Misreading Aristotle’s “Leisurely Philosophy” in Cicero

In the fifth book of the Tusculan Disputations (concerning the self sufficiency of virtue) there are, it seems, several parallels or echoes of Aristotelian philosophy.  It is commonly accepted that Cicero read Aristotle, so this is not surprising.  Further, it is likewise not so shocking that Cicero might have misread Aristotle as well.  Aristotle famously says in the first book of Metaphysics that,

It is therefore probable that at first the inventor of any art which went further than the ordinary sensations was admired by his fellow-men, not merely because some of his inventions were useful, but as being a wise and superior person.  And as more and more arts were discovered, some relating to the necessities and some to the pastimes of life, the inventors of the latter were always considered wiser than those of the former, because their branches of knowledge did not aim at utility. Hence when all the discoveries of this kind were fully developed, the sciences which relate neither to pleasure nor yet to the necessities of life were invented, and first in those places where men had leisure (Metaphysics A.1, trans. Rackham) (1).

Cicero takes this as meaning that the first philosophers willingly put aside the distractions of a pragmatic life in order to give total devotion to philosophy:

Those who first directed themselves to the study of philosophy, so that, with all things being put aside, they were positioning themselves to whole-heartedly inquire into the best state of life (my translation) (2).  

This interpretation suggests the image of a retiring gentlemen leaning back in his recliner to focus his attention on the finer, and more pleasing, aspects of the intellect.  Although this may, in fact, have some of the intent of Aristotle’s account, and perhaps in no small part may explain his exaltation of the contemplative life, it strikes me as an oddly individualistic account. 

I have always read the account in the Metaphysics as at least a partial attempt at explaining a historical phenomenon.  When mankind had reached only so far in the ascent of science, it did not yet reach to the non-productive realm of the theoretical science, philosophy.  When it did, it philosophy was born, not of necessity, but of leisure. This is not an account of a single man, but of mankind,or at least the Greeks.

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Notes:

  1.  Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον εἰκὸς τὸν ὁποιανοῦν εὑρόντα τέχνην παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς αἰσθήσεις θαυμάζεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, μὴ μόνον διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναί τι τῶν εὑρεθέντων, ἀλλ᾿ ὡς σοφὸν καὶ διαφέροντα τῶν ἄλλων· πλειόνων δ᾿ εὑρισκομένων τεχνῶν, καὶ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα, τῶν δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν οὐσῶν, ἀεὶ σοφωτέρους τοὺς τοιούτους ἐκείνων ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι,1 διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν εἶναι τὰς ἐπιστήμας αὐτῶν. ὅθεν ἤδη πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κατεσκευασμένων αἱ μὴ πρὸς ἡδονὴν μηδὲ πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εὑρέθησαν, καὶ πρῶτον ἐν τούτοις τοῖς τόποις οὗπερ ἐσχόλασαν (~981b13 ff). 
  2. …qui primi se ad philosophiae studium contulerunt, ut omnibus rebus posthabitis totos se in optimo vitae statu exquirendo collocarent… (Tusculan Disputations 5.1).

Ancient Philosophy Links March 19-25

QUOTATION:

We take it that the person who the capacity to know difficult things, that is, things that are not easy for humans to know–he is wise” Aristotle, Metaphysics A2

BOOKS PUBLISHED:

PLOTINUS: Ennead IV.7: On the Immortality of the Soul: Translation, with an Introduction and Commentary (The Enneads of Plotinus) Paperback – March 24, 2016
by Barrie Fleet (Author)

Plotinus the Platonist
by David Yount

The Poverty of Eros in Plato’s Symposium
by Lorelle D. Lamascus

Augustine and Academic Skepticism: A Philosophical Study
by Blake Dutton

BOOK REVIEWS:

NB: Book titles are linked to Amazon, by lines are linked to review

HÅVARD LØKKE
Knowledge and Virtue in Early Stoicism
Reviewed by Nathan Powers, State University of New York at Albany

FRANÇOIS RENAUD AND HAROLD TARRANT
The Platonic Alcibiades I: The Dialogue and its Ancient Reception
Reviewed by Francisco J. Gonzalez, University of Ottawa

Mariska Leunissen, ed.
Aristotle’s Physics: A Critical Guide.
Reviewed by Karel Thein.

 

The Dynamics of Thought: “The Soul is All Things”

(This post assumes that thought or perception is self-cognizant, that is, that to have a perception or thought is to be aware of it, as a function of the perception or thought itself, and that awareness does not owe to some capacity over and above perception or thought itself.  See this post for Aristotle’s position.)

As an addendum to the idea that awareness is concomitant with all thought insofar as as it is thought, it is important to discuss the overall flexibility of the soul as a capacity par excellence. In contrast to some readings of the Platonic account which has all knowledge somehow latent within us in Recollection, the Aristotelian account maintains that thought is something entirely plastic and receptive to its objects. This is the case to such a degree that Aristotle can make the seemingly shocking statement that, “Let us now summarize our results about soul, and repeat that the soul is in a way all existing things” (De Anima 431b21, trans. Smith). This may in fact be the explanation for why Aristotle does not need to appeal to some feature over and above the mere presence of a thought to account for an awareness of that thought. For if the soul were not an all-accommodating capacity, a potentiality, then this would mean it would have only a capacity determinate for certain thoughts; it could only have an awareness of those objects for which it was a determinate capacity. This would entail that if the soul were to meet anything outside the confines of its proscribed capacity, it would not be aware of them.  Yet this is absurd; anything we think of, we are aware of. Therefore, if we want to preserve the feature of psychology that thought brings with it an awareness of itself, we would do well by also maintaining, with Aristotle, that the “soul is all things.”