was named after Aristotle’s son.

2.  The “Hidden Meaning” of Nicomachus
Nicomachus means “victor in the battle,” so it perhaps is no surprise that courage is the very first virtue discussed in detail, as Aristotle makes it a point to say that the prime exemplification of courage is courage in battle.  He further contends that the other uses of the word courage are really an extension of this primary usage from war.

3.  The Chief Good
The inquiry which serves to guide the entire enterprise of the Nichomachean Ethics is answering the question as to what is the chief human good.  The chief good, still familiar to us today through use of the Latin term, summum bonum, is that thing at which all people aim, and for which all other things are done.  Aristotle says that happiness is the chief good, and famously says that happiness is an “activity of reason in accordance with virtue… and this is in a full life” (1098a16-18).2)τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ’ ἀρετήν… ἔτι δ’ ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ.  This last point is meant to emphasize that in order to achieve the chief good one must live a complete life of excellence, all the way unto death.

4.  Did Aristotle write anything else on ethics?
The Nicomachean Ethics is not the only work by Aristotle on the subject of ethics, or practical living.  There is also the Eudemian Ethics and the Magna Moralia, sometimes also called the Great Ethics.  While the Eudemian Ethics is considered genuine, many scholars cast doubt on the Aristotelian authorship of the Magna Moralia, and most believe the comparatively small On Virtues and Vices is not by Aristotle.

5.  Don’t forget politics…
In our modern world, we seldom expect politics and ethics to go together.  However, this was exactly the layout in Aristotle’s plan for the Ethics.  Near the end of the treatise, he makes a point to say that in order to complete this discussion of human affairs, a study of the constitutions of different cities must be undertaken.  Although the human good, i.e. happiness, is something that is pursued by an individual, it is actualized within the confines of a Greek city-state (polis).  Thus, the important and appropriate conditions of virtue must be cultivated by those knowledgable about politics; only in such a system can the virtuous man live.

6.  Many Virtues in Two Divisions
Aristotle divided up his virtues into two main kinds, though this is not to say that he believed the virtues were in fact separable from each other.  On the one hand there are virtues of character: courage (andreia), moderation (sophrosyne),  generosity (eleutheriotes), munificence (megaloprepeia), magnanimity (megalopsuchia), mildness (praotes), and justice (dikaiosyne), as well as others dealing with sociability.  While the intellectual virtues are scientific knowledge (episteme), craftsmanship (techne), prudence (phronesis), intelligence (nous), wisdom (sophia), understanding (synesis), and sense (gnome).

7.  Eudaimonia
A word that often causes non-Greek readers of the Ethics problems is eudaimonia.  This is often translated as “happiness.”  The root of the word means something like “well-favored by a god.”  It is literally “well-demoned,” except that “demon” here is a rather positive term, unlike our English usage, and it means something like a demigod or divine being.  Furthermore, this “happiness” does not correspond to a feeling, as our word does, but it confers a type of status on someone, what we might call flourishing or a blessed state.  More helpful than this Greek term is what was said in point 3 above: happiness or eudaimonia is an “activity of reason in accordance with virtue… and this is in a full life.”

8.  Virtue and Ethics
The Greek word arete is often translated virtue or excellence.  In fact, what this second translation demonstrates is that for an ancient Greek, arete covered excellence in any area, such as a horse, a hammer or a human.  In our day, we could even extend this usage and say there is an arete of a car, i.e., that excellence which good cars demonstrate when they are being driven.  Our word “ethics” derives from the Greek word ethike, meaning those things “pertaining to and expressing traits of character.”  We should be wary, then, of attributing to Aristotle a moral system in our modern understanding of that term.

9.  Aristotle and Virtue Ethics
Aristotle, in writing the Nicomachean Ethics, initiated the school of theorizing today called Virtue Ethics.  In this system, more emphasis is placed on cultivating the character and virtues of an individual so that one becomes a virtuous person, whereas other major ethical theories tend to focus on either rules or outcomes.

10.  NE or EN?
Often either the initials NE or EN are used to refer to the Nicomachean Ethics.  The reason for this is that NE stands for the English Nicomachean Ethics, while EN stands for Latin Ethica Nicomachea.  Both refer to the same book, yet Latin observes a different word order from English.  Why the Latin title?  Many of Aristotle’s treatises have a Latin name, some of which are more popular than the English title, such as De Anima (On the Soul) while other times the English name is the only one most people are familiar with, e.g. Parts of Animals (De Partibus Animalium). 

References   [ + ]

1. ↑ See Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of Famous Philosophers, Book V, Aristotle, for more (though perhaps dubious) information on the biography of Aristotle
2. ↑ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ’ ἀρετήν… ἔτι δ’ ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ.

