Tag Archives: Plotinus

Plotinus: How Does the Universe See? Part 2 of 2

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But whether perception is of χρεία alone one must investigate in this way.  If there could not be a perception for the soul when it is alone, but perceptions are with the body, [perception] would be because of the body, from which also perceptions come, and perception is given because of the association [of the soul] with the body, and indeed it follows necessarily—for whatever undergoes an affection with respect to the body, also reaches as far as the soul, if it is a stronger affection—or it has been contrived [that we perceive] so as to guard ourselves from that thing causing the affection to destroy [our body] before it becomes greater or closer to us.  But if, indeed, this is so, perceptions would be for χρεία. For if they are also for knowledge, [they would be] for a being not in knowledge but which is ignorant because of circumstance, and in order to remember because of forgetfulness, not for a being not in need nor in forgetfulness.  But if this is the case, there must be an investigation not only about the earth alone, but also about all the stars and especially concerning all the heaven and universe.
(Plotinus, Enneads, IV.4.24 lines 1-14) (1).

In the previous post on this topic, I introduced two ways we are to understand Plotinus’ use of the work chreia— need and use.  In the text we are examining, we are especially applying these two meanings to the case of the universe as a subject of perception, particularly sight. When it comes to determining when and if the universe can see, we can dismiss chreia-need because this would imply a lack on the part of the universe.  That is, the universe would lack knowledge, but Plotinus rules this out by saying, “For if [perceptions] are also for knowledge, [they would be] for a being not in knowledge but which is ignorant because of circumstance, and in order to remember because of forgetfulness, not for a being not in need nor in forgetfulness.”  Yet the universe is not ignorant nor in need of remembering, so this possibility is ruled out: perception cannot be for need.  Furthermore, if the universe is all there is and yet perceives something outside of itself, then the universe would not be all there is.  Thus a second reason for dismissing need as an explanation for the universe’s perception.

Perhaps then, perception is for the use of the universe.  Remember that in the text, Plotinus has said that whenever there is a thing with (at least) two parts, one part, when it is affected, transmits it affections to the other part, if it is a sufficiently strong affection. (2)  In this more opaque language it was first presented as the initial option of the disjunction concerning the chreia of perception.  As it is applied less broadly, the parts being discussed are the body and the soul.  In the case of the universe under investigation, when one part undergoes an affection (sphere of the planets), then this is transmitted to the soul of the universe by necessity (resulting in sight).

Although it is true that the universe does not see for the purpose of gaining new information, it can, as we can look at our own hand, nevertheless look at itself with a part of itself.  On first glance, it would appear that the universe looking at itself would be vain, to no effect (μάτην).  But if looking at itself just happens as a matter of course, then, Plotinus’ line of thought goes, looking at itself is not vain, because this is not the purpose of its looking, but is the necessary consequence of the way the universe is set up.

(1)
Τὸ δὲ εἰ τῆς χρείας μόνον ἡ αἴσθησις, ὧδε σκεπτέον.
Εἰ δὴ ψυχῇ μὲν μόνῃ οὐκ ἂν αἴσθησις γίνοιτο, μετὰ δὲ
σώματος αἱ αἰσθήσεις, διὰ σῶμα ἂν εἴη, ἐξ οὗπερ καὶ αἱ
αἰσθήσεις, καὶ διὰ τὴν σώματος κοινωνίαν δοθεῖσα, καὶ
ἤτοι ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπακολουθοῦσα—ὅ τι γὰρ πάσχει τὸ   (5)
σῶμα, καὶ φθάνει τὸ πάθος μεῖζον ὂν μέχρι ψυχῆς—
ἢ καὶμεμηχάνηται, ὅπως καὶ πρὶν μεῖζον γενέσθαι τὸ ποιοῦν,
ὥστε καὶ φθεῖραι, ἢ καὶ πρὶν πλησίον γενέσθαι, φυλάξασθαι.
Εἰ δὴ τοῦτο, πρὸς χρείαν ἂν εἶεν αἱ αἰσθήσεις. Καὶ γὰρ εἰ
καὶ πρὸς γνῶσιν, τῷ μὴ ἐν γνώσει ὄντι ἀλλ’ ἀμαθαίνοντι    (10)
διὰ συμφοράν, καὶ ἵνα ἀναμνησθῇ διὰ λήθην, οὐ τῷ μήτε
ἐν χρείᾳ μήτε ἐν λήθῃ. Ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο, οὐ περὶ τῆς γῆς ἂν
μόνον εἴη σκοπεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ἄστρων ἁπάντων καὶ
μάλιστα περὶ παντὸς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ κόσμου.

(2)
Plotinus is here likely taking up a line of thought from Plato, “Assume that some of the affections of our body are extinguished in the body before they reach the soul, leaving the soul unaffected, and that other affections permeate both body and soul and cause a vibration in both conjointly and in each individually” (Trans. Fowler, Philebus, 33d).

