Tag Archives: ethics

Old Age and Justice in the Republic

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Near the beginning of the Politics Aristotle says that the young should not study politics, for they have not yet acquired the experience requisite for such a science.  Perhaps a similar concern, free of prohibition, offers Plato a reason to introduce the character of Cephalus at the beginning of the Republic.

Cephalus, as it turns out, is a very old man.(1)  Socrates tells us that he is very eager to speak to the aged, because all have to travel down the path of old age, and he wants to know “what kind of road it is, rough and difficult, or easy and passable.”(2)  Plato uses Cephalus, as seems plain from his hasty exit, for a characteristically dramatic and philosophical purpose.  Cephalus himself elaborates on the topic of old age, eagerly opining to a rare audience, Socrates, that although the carousing long nights of youth are no longer possible, gone also is the despotism of sexual desire.  More importantly, he mentions that though wealth is a palliative in old age, character is more important.(3)  More somberly, Cephalus continues on to admit that of late he has been haunted by the fear of his life after death— the hand of death is beginning to point at him.  “The tales told concerning those in Hades, how it is necessary that those who have been unjust must pay the penalty there, although entirely laughable up to this point, at that point [of encroaching mortality] they harrow his soul that they may be true.” (4)

Cephalus emphasizes however, that just deeds, stored and accumulated throughout a life, are a sweet hope to the man in old age that he will escape such horrors.  It is from Cephalus then, by the exortation of old age, the idea that a complete life must be lived justly in order to reap the easy conscience of old age, and that character, informed by the requirements of justice may allow a soul to pass into the blessed afterworld, that the great themes of justice and morality are introduced into the dialogue.  Far from being an abstract treatise, Plato foresees for us a path that all must take, that of a burdensome or light old age, and gives us no determination of the fate of Cephalus, but bids us examine our own.

 

REFERENCES:

Translations mine.

  1. 328b9 μάλα πρεσβύτης
  2. 328e3-4 ποία τίς ἐστιν, τραχεῖα καὶ χαλεπή,
    ἢ ῥᾳδία καὶ εὔπορος.
  3. 329d3 ὁ τρόπος
  4. 330d7-e2 οἵ τε γὰρ λεγόμενοι μῦθοι περὶ
    τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου, ὡς τὸν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσαντα δεῖ ἐκεῖ διδόναι δίκην, καταγελώμενοι τέως, τότε δὴ στρέφουσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ ἀληθεῖς ὦσιν·

Aristotle’s Courage: A Clear and Short Explanation

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Aristotle defines, defends and explains a number of virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics, invoking examples and arguments to make a case for what is his understanding of the virtue in question, taking for granted that the virtue in question is in fact a virtue and worthy of cultivation.

One such virtue, I expect, that none would object to is the virtue of courage.  And this, in fact, is the first virtue Aristotle speaks about in detail.

Now, like all virtues, the virtue of courage (andreia, literally ‘manliness’)1)ἀνδρεία deals with a mean, that is, a midpoint of moderation between two extreme points, which should both be avoided as they either involve excess or deficiency.  On the side of excess there is boldness (tharsos),2)1115a7 θάρσος while the result of a deficiency is fear (phobos).3)((φόβος))  Lastly, harkening back to the language of moderation, Aristotle says that the one who exceeds in fearlessness is rash (thrasus)4)θρᾰσύς 1115b29 while he who exceeds in fearing is a coward (deilos).5)δειλός 1115b34

In order to describe the domain in which courage is operative, Aristotle next makes the rather obvious point that we fear all bad things6)1115a10 πάντα τὰ κακά so that it is commonly said that fear is an expectation7)1115a9 προσδοκία of bad things.  However, merely not fearing fearful things is not sufficient to call someone courageous.  For example, a virtuous man should rightly fear the loss of a good reputation; it would be absurd to suggest he is not courageous because he fears the loss of his reputation.  As this example shows, the appropriateness or not, of courage in the right circumstances ought to inform us as to whether someone is actually courageous or not.

Aristotle does not, as we just said, simply bestow the title of courageous upon anyone, so long as they lack fear, no matter the situation.  Rather, he defines the courageous person thus:

The courageous man withstands and fears those things which it is necessary [to fear and withstand] and on account of the right reason, and how and when it is necessary [to fear or withstand] them, and likewise in the case of being bold (1116b17-19)8)ὁ μὲν οὖν ἃ δεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος·

This passage illuminates several points.  The most obvious is that the man of courage acts courageously in a qualified way: at the right time, in the right manner, with the right motivation, etc.  This is why Aristotle also says that those who do not fear being poor (i.e. they waste their money) are not courageous and those who commit suicide to escape certain things are behaving cowardly (1116a13).  This passage also tells us the courageous man is both fearful AND bold, but he is such in the right time, right manner, for the right reason. This right reason, or the correct motivation, as Aristotle repeats or implies several times,9)see also: 1116a15, 1116b3, 1117b20 is that courageous acts are conducted with an eye on the correct purpose, or what is commonly translated as the “final cause.”10)οὗ ἕνεκα  As he helpfully tells us at 1115b, the purpose for which courageous acts are done is the “fine” or “noble” (kalon).11)καλόν  Aristotle, at this point, does not explain the fine sufficiently, but he does offer this up to reinforce its centrality, “Indeed, on account of the fine the courageous man withstands and does what he does in accordance with courage.”12)καλοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν.

