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Aristotle’s Categories: Four-fold Division of Being

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In the previous chapter of the Categories we have already discussed homonymy, synonomy, and paronymy.  This section, Chapter 2 of Aristotle’s Categories, sets forth a four-fold system of classification for “things that are,” [1] in addition to introducing a distinction between things that are said “in combination” and things said “without combination.”  Although not without straying interpretations, the distinction between “combined and uncombined” is rather clear, on my view, from the context.  So I will instead be focusing on the four-fold division that takes up the majority of the chapter and the lion’s share of the philosophical difficulty.  Needless to say, however, for the purpose of an explanatory post such as this, I will be sticking to orthodox and traditional interpretations, although of course there are always divergences and minority reports.

Things That Are Said:

 

Of the things that are said, some are said in combination (symploke), while some are said without combination.  Those that are said in combination are such as “human runs,” “human wins.”  Those without combination are such as “man,” “ox,” “runs,” “wins.”

 

Things That Are:

 

A) Of things that are, some are said of an individual subject (tis hypokeimenon), but are not in any subject, such as “human” is said of an individual human, but is not in any subject.

 

B) But some are in a subject, yet are said of no subject.  And by “in a subject,” I mean that which exists in something not as a part and is impossible to be apart from that in which it is.  For example, an individual grammatical knowledge (tis grammatike) is in a subject, but is said of no subject, and individual white is in a subject, i.e. a physical body (for every color is in a body) but it is said of no subject.

 

C) Some are said both of a subject and are in a subject, for example knowledge (episteme) is in a subject, i.e. a soul, but is said of a subject, i.e. grammatical knowledge

 

D) Some are neither in a subject nor said of a subject, for example, an individual person or an individual horse–– for none of these is in a subject nor is it said of a subject.  And generally, things that are irreducible and one in number are said of no subject, but nothing hinders some things from being in the subject.  For, of the things in a subject, the individual grammatical knowledge is one of them (Aristotle, Categories, 1a16-1b9). [2]

First let us discuss what Aristotle means by “in a subject” and “said of a subject.” Since the four-fold division consists entirely in affirming or denying these classifications, resulting in four distinctions, if we understand these two phrases, we are well on our way to understanding all of this chapter.

The In-a-subject Relation

It is best to understand both the in-a-subject and said-of-a-subject distinctions, at a general level, as belonging to relations between things.  So in-a-subject means that if X is in Y, where Y is the subject, we are to understand Y as either a substance proper or, more abstactly, as that thing, whatever it is, which undergoes the process which results in some relation.  X here cannot exist independently from some kind of subject or substance, and that is why it is said to be “in” a subject, for it will not exist “out” of a subject.  Thus the category of things not a subject or substance, here represented by X, are dependent on the subject for their existence.  So in Aristotle’s example, an individual’s grammar-knowledge (his understanding of how language works) is “in” an individual (his mind) because it is dependent on the individual and cannot exist apart from this individual, viz., Grammatical knowledge is in the mind.

The Said-of-a-subject Relation

While the in-a-subject distinction concerns a subject or substance and its independent status (in contrast to the dependent relation of a non-subject or non-substance), the said-of-a-subject relation pertains to an individual and a universal, or in slightly different wording, to an individual and a species or genus.  Returning to one of Aristotle’s examples, the term human (as a species) is “said of” an individual human, viz., Socrates is a human.

The Four-fold Division Simplified

Now that we have discussed the in-a-subject relation and the said-of-a-subject relation, we can apply these distinctions to the text above to get four categories into which (presumably) all things fit.

A) Essential Universals: Universals (or species and genera) in their relation to substances. E.g. “Human” in “Socrates is human.”
B) Accidental Particulars: Particulars, but not substances. E.g. An individual grammatical knowledge in a person.
C) Accidental Universals: Universals (or species and genera) in their relation to things other than substances. E.g. Knowledge is said both of grammatical knowledge (i.e. grammatical knowledge is knowledge) and is in a subject, i.e. a mind.
D) Primary Substances: Particulars that are substances. E.g. An individual such as Socrates or a particular horse, e.g. Secretariat

 

 

REFERENCES:

[1] Although the division is four-fold, there are actually 6 possibilities; however two of these possibilities are contradictions: “in a subject and not in a subject” and “of a subject and not in a subject.”

