Tag Archives: philosophy

Aristotle’s Courage: A Clear and Short Explanation

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Aristotle defines, defends and explains a number of virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics, invoking examples and arguments to make a case for what is his understanding of the virtue in question, taking for granted that the virtue in question is in fact a virtue and worthy of cultivation.

One such virtue, I expect, that none would object to is the virtue of courage.  And this, in fact, is the first virtue Aristotle speaks about in detail.

Now, like all virtues, the virtue of courage (andreia, literally ‘manliness’)1)ἀνδρεία deals with a mean, that is, a midpoint of moderation between two extreme points, which should both be avoided as they either involve excess or deficiency.  On the side of excess there is boldness (tharsos),2)1115a7 θάρσος while the result of a deficiency is fear (phobos).3)((φόβος))  Lastly, harkening back to the language of moderation, Aristotle says that the one who exceeds in fearlessness is rash (thrasus)4)θρᾰσύς 1115b29 while he who exceeds in fearing is a coward (deilos).5)δειλός 1115b34

In order to describe the domain in which courage is operative, Aristotle next makes the rather obvious point that we fear all bad things6)1115a10 πάντα τὰ κακά so that it is commonly said that fear is an expectation7)1115a9 προσδοκία of bad things.  However, merely not fearing fearful things is not sufficient to call someone courageous.  For example, a virtuous man should rightly fear the loss of a good reputation; it would be absurd to suggest he is not courageous because he fears the loss of his reputation.  As this example shows, the appropriateness or not, of courage in the right circumstances ought to inform us as to whether someone is actually courageous or not.

Aristotle does not, as we just said, simply bestow the title of courageous upon anyone, so long as they lack fear, no matter the situation.  Rather, he defines the courageous person thus:

The courageous man withstands and fears those things which it is necessary [to fear and withstand] and on account of the right reason, and how and when it is necessary [to fear or withstand] them, and likewise in the case of being bold (1116b17-19)8)ὁ μὲν οὖν ἃ δεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος·

This passage illuminates several points.  The most obvious is that the man of courage acts courageously in a qualified way: at the right time, in the right manner, with the right motivation, etc.  This is why Aristotle also says that those who do not fear being poor (i.e. they waste their money) are not courageous and those who commit suicide to escape certain things are behaving cowardly (1116a13).  This passage also tells us the courageous man is both fearful AND bold, but he is such in the right time, right manner, for the right reason. This right reason, or the correct motivation, as Aristotle repeats or implies several times,9)see also: 1116a15, 1116b3, 1117b20 is that courageous acts are conducted with an eye on the correct purpose, or what is commonly translated as the “final cause.”10)οὗ ἕνεκα  As he helpfully tells us at 1115b, the purpose for which courageous acts are done is the “fine” or “noble” (kalon).11)καλόν  Aristotle, at this point, does not explain the fine sufficiently, but he does offer this up to reinforce its centrality, “Indeed, on account of the fine the courageous man withstands and does what he does in accordance with courage.”12)καλοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν.

Perhaps to better understand Aristotle’s conception of the fine as it relates to the courageous, we should look to the paradigmatic case of courage.  For Aristotle, as for many of us, the soldier in battle is the best example of courage.  He gives us a couple of reasons to believe this is so.  The first is that death, of all things, is the most frightening.13)1115a26  Yet, it is not just any kind of death, but death in war, for this is the finest.14)Strongly implied, as the answer to the question, “Is it in the finest?” (1115a29-30)  What this shows is that courage is shown best in situations in which “there is a fight” (1115b4).15)ἀλκή  The fact also, Aristotle thinks, that we most publicly honor those who either die in battle or successfully overcome the enemy, is a proof that this is the highest type of courage.  In light of this, he also notes that courage has more to do with fearful things than bold things, although of course it involves both.  What he means is that we praise the courageous man because he is able to withstand the painful and not because he restrains himself from the pleasurable, for the first is more difficult.

 

 

References   [ + ]

1. ↑ ἀνδρεία
2. ↑ 1115a7 θάρσος
3. ↑ ((φόβος))
4. ↑ θρᾰσύς 1115b29
5. ↑ δειλός 1115b34
6. ↑ 1115a10 πάντα τὰ κακά
7. ↑ 1115a9 προσδοκία
8. ↑ ὁ μὲν οὖν ἃ δεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος·
9. ↑ see also: 1116a15, 1116b3, 1117b20
10. ↑ οὗ ἕνεκα
11. ↑ καλόν
12. ↑ καλοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν.
13. ↑ 1115a26
14. ↑ Strongly implied, as the answer to the question, “Is it in the finest?” (1115a29-30)
15. ↑ ἀλκή

Does Aristotle’s Nature have One or Many Uses?