Perhaps to better understand Aristotle’s conception of the fine as it relates to the courageous, we should look to the paradigmatic case of courage.  For Aristotle, as for many of us, the soldier in battle is the best example of courage.  He gives us a couple of reasons to believe this is so.  The first is that death, of all things, is the most frightening.13)1115a26  Yet, it is not just any kind of death, but death in war, for this is the finest.14)Strongly implied, as the answer to the question, “Is it in the finest?” (1115a29-30)  What this shows is that courage is shown best in situations in which “there is a fight” (1115b4).15)ἀλκή  The fact also, Aristotle thinks, that we most publicly honor those who either die in battle or successfully overcome the enemy, is a proof that this is the highest type of courage.  In light of this, he also notes that courage has more to do with fearful things than bold things, although of course it involves both.  What he means is that we praise the courageous man because he is able to withstand the painful and not because he restrains himself from the pleasurable, for the first is more difficult.

 

 

References   [ + ]

1. ↑ ἀνδρεία
2. ↑ 1115a7 θάρσος
3. ↑ ((φόβος))
4. ↑ θρᾰσύς 1115b29
5. ↑ δειλός 1115b34
6. ↑ 1115a10 πάντα τὰ κακά
7. ↑ 1115a9 προσδοκία
8. ↑ ὁ μὲν οὖν ἃ δεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος·
9. ↑ see also: 1116a15, 1116b3, 1117b20
10. ↑ οὗ ἕνεκα
11. ↑ καλόν
12. ↑ καλοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν.
13. ↑ 1115a26
14. ↑ Strongly implied, as the answer to the question, “Is it in the finest?” (1115a29-30)
15. ↑ ἀλκή

Mirroring the Ego: Aristotle’s Origin of Friendship Part 1

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Like few philosophers before or since, Aristotle is a keen taxonomist.  He orders and arranges things, ideas and arguments into various categories, some of which are very helpful.  Others seem bizarre or quaint to the modern reader.

In the Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle devotes an entire chapter to discussing friendship.  Aristotle divides friendships into three categories: the perfect, the pleasurable, and the useful.  As one could guess, you can do no better than a perfect friendship.  As Aristotle launches upon one of his characteristic asides he discusses the origin of friendship in general.

The marks of friendship with respect to the relationships of our intimates, and by which friendships themselves are defined, appear to come from our relationship with ourselves.  For they define the friend as someone who wishes or does the good, or what appears good, on account of the other, or as someone who wishes his friend to exist and to live for his own sake.  This is the same thing mothers feel toward their children, or friends who have come into conflict.  Others define the friend as someone who spends time and chooses the same things as his friend or as someone who shares in the joy and sorrow of the friend.  This latter definition especially concerns mothers.  With one of these ideas they also define friendship.  Each of these is found in the good man’s relation with himself (and with respect to other men, in that way in which they think they are such, just as it is said, virtue and the good man seem to be the measure for each).  The good man is likeminded with himself, and he grasps at the same things with his entire soul.  And he wishes the good for himself and what appears to be good, and he does it (for to do good is characteristic of a good man) and on account of himself (that is, for the sake of the intellectual faculty, which very thing each man seems to be).

τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας, καὶ οἷς αἱ φιλίαι ὁρίζονται, ἔοικεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐληλυθέναι. τιθέασι γὰρ φίλον τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ πράττοντα τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, ἢ τὸν βουλόμενον εἶναι καὶ 1166a.5ζῆν τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν· ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες πρὸς τὰ τέκνα πεπόνθασι, καὶ τῶν φίλων οἱ προσκεκρουκότες. οἳ δὲ τὸν συνδιάγοντα καὶ ταὐτὰ αἱρούμενον, ἢ τὸν συναλγοῦντα καὶ συγχαίροντα τῷ φίλῳ· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς μητέρας συμβαίνει. τούτων δέ τινι καὶ τὴν φιλίαν 1166a.10ὁρίζονται. πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ ὑπάρχει (τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς, ᾗ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι· ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, μέτρον ἑκάστων ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι)· οὗτος γὰρ ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν· καὶ βούλεται 1166a.15δὴ ἑαυτῷ τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πράττει (τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τἀγαθὸν διαπονεῖν) καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα (τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ)· NE 1166a1-17

Here as elsewhere, Aristotle appeals to the definition of friendship as someone wishing well for another person for the sake of that person.  To perhaps oversimplify it: relational altruism.  Now altruism, as it turns out, is quite the tedious topic, tending toward an exhaustive regress.  Every time seemingly altruistic motives are displayed, a gainsayer can point here or there and say, “See, you really did it to satisfy x or y for yourself!”  This problem or paradox of altruism, however, as vexatious as it is for us, does not seem to have arisen by the time of Aristotle.  Nevertheless, since this definition– doing something for someone else’s sake alone –seems integral to Aristotle’s attempts at understanding friendship, we are saddled with solving the implications of this difficulty ourselves.

The problem is that Aristotle affirms (1) Friendship is wishing well for the other for his own sake (2) Friendship originates from the relationship we have for ourselves.  The difficulty for me in accepting both these beliefs is that (1) seems precluded by (2).  If friendship is really an extension of my own relationship toward myself, then only in so far as that relationship partakes or mirrors my own relationship toward myself, can it be said that it is a friendship.  However, this very idea undercuts the notion that we do things merely for the sake of the friend as in (1).  For example, if a friendship either becomes or appears to become different than our relationship with ourselves, will we not dissolve the friendship?  Yes, as I understand it, in accord with (2), but no, if we consider (1) alone.

I will discuss in the next post a possible solution to this problem.