Aristotle’s Courage: A Clear and Short Explanation

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Aristotle defines, defends and explains a number of virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics, invoking examples and arguments to make a case for what is his understanding of the virtue in question, taking for granted that the virtue in question is in fact a virtue and worthy of cultivation.

One such virtue, I expect, that none would object to is the virtue of courage.  And this, in fact, is the first virtue Aristotle speaks about in detail.

Now, like all virtues, the virtue of courage (andreia, literally ‘manliness’)1)ἀνδρεία deals with a mean, that is, a midpoint of moderation between two extreme points, which should both be avoided as they either involve excess or deficiency.  On the side of excess there is boldness (tharsos),2)1115a7 θάρσος while the result of a deficiency is fear (phobos).3)((φόβος))  Lastly, harkening back to the language of moderation, Aristotle says that the one who exceeds in fearlessness is rash (thrasus)4)θρᾰσύς 1115b29 while he who exceeds in fearing is a coward (deilos).5)δειλός 1115b34

In order to describe the domain in which courage is operative, Aristotle next makes the rather obvious point that we fear all bad things6)1115a10 πάντα τὰ κακά so that it is commonly said that fear is an expectation7)1115a9 προσδοκία of bad things.  However, merely not fearing fearful things is not sufficient to call someone courageous.  For example, a virtuous man should rightly fear the loss of a good reputation; it would be absurd to suggest he is not courageous because he fears the loss of his reputation.  As this example shows, the appropriateness or not, of courage in the right circumstances ought to inform us as to whether someone is actually courageous or not.

Aristotle does not, as we just said, simply bestow the title of courageous upon anyone, so long as they lack fear, no matter the situation.  Rather, he defines the courageous person thus:

The courageous man withstands and fears those things which it is necessary [to fear and withstand] and on account of the right reason, and how and when it is necessary [to fear or withstand] them, and likewise in the case of being bold (1116b17-19)8)ὁ μὲν οὖν ἃ δεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος·

This passage illuminates several points.  The most obvious is that the man of courage acts courageously in a qualified way: at the right time, in the right manner, with the right motivation, etc.  This is why Aristotle also says that those who do not fear being poor (i.e. they waste their money) are not courageous and those who commit suicide to escape certain things are behaving cowardly (1116a13).  This passage also tells us the courageous man is both fearful AND bold, but he is such in the right time, right manner, for the right reason. This right reason, or the correct motivation, as Aristotle repeats or implies several times,9)see also: 1116a15, 1116b3, 1117b20 is that courageous acts are conducted with an eye on the correct purpose, or what is commonly translated as the “final cause.”10)οὗ ἕνεκα  As he helpfully tells us at 1115b, the purpose for which courageous acts are done is the “fine” or “noble” (kalon).11)καλόν  Aristotle, at this point, does not explain the fine sufficiently, but he does offer this up to reinforce its centrality, “Indeed, on account of the fine the courageous man withstands and does what he does in accordance with courage.”12)καλοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν.

Perhaps to better understand Aristotle’s conception of the fine as it relates to the courageous, we should look to the paradigmatic case of courage.  For Aristotle, as for many of us, the soldier in battle is the best example of courage.  He gives us a couple of reasons to believe this is so.  The first is that death, of all things, is the most frightening.13)1115a26  Yet, it is not just any kind of death, but death in war, for this is the finest.14)Strongly implied, as the answer to the question, “Is it in the finest?” (1115a29-30)  What this shows is that courage is shown best in situations in which “there is a fight” (1115b4).15)ἀλκή  The fact also, Aristotle thinks, that we most publicly honor those who either die in battle or successfully overcome the enemy, is a proof that this is the highest type of courage.  In light of this, he also notes that courage has more to do with fearful things than bold things, although of course it involves both.  What he means is that we praise the courageous man because he is able to withstand the painful and not because he restrains himself from the pleasurable, for the first is more difficult.

 

 

References   [ + ]

1. ↑ ἀνδρεία
2. ↑ 1115a7 θάρσος
3. ↑ ((φόβος))
4. ↑ θρᾰσύς 1115b29
5. ↑ δειλός 1115b34
6. ↑ 1115a10 πάντα τὰ κακά
7. ↑ 1115a9 προσδοκία
8. ↑ ὁ μὲν οὖν ἃ δεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος·
9. ↑ see also: 1116a15, 1116b3, 1117b20
10. ↑ οὗ ἕνεκα
11. ↑ καλόν
12. ↑ καλοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν.
13. ↑ 1115a26
14. ↑ Strongly implied, as the answer to the question, “Is it in the finest?” (1115a29-30)
15. ↑ ἀλκή