Tag Archives: philosophy

The Four Predicables: Definition

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Aristotle, in Topica 1.IV, discussed the basis of propositions and problems, the later of which are merely the former recast in question form.  A proposition is assumed to be of the form, “A is an X.”  Thus, we have the traditionally assigned term, “predicable,” that is, something which can be predicated of a thing.  For example, “John is a two footed animal” or “Man is capable of learning to type” are two propositions and each subject, “John” and “Man” has something predicated of it, respectively a “two footed animal,” and “capable of learning to type.”  Whether Aristotle has intended to exhaustively account for all predicables, that is, attributes which are said to be about some thing “X”, we do not know.  It does appear though, that this four-fold division into definition, property, genus and accident is able to suffice for all practical purposes.
Let us look now at all the first predicable, definition.

One must speak about what definition is, what a property is, what a genus is, and what an accident is.  A definition is a phrase which signifies the essence.  A phrase is either given in exchange for a word or a phrase in exchange for another phrase.  For it is possible for one of the things being signified to be defined by a phrase.  When people make a proposition by assigning a name by some way, it is obvious that they do not give the definition of a thing, since every definition is a kind of phrase.  Indeed one must consider such a thing “definitional”, such as, “the seemly is noble.”  And likewise, “Whether perception and knowledge are the same thing or different?”  For most of the effort concerning definitions is whether something is the same or different.  Simply let all those things be called “definitional” which come under the same method as definitions.  That all the things just said are such, it is obvious from these.  When we are able to argue that things are the same or different, we are also able to undertake this same way regarding definitions.  For pointing out that things are not the same, we will have destroyed the definition.  The thing just said cannot be said in reverse though.  For it is not sufficient for proving a definition to point out that something is the same; though it is sufficient for demolishing a definition to point out that something is not the same.[i]  Topica 101b36-102a17 

We might have expected Aristotle to have given us a clear and detailed definition of “definition,” since it this idea, at least from the time of Socrates, that appears to be the starting point for philosophical discourse.  Aristotle is stinting as often, however, and we do not quite receive as full an explanation as we had wished.

Aristotle begins by pointing out that a definition is necessary and sufficient to describe the essence of something.  Because it sets up the minimal conditions of what something is, a definition cannot be as simple as a single word.  A definition must be a phrase.  For example the phrase, “A flat-surfaced, 4 legged object,” could correspond, as a definition, to the word, “table.”  Likewise, “[A table is] a flat-surfaced, 4 legged object,” could be used in place of another phrase, such as, “horizontally raised plane.”  We could alternatively, for instance, say, “a horizontally raised plane” is a “flat-surfaced, 4 legged object.”

When something is merely a copulative pairing, such as, “x is y,” Aristotle prefers to call it “definitional” (horikos) rather than properly a definition (horos/horismos).

Aristotle makes the fascinating point that much of the time and effort in coming up with definitions involves determining similarities and differences between two things.  Furthermore, by giving either an example or a counterexample I can prove or disprove a definition.  If I maintain that a, “horizontally raised plane” is, in fact, a “table,” such a designation may be insufficiently determinative of the “essence” of the thing in question.  Thus the phrase, “horizontally raised plane” is insufficient for demonstrating a given definition, at least by the method of providing examples.  Another way of saying this is that if I point out objects which are really tables, they would also match the description of “horizontally raised plane.”  That an actual table happens to match up with my definition of table might in fact be a mere coincidence, owing to the broad and accommodating definition I have offered.  As Aristotle correctly puts it, therefore, you cannot prove a definition in this way.  On the other hand, however, one could disprove a definition by offering a counterexample.  “Horizontally raised plane” also includes things such as desks, cabinets or even geographical landmarks such as plateaus.  Because of the imprecision in this case (perhaps flat-out error in another example of a definition), the definition of a table as a, “horizontally raised plane” has been refuted.  Thus counterexamples have proved the definition incorrect.

 