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In one of the many memorable passages in the first book of the Politics Aristotle is making the case for what we might call a division of labor.  Aristotle says that men and women are disposed such that men are the natural leaders while women are naturally subservient, similar to the relationship between master and slave.  On his understanding one must rule and another must be subject, the former belonging to intellect and the master while the body and the slave represent the subservient element.

Additionally, as part of promoting this argument, Aristotle says that things are made by nature so as to be distinct (and presumably complementary).

Therefore the feminine and the slavish are distinguished (for Nature makes no such thing as the blacksmiths make the Delphic knife, in need of something, but Nature makes one thing for one thing.  For in this way each tool will turn out most splendidly, not serving many functions but one) (1252b1-5).1)οὖν διώρισται τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον (οὐθὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσιςποιεῖ τοιοῦτον οἷον οἱ χαλκοτύποι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν,πενιχρῶς, ἀλλ’ ἓν πρὸς ἕν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἀποτελοῖτο κάλλιστα τῶν ὀργάνων ἕκαστον, μὴ πολλοῖς ἔργοις ἀλλ’ ἑνὶ δουλεῦον.

Now unfortunately, we do not know the exact utility or makeup of this “Delphic knife,” so we have to make some guesses as to its exact use.  Walter Burkert notes, “the Delphic knives were made in a special form which we are unable to construct with certainty in spite of numerous ironical allusions.”2)Homo Necans, 1984, pg. 119  There is also the proverbial saying that, “When you sacrifice at Delphi, you will have to bring extra meat for yourself.”3)Com.adesp. 460; Plut. Q. conv. 709a  This may imply that not only does the knife cut, but, as a second function, it takes away the meat.

So, with one line of interpretation, we might say that the Delphic knife is like that uniquely American contraption, the spork, half-spoon, half-fork, serving as both that which cuts the sacrificial victim and that which serves this meat as a kind of spatula.  (It matters little which two particular roles the knife is serving in this scenario, as long as we ascribe to it more than one).  Now keep in mind, on analogy with either the man/woman or master/slave dynamic, in those relations the man is retaining a single role in that as both husband and master he is the ruling element, in virtue of his intellect.  In the case of the Delphic knife, it tries to do too much, and, incurs the contempt of Aristotle just as much as a Swiss Army knife would.

There is another passage in the Parts of Animals however, which, in enumerating the uses of tails, makes this statement:

There are many differences of tails, and nature makes use of it in the following ways, not only as a protection and covering of the bottom, but also as a help and use for those possessing it (690a1-4).4)No Greek as the TLG does not yet have this text!

Previously Aristotle had also mentioned the various functions of the Elephant’s trunk.

Therefore the elephant has for breathing a nostril [i.e. trunk], just as each of the other animals having a lung, but because he spends his time in water and his torpid egress from water the nostril is lengthened and able to wrap around things.  And with his [fore]feet being deprived of their use, Nature, as we said, uses the nostril as a help toward that help which the feet normally supplies (659a30-37).5)No Greek as the TLG does not yet have this text!

So in these two passages from the Parts of Animals we see that Aristotle does not have a problem in granting that different parts of animals, at least, can and do have multiple functions.

Where does this leave us with regard to the statement above in the Politics, that “Nature makes one thing for one thing.  For in this way each tool will turn out most splendidly, not serving many functions but one?”  Does Nature make one thing for one thing or many things?  Is the elephant not “splendid” because its trunk is used for many purposes instead of just one?  But doesn’t Nature also make the elephant?

Perhaps the overarching purpose of an organism is what Aristotle means when he talks about Nature making one thing for one thing.  That is, nature makes men to rule (even though their hands, or eyebrows, etc serve many ends) and elephants to serve X role (even though their trunks can be used both to breathe and as hands).

Or is Aristotle just changing his mind on the subject, or inconsistent, or most frustrating of all, is he just being brilliantly opaque, as he so often can be?

References   [ + ]

1. ↑ οὖν διώρισται τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον (οὐθὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσιςποιεῖ τοιοῦτον οἷον οἱ χαλκοτύποι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν,πενιχρῶς, ἀλλ’ ἓν πρὸς ἕν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἀποτελοῖτο κάλλιστα τῶν ὀργάνων ἕκαστον, μὴ πολλοῖς ἔργοις ἀλλ’ ἑνὶ δουλεῦον.
2. ↑ Homo Necans, 1984, pg. 119
3. ↑ Com.adesp. 460; Plut. Q. conv. 709a
4. ↑ No Greek as the TLG does not yet have this text!
5. ↑ No Greek as the TLG does not yet have this text!

