Philosophical Humility, or, Admitting I Don’t Know What I Don’t Know

I have seen many a conscientious reader of Plato smirk when considering Socrates’ plea that he knows one thing, he knows nothing.  We are in on the joke, I think many people believe; Socrates is much more clever than I and certainly more enlightened than the characters, in comparison real rubes, he systematically dismantles in the dialogues.  Socrates, under the hallowed authority of this confession, is a figure to whom we give lip service as the fount of all western education: be humble, accept your limitations, pursue the truth, and recognize that learning is never complete.

Nevertheless, Socrates is critical not only of a lack of knowledge, but also that erroneous “knowledge,” the misinformation, to which he also unwittingly adheres.  In the Gorgias, he goes so far as to say this.

I therefore, would cross-question you with pleasure, if you are the kind of person I am. But if not, I would let it be. Of what kind am I? Of those who are pleased to be refuted if I say something untrue, and with pleasure I would refute if someone said something untrue, and in fact I am not less pleased being refuted than refuting. For I think it is a greater good to be refuted, by as much greater it is a good to rid oneself of a great evil than to rid someone else of it. For I do not think that a thing could be such an evil for a man, as much as having a false opinion concerning the things about which our discussion is about (Gorgias 458a1-b1). [1]

Far from being shameful, Socrates thinks it is a actually a good to be refuted rather than a harm, and he prefers this to refuting someone else!

In light of this Socratic admission, I have thought how it applies to students who are hesitant to admit, in a classroom setting, and in one way or another, that they do not know.  However insofar as this is a legitimate fear, I assume that students have done their due diligence in homework, readings and independent thought on the subject. If they have not completed all of these preparatives, then these students are not candidates for Socratic humility, admitting they know what they do not know, but are simply poor students.

Thus I take it as a given, that if one is a prepared student, it is a philosophical good to admit what and when one does not know, for this is THE propaedeuctic.  Of course, these are also applicable to discussions of ancient philosophy in non-academic settings, and may even be useful generally when there are group intellectual discussions.

Fear of Appearing Stupid

I am sure we can all relate to this.  We are hesitant to speak up in class because we think our comment too obvious, or our question too stupid.  I have found that personally, as a participant and as a teacher, that an attitude of patient charity towards every single comment and question leads to more confidence in the questioner and more frankness in the answer.  Yet I am not a proponent of the idea that there are no stupid questions.  Rather, I think whether a question is stupid or not, the questioner should be a position in which he is encouraged to ask the stupid question, and not feel intellectual pain over it, while still being lead toward more intelligent questions.

Fear of Academic Worth

Another obstacle to Socratic humility is fear of having one’s academic worth undermined if one does not know the answer to a question or asks for clarification on background information owing to lack of knowledge.  As jockeying for the glory of the admiration of one’s peers is always in play in a classroom, I think, then acknowledging one’s ignorance in even minor issues often is an obstacle to learning and academic growth.

Fear of Preparedness

This I think is the most difficult of the fears.  For I think that if a student actually is prepared, but is hesitant to speak up in such a way because it might imply she is not prepared, this too is an obstacle to Socratic humility and to learning.  One way for a student to overcome this fear, is to couch his confession of ignorance (on whatever item of knowledge it is) in the context of expressing knowledge which is illustrative of the fact that the student does not some things, just not all, on this subject.

In conclusion, I think it is apparent that these are not only fears of the individual, but also expectations that the group can, in the snide inner voice we like to imagine we do not have, impose on an individual.  “Oh, you don’t know X about Y on Z, then you must not be very bright.”  “You need clarification on this, are you serious!”

 

 


 

REFERENCES:

[1] (a.) ἐγὼ οὖν, εἰ μὲν καὶ σὺ εἶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧνπερ καὶ ἐγώ,
ἡδέως ἄν σε διερωτῴην· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐῴην ἄν. ἐγὼ δὲ τίνων
εἰμί; τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων εἴ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς
λέγω, ἡδέως δ’ ἂν ἐλεγξάντων εἴ τίς τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγοι,
οὐκ ἀηδέστερον μεντἂν ἐλεγχθέντων ἢ ἐλεγξάντων· μεῖζον (5)
γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡγοῦμαι, ὅσῳπερ μεῖζον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν
αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι κακοῦ τοῦ μεγίστου ἢ ἄλλον ἀπαλλάξαι.
οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι τοσοῦτον κακὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅσον δόξα
(b.) ψευδὴς περὶ ὧν τυγχάνει νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ὤν.