[i] Λεκτέον δὲ τί ὅρος, τί ἴδιον, τί γένος, τί συμβεβηκός.
ἔστι δ’ ὅρος μὲν λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι σημαίνων, ἀποδίδο-
(102a.) ται δὲ ἢ λόγος ἀντ’ ὀνόματος ἢ λόγος ἀντὶ λόγου· δυνατὸν
γὰρ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ λόγου τινὰ σημαινομένων ὁρίσασθαι. ὅσοι
δ’ ὁπωσοῦν ὀνόματι τὴν ἀπόδοσιν ποιοῦνται, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ
ἀποδιδόασιν οὗτοι τὸν τοῦ πράγματος ὁρισμόν, ἐπειδὴ πᾶς
ὁρισμὸς λόγος τίς ἐστιν. ὁρικὸν μέντοι καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον θετέον, (5)
οἷον ὅτι <τὸ> καλόν ἐστι τὸ πρέπον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ πότερον
ταὐτὸν αἴσθησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἕτερον· καὶ γὰρ περὶ τοὺς
ὁρισμοὺς πότερον ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον ἡ πλείστη γίνεται δια-
τριβή. ἁπλῶς δὲ ὁρικὰ πάντα λεγέσθω τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν
ὄντα μέθοδον τοῖς ὁρισμοῖς. ὅτι δὲ πάντα τὰ νῦν ῥηθέντα  (10)
τοιαῦτ’ ἐστί, δῆλον ἐξ αὐτῶν. δυνάμενοι γὰρ ὅτι ταὐτὸν
καὶ ὅτι ἕτερον διαλέγεσθαι, τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς
ὁρισμοὺς ἐπιχειρεῖν εὐπορήσομεν· δείξαντες γὰρ ὅτι οὐ ταὐτόν
ἐστιν ἀνῃρηκότες ἐσόμεθα τὸν ὁρισμόν. οὐ μὴν ἀντιστρέφει γε
τὸ νῦν ῥηθέν· οὐ γὰρ ἱκανὸν πρὸς τὸ κατασκευάσαι τὸν ὁρι- (15)
σμὸν τὸ δεῖξαι ταὐτὸν ὄν. πρὸς μέντοι τὸ ἀνασκευάσαι αὔτ-
αρκες τὸ δεῖξαι ὅτι οὐ ταὐτόν.

 

Eliminate Psychological Pain: 2 Obols, Cheap!

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“[Antiphon] is said to have composed a tragedy together with Dionysus the tyrant. Yet while he was engaged in its composition he contrived an art to relieve pain, just as there is medical treatment for the sick. After he procured a small apartment for himself beside the marketplace of Corinth, he advertised that he was able to serve those in pain through words. When he discerned the causes [of pain], he consoled his patients. But he considered his art of painlessness inferior to when he turned to the rhetorical art[1].”  (Plutarch, Vit. X orat. 1 p. 833c)

 Without commenting on the validity of the charge, this anecdote reminds me of one of the most persistent criticisms of psychology/psychotherapy.  Such therapies involve word tennis until the troubles go away, with the implication that the mind clears itself of any particular problem after an elapse proportionate to its distress, by no dint of the therapy involved.  It is unclear, given the brevity of what is reported here, what exactly Antiphon was saying, but given the Platonic leanings of Plutarch, the story comes across as opportunistic hucksterism.  Obviously, as noted here, Antiphon preferred rhetoric (here apparently synonymous with sophistry) as a more lucrative enterprise to the “art of pain relief”, perhaps either due to its financial potential in court or because it was less vexing or both, and since Plutarch notes that this therapeutic enterprise was less valued, the impression given is that Antiphon simply varied the location, but not the content of his sophistry.  You can take the sophist cum therapist out of the agora, but you can’t take the agora out of the sophist.  Once a ware-peddler, always a ware peddler.  The practice, not to mention the recidivism rate, of word mongering, at any rate, is dangerously antithetical to philosophical considerations. 

This very brief story aptly portrarys, at least from a Platonist viewpoint, the contempt that sophists had– or were reputed to have– towards the more important matters of the soul, as Antiphon displays by turning his back on the alleviation of others’ suffering.    

 [1]  [Antiphon] λέγεται δὲ τραγωιδίας συνθεῖναι ἰδίαι καὶ σὺν Διονυσίωι τῶι τυράννωι· ἔτι δ’ ὢν πρὸς τῆι ποιήσει τέχνην ἀλυπίας συνεστήσατο, ὥσπερ τοῖς νοσοῦσιν ἡ παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν θεραπεία ὑπάρχει· ἐν Κορίνθωι τε κατεσκευασμένος οἴκημά τι παρὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν προέγραψεν, ὅτι δύναται τοὺς λυπουμένους διὰ λόγων θεραπεύειν, καὶ πυνθανόμενος τὰς αἰτίας παρεμυθεῖτο τοὺς κάμνοντας. νομίζων δὲ τὴν τέχνην ἐλάττω ἢ καθ’ αὑτὸν εἶναι ἐπὶ ῥητορικὴν ἀπετράπη.