Plotinus: How Does the Universe See?, Part 1

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But whether perception is of χρεία (chreia) alone one must investigate in this way.  If there could not be a perception for the soul when it is alone, but perceptions are with the body, [perception] would be because of the body, from which also perceptions come, and perception is given because of the association [of the soul] with the body, and indeed it follows necessarily—for whatever undergoes an affection with respect to the body, also reaches as far as the soul, if it is a stronger affection—or it has been contrived [that we perceive] so as to guard ourselves from that thing causing the affection to destroy [our body] before it becomes greater or closer to us.  But if, indeed, this is so, perceptions would be for χρεία (chreia). For if they are also for knowledge, [they would be] for a being not in knowledge but which is ignorant because of circumstance, and in order to remember because of forgetfulness, not for a being not in need nor in forgetfulness.  But if this is the case, there must be an investigation not only about the earth alone, but also about all the stars and especially concerning all the heaven and universe.
(translation mine, Plotinus, Enneads, IV.4.24 lines 1-14) (1)

Plotinus has here introduced the concept of perception and, more particularly, whether it proceeds by χρεία (chreia).  This investigation, as I shall comment on in the next few posts, will be expanded upon by Plotinus to also include the universe.

However, in Plotinus there are in fact two main understandings of this term: χρεία-use and χρεία-need.(2)  An acknowledgment of this distinction allows us to properly appreciate that the initial question, whether perception concerns χρεία, is not a yes or no question, but one involving the ways in which perception can be said to deal with χρεία.  The first option, χρεία-use, is proposed in very abstract terms: whenever there is a thing with (at least) two parts, one part, when it is affected, transmits it affections to the other part by necessity, if it is a sufficiently strong affection.(3)  The second option, χρεία-need, is simpler: perception occurs to protect the body (or perhaps the soul-body union) from harm.(4)  After briefly introducing these two options, Plotinus will deny that χρεία-need can apply to the perception of the universe.  The rest of 24 and relevant parts of chapters 25 and 26 will explore whether, and in what ways χρεία-use can apply to the universe, as well as including discussion, in parallel inquiries, about the sun, stars and the earth.

When Plotinus denies perception for the universe, I claim that what he intends to deny is perception of external things.  We are left with internal perception.  These two types of internal perception are συναίσθησις (synaisthesis), or perception by the whole, and perception of part by part.  Once these two types of perception have been distinguished, Plotinus will focus on perception of part by part in the case of the universe.  Plotinus will later pick up the “by necessity” clause which was initially included with the first option of the opening of chapter 24, that affections are given from one part to another.  But he will deny that anything, including the universe, sees by merely having the requisite parts in place, as a matter of necessity.  For sight to take place something else needs to be in place.

This something else, as Plotinus points out, is an inclination towards sensibles.  I argue that in the case of the universe this inclination is provided by συμπάθεια.  The role συμπάθεια serves in providing inclination arises from the shared interests and concerns which attend it.  I will explore this more in the following posts.

 

REFERENCES:

 

(1)
Τὸ δὲ εἰ τῆς χρείας μόνον ἡ αἴσθησις, ὧδε σκεπτέον.
Εἰ δὴ ψυχῇ μὲν μόνῃ οὐκ ἂν αἴσθησις γίνοιτο, μετὰ δὲ
σώματος αἱ αἰσθήσεις, διὰ σῶμα ἂν εἴη, ἐξ οὗπερ καὶ αἱ
αἰσθήσεις, καὶ διὰ τὴν σώματος κοινωνίαν δοθεῖσα, καὶ
ἤτοι ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπακολουθοῦσα—ὅ τι γὰρ πάσχει τὸ   (5)
σῶμα, καὶ φθάνει τὸ πάθος μεῖζον ὂν μέχρι ψυχῆς—ἢ καὶ
μεμηχάνηται, ὅπως καὶ πρὶν μεῖζον γενέσθαι τὸ ποιοῦν,
ὥστε καὶ φθεῖραι, ἢ καὶ πρὶν πλησίον γενέσθαι, φυλάξασθαι.
Εἰ δὴ τοῦτο, πρὸς χρείαν ἂν εἶεν αἱ αἰσθήσεις. Καὶ γὰρ εἰ
καὶ πρὸς γνῶσιν, τῷ μὴ ἐν γνώσει ὄντι ἀλλ’ ἀμαθαίνοντι    (10)
διὰ συμφοράν, καὶ ἵνα ἀναμνησθῇ διὰ λήθην, οὐ τῷ μήτε
ἐν χρείᾳ μήτε ἐν λήθῃ. Ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο, οὐ περὶ τῆς γῆς ἂν
μόνον εἴη σκοπεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ἄστρων ἁπάντων καὶ
μάλιστα περὶ παντὸς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ κόσμου.

(2)
Whether Plotinus was consciously aware of this ambiguity, or it simply slipped his mind as he was focused on χρεία, I do not know.  The Lexicon Plotinianum even acknowledges the flexibility of this term, giving both “a) need” and “b) use, utility, service” as definitions, while adding, “Some of the instances in b) might equally well be put under a), and vice versa” (Sleeman 1111-12).

(3)
I will avoid stating an exact relation between affection and perception, and say that affection and perception can mostly be treated as the same.  Perceptions are not the same as affections, but perceptions involves affections.

(4)
Perhaps the instigation for this investigation is the need to pursue the ramifications of the relation between body and soul.  See O’Meara, Chapter 2: The Relation between Sensible and Intelligible Reality, for the importance of developing this idea (O’Meara, Dominic J. Plotinus: An Introduction to the Enneads. Oxford: Clarendon, 1993).