Tag Archives: psychology

The Dynamics of Thought: “The Soul is All Things”

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(This post assumes that thought or perception is self-cognizant, that is, that to have a perception or thought is to be aware of it, as a function of the perception or thought itself, and that awareness does not owe to some capacity over and above perception or thought itself.  See this post for Aristotle’s position.)

As an addendum to the idea that awareness is concomitant with all thought insofar as as it is thought, it is important to discuss the overall flexibility of the soul as a capacity par excellence. In contrast to some readings of the Platonic account which has all knowledge somehow latent within us in Recollection, the Aristotelian account maintains that thought is something entirely plastic and receptive to its objects. This is the case to such a degree that Aristotle can make the seemingly shocking statement that, “Let us now summarize our results about soul, and repeat that the soul is in a way all existing things” (De Anima 431b21, trans. Smith). This may in fact be the explanation for why Aristotle does not need to appeal to some feature over and above the mere presence of a thought to account for an awareness of that thought. For if the soul were not an all-accommodating capacity, a potentiality, then this would mean it would have only a capacity determinate for certain thoughts; it could only have an awareness of those objects for which it was a determinate capacity. This would entail that if the soul were to meet anything outside the confines of its proscribed capacity, it would not be aware of them.  Yet this is absurd; anything we think of, we are aware of. Therefore, if we want to preserve the feature of psychology that thought brings with it an awareness of itself, we would do well by also maintaining, with Aristotle, that the “soul is all things.”

Eliminate Psychological Pain: 2 Obols, Cheap!

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“[Antiphon] is said to have composed a tragedy together with Dionysus the tyrant. Yet while he was engaged in its composition he contrived an art to relieve pain, just as there is medical treatment for the sick. After he procured a small apartment for himself beside the marketplace of Corinth, he advertised that he was able to serve those in pain through words. When he discerned the causes [of pain], he consoled his patients. But he considered his art of painlessness inferior to when he turned to the rhetorical art[1].”  (Plutarch, Vit. X orat. 1 p. 833c)

 Without commenting on the validity of the charge, this anecdote reminds me of one of the most persistent criticisms of psychology/psychotherapy.  Such therapies involve word tennis until the troubles go away, with the implication that the mind clears itself of any particular problem after an elapse proportionate to its distress, by no dint of the therapy involved.  It is unclear, given the brevity of what is reported here, what exactly Antiphon was saying, but given the Platonic leanings of Plutarch, the story comes across as opportunistic hucksterism.  Obviously, as noted here, Antiphon preferred rhetoric (here apparently synonymous with sophistry) as a more lucrative enterprise to the “art of pain relief”, perhaps either due to its financial potential in court or because it was less vexing or both, and since Plutarch notes that this therapeutic enterprise was less valued, the impression given is that Antiphon simply varied the location, but not the content of his sophistry.  You can take the sophist cum therapist out of the agora, but you can’t take the agora out of the sophist.  Once a ware-peddler, always a ware peddler.  The practice, not to mention the recidivism rate, of word mongering, at any rate, is dangerously antithetical to philosophical considerations. 

This very brief story aptly portrarys, at least from a Platonist viewpoint, the contempt that sophists had– or were reputed to have– towards the more important matters of the soul, as Antiphon displays by turning his back on the alleviation of others’ suffering.    

 [1]  [Antiphon] λέγεται δὲ τραγωιδίας συνθεῖναι ἰδίαι καὶ σὺν Διονυσίωι τῶι τυράννωι· ἔτι δ’ ὢν πρὸς τῆι ποιήσει τέχνην ἀλυπίας συνεστήσατο, ὥσπερ τοῖς νοσοῦσιν ἡ παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν θεραπεία ὑπάρχει· ἐν Κορίνθωι τε κατεσκευασμένος οἴκημά τι παρὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν προέγραψεν, ὅτι δύναται τοὺς λυπουμένους διὰ λόγων θεραπεύειν, καὶ πυνθανόμενος τὰς αἰτίας παρεμυθεῖτο τοὺς κάμνοντας. νομίζων δὲ τὴν τέχνην ἐλάττω ἢ καθ’ αὑτὸν εἶναι ἐπὶ ῥητορικὴν ἀπετράπη.