You are Always Changing, Death is but Another Change

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The time of a human life is a point; its essence flows away, its perception is dim, the assemblage of the whole body is quick to decay, the soul is a roundabout, fortune is hard to interpret, fame is uncertain. To speak to someone who understands, all the things of the body are a river, while all the things of the soul are a dream and a delusion. Life is a war and the dwelling place of a sojourner, posthumous fame is oblivion. What, therefore, is able to be an escort [in life]? The one and only thing is philosophy. And philosophy is this, to preserve the god inside of us to be free of violence and unharmed, to be greater than pleasures and pains, doing nothing vainly or dishonestly or with hypocrisy, not being at a loss to do anything or not do anything. And yet it still accepts the things that come about and are portioned out, since they come from that same place where it came. And in general philosophy is accepting death with a gracious understanding, as nothing other than a dissolution of the elements from which each living creature is composed. And yet if there is nothing terrible in the elements themselves wherein each thing changes continuously into another thing, why would someone mistrust the change and dissolution of everything? For it is in accordance with nature. And there is nothing evil in accordance with nature. 1
 Meditations II.17

This is the last chapter of Book 2. Marcus, as he does continuously, is mindful and considerate of his own mortality, pondering fate not as an emotional spur so as to accomplish great deeds, but with an eye toward rationally digesting what personal death means within the scope of nature and the divine order. We would unfairly burden Marcus if we were to require of him a level of clarity which cannot be expected of a work aimed for personal reflection, so instead I approach the Meditations as a work which often needs its thoughts and arguments to be drawn out. This is one such section.

Far from being dour, as the stereotype of a frowning Stoic might allow us to infer, Marcus, although he begins by listing off the shortcomings of our human mortality, is in actuality laying out the case for the radical change we are constantly undergoing in our lives already. Even when a human is living, he is only a point (στιγμή), a thing both definite and small. The soul is often considered by the common person, no doubt because of its perceived persistence, as the element which truly constitutes the self. Yet even the soul, in Marcus’ words, is transient. It is called a ῥόμβος, meaning either a magic wheel or a whirling motion. Clearly motion is the emphasis, so I have translated it as roundabout.

The one constant thing in our lives, if we are fortune enough to have cultivated it, is philosophy. The job of philosophy is to cultivate our inner self to be morally pure and personally disciplined. This undertaking, however, is not to be done outside of or independent of the fated events which are doled out by the universe. In fact, Marcus tells us, philosophy is especially purposeful towards the goal of receiving death, perhaps the most disturbing of our fated events, with a glad heart (ἵλεῳ τῇ γνώμῃ). The gleeful acceptance of our death reflects a philosophically resigned mind.

As Marcus established the transience of both the body and soul, he points out that they are both made out of the same stuff as everything else in the universe. Since we are not disturbed at the constant flux of our constitutive elements as we live, we should not be alarmed at the final dissolution of the elements which make ourselves, as both bodies and souls.

1 Τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου βίου ὁ μὲν χρόνος στιγμή, ἡ δὲ οὐσία ῥέουσα, ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις ἀμυδρά, ἡ δὲ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος σύγκρισις εὔσηπτος, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ῥόμβος, ἡ δὲ τύχη δυστέκμαρτον, ἡ δὲ φήμη ἄκριτον: συνελόντι δὲ εἰπεῖν, πάντα τὰ μὲν τοῦ σώματος ποταμός, τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄνειρος καὶ τῦφος, ὁ δὲ βίος πόλεμος καὶ ξένου ἐπιδημία, [2] ἡ δὲ ὑστεροφημία λήθη. τί οὖν τὸ παραπέμψαι δυνάμενον; ἓν καὶ μόνον φιλοσοφία: τοῦτο δὲ ἐν τῷ τηρεῖν τὸν ἔνδον δαίμονα ἀνύβριστον καὶ ἀσινῆ, ἡδονῶν καὶ πόνων κρείσσονα, μηδὲν εἰκῇ ποιοῦντα μηδὲ διεψευσμένως καὶ μεθ̓ ὑποκρίσεως, ἀνενδεῆ τοῦ ἄλλον ποιῆσαί τι ἢ μὴ ποιῆσαι: ἔτι δὲ τὰ συμβαίνοντα καὶ ἀπονεμόμενα δεχόμενον ὡς ἐκεῖθέν ποθεν ἐρχόμενα, ὅθεν αὐτὸς ἦλθεν: ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ τὸν θάνατον ἵλεῳ τῇ γνώμῃ περιμένοντα ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ λύσιν τῶν στοιχείων, ἐξ ὧν ἕκαστον ζῷον συγκρίνεται. εἰ δὲ αὐτοῖς τοῖς στοιχείοις μηδὲν δεινὸν ἐν τῷ ἕκαστον διηνεκῶς εἰς ἕτερον μεταβάλλειν, διὰ τί ὑπίδηταί τις τὴν πάντων μεταβολὴν καὶ διάλυσιν; κατὰ φύσιν γάρ: οὐδὲν δὲ κακὸν κατὰ φύσιν. Τὰ ἐν Καρνούντῳ.