Thinking of Thought in the Thought of Aristotle’s God Part 2/3

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“Therefore, first off, if intellect is not a thinking but an ability for thinking, it is reasonable that the continuity of intellect’s thinking is toilsome. Second, it is obvious that there would be something more honorable than intellect, the thing being thought. For both thinking and the thought also belong to one thinking the worst thing. So that if this is to be shunned (for not seeing some things is better than seeing some things), thought would not be the best thing. So it thinks about itself, if indeed intellect is the best, and its thinking is the thinking of thinking. And it appears that knowledge and perception and opinion and understanding are always of something else, but are of themselves incidentally. And yet if thinking and being thought are different, concerning which does well-doing belong to intellect? [i.e. which action gives intellect its excellence? The something thinking or that something which is being thought.] For the essence of thought and the thing being thought are not the same thing.”1
Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1074b27-1075a1

Part 1 Here

Given the starting part that nous (intellect), traditionally interpreted as God himself, is the “most divine of phenomena” we have seen Aristotle argue in the first part of this passage, that nous 1) thinks, since not thinking would be irreverent, no better than the mortal nous of a sleeping man 2) controls itself, since if something else controlled nous‘ act of thinking nous would merely be a type of ability rather than the best (i.e. divine) essence 3) thinks of the most divine and honorable thing 4) always thinks of the most divine and honorable thing, since any alteration, ipso facto, is a change for the worse, and thus unworthy of the divine.

In this section, Aristotle continues his line of argumentation, working under the guidance of an implicit question, “What gives nous, as a thinking thing, its quality as the most divine thing? Is it the mere fact of its thinking, that it thinks, OR that which it thinks about, the object of its thought, the thing being thought about?” Aristotle says that if nous is not “thinking itself” but only the capacity to think, then thinking will only come to it with difficulty. In this understanding nous would be just like a poodle, in Dr. Johnson’s famous image, trying to stand on two legs. The dog certainly is able to stand on its hind legs, but poorly and with much labor; a true biped, however, can perform such an action with the facility of native ease. Likewise, if nous is only an ability, it is not nous in so far as it is thinking, but nous as the repository of the actual thought that it possesses, which is the valuable and divine characteristic of nous. Even the lowest form of human beings, for example a violent and recalcitrant prisoner, thinks and has thoughts of things, which in his case are undoubtedly base indeed. Thus it must be the content, the thing being thought, not thinking per se, which we as perceptive philosophers value, at least in respect to calling nous “divine.”

Aristotle says somewhat oddly, “So that if this is to be shunned (for not seeing some things is better than seeing some things), thought would not be the best thing.” I would paraphrase him thus. So if we reject (to use his word, shun) the idea that intellect is a thinking but accept rather, that it is a capacity to think, then thought and thinking are not the best thing, rather the object of thought, the thing being thought, is the best thing. His parenthetical remark is meant as a repetition of the line before, “for not seeing some things,” means “not thinking some things.” Aristotle therefore means, “Not thinking about some things (i.e. raping, outhouses, false statements) is clearly better than thinking about them.” This passing parenthetical remark is an additional proof that it is the object of thought that we value, not thinking itself, for if it were the latter we would even approve of the thinking of the most base and vile thoughts. We most certainly do not.

Aristotle also notes an odd feature of mental life, namely that although mental states such as knowledge or opinion can be “of” themselves, this is not intrinsic to their nature. I can have an opinion of my opinion that Plato is the best philosopher, such as, “I have the opinion that I may be wrong about my opinion that Plato is the best philosopher.”2 This fact, that I am able to form an opinion about an opinion does help to mark out the distinction that an opinion, as a mental state, is a different thing from that which the opinion is about. There is the opinion, and then the content of that opinion, which normally are difficult to distinguish. However, when Aristotle points out the fact that we can have a perception of a perception (looking in the mirror) or an opinion of an opinion, he has demonstrated that the mental state and the content of that state are two different entities.

When attributing qualities to nous, though, we need not choose between whether it is the thinking itself or the object of thinking that garners our admiration. For nous is a thinking of thinking. Nous both thinks, and in its thinking it thinks of the most divine and honorable thing, which happens to be itself. Nous therefore thinks about itself, perpetually thinking.

1. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰ μὴ νόησίς ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δύναμις, εὔλογον ἐπίπονον εἶναι τὸ συνεχὲς αὐτῷ τῆς νοήσεως: ἔπειτα δῆλον [30] ὅτι ἄλλο τι ἂν εἴη τὸ τιμιώτερον ἢ ὁ νοῦς, τὸ νοούμενον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ ἡ νόησις ὑπάρξει καὶ τὸ χείριστον νοοῦντι, ὥστ ̓ εἰ φευκτὸν τοῦτο (καὶ γὰρ μὴ ὁρᾶν ἔνια κρεῖττον ἢ ὁρᾶν), οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἄριστον ἡ νόησις. αὑτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις. [35] φαίνεται δ ̓ ἀεὶ ἄλλου ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ δόξα καὶ ἡ διάνοια, αὑτῆς δ ̓ ἐν παρέργῳ. ἔτι εἰ ἄλλο τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖσθαι, κατὰ πότερον αὐτῷ τὸ εὖ ὑπάρχει; οὐδὲ γὰρ ταὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι νοήσει καὶ νοουμένῳ.

2. I am not, in fact, (nor can I be) wrong!