[2] Τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν λέγεται, τὰ
δὲ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς. τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ συμπλοκήν, οἷον
ἄνθρωπος τρέχει, ἄνθρωπος νικᾷ· τὰ δὲ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς,
οἷον ἄνθρωπος, βοῦς, τρέχει, νικᾷ.
Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν καθ’ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται, ἐν  (20)
ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενί ἐστιν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος καθ’ ὑποκειμένου
μὲν λέγεται τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενί ἐστιν·
τὰ δὲ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι, καθ’ ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς
λέγεται, —ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ λέγω ὃ ἔν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος
ὑπάρχον ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν,— οἷον ἡ τὶς (25)
γραμματικὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ, καθ’ ὑπο-
κειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται, καὶ τὸ τὶ λευκὸν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ
μέν ἐστι τῷ σώματι, —ἅπαν γὰρ χρῶμα ἐν σώματι,— καθ’
ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται· τὰ δὲ καθ’ ὑποκειμένου τε
(1b.) λέγεται καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν, οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐν ὑπο-
κειμένῳ μέν ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ, καθ’ ὑποκειμένου δὲ λέγεται
τῆς γραμματικῆς· τὰ δὲ οὔτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν οὔτε καθ’
ὑποκειμένου λέγεται, οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ τὶς ἵπ-
πος, —οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων οὔτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν (5)
οὔτε καθ’ ὑποκειμένου λέγεται·— ἁπλῶς δὲ τὰ ἄτομα καὶ ἓν
ἀριθμῷ κατ’ οὐδενὸς ὑποκειμένου λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ
ἔνια οὐδὲν κωλύει εἶναι· ἡ γὰρ τὶς γραμματικὴ τῶν ἐν ὑπο-
κειμένῳ ἐστίν.

Platonic Forms as Paradigms in Comedic Philosophy

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Here is an intriguing text found in Diogenes Laertius.  It is retold by Diogenes who apparently found it in Alcimus, a certain Greek rhetorician, who relates how Plato owes an intellectual debt to Epicharmus, a poet.  What is certainly bizarre about this relation is that Epicharmus was a comic poet, and the passages of Epicharmus brought forward here concerns the theory of the Forms.  I do not wish to speculate on the likelihood of whether Plato would borrow from a comic poet, or in fact, if these fragments even belong to Epicharmus.  Rather, I am interested in the Platonist conception of forms which this passage is attempting to illuminate.

Yet Alcimus also says this: “Wise men say the soul perceives some things through the body such as a sound, a sight, but other things the soul intuits itself through itself (αὐτὴν καθ’ αὑτὴν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι) while not making use of the body. Therefore, of the things that are, some are sensibles, others are intelligibles. And on account of these things, Plato used to say that it is necessary for those who desire to comprehend the principles of the universe first of all to distinguish the Forms among themselves, for example, likeness and singularity and plurality and magnitude and rest and motion. Secondly, it is necessary to comprehend as many of the forms as are in relation to each other, for example knowledge or magnitude or mastership. (For we must keep in mind that the names in usage [properly] belong to the Forms because they participate in the Forms. I mean, for example, that just things are just insofar as they participate in justness, and beautiful things are beautiful insofar as they participate in beauty). Furthermore, each one of the Forms is eternal and a thought, and in addition, does not undergo change. Therefore he also says that the Forms by their nature stand as paradigms, and other things resemble these because they were established as likenesses of the Forms. Therefore, Epicharmus speaks in this way concerning the good and the Forms:

 

A: So is flute-playing a certain thing?

B: Yes, entirely.

A: Then is a flute-playing a man?

B: Of course not.

A: Come see then, what is a flute-player? Who does he seem to you to be? A man? Or not a man?

B: Entirely a man.

A: Therefore do you think that it would also be this way concerning the good?

 

The good is a certain thing in itself, and whoever learns that would know, and is already become a good man. For just as there is a flute-player because he learns flute-playing, or a dancer because he learns dancing or a weaver because he learns weaving, or any such thing in like manner, whatever you could wish to come up with, so the man himself would not be the craft, but in fact he would be the craftsman (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, Plato, bk. III. ch. 12-14). [1]

I will refrain here from commenting on the possible comedic merit of this excerpted dialogue, except to say that I would personally very much enjoy a comedy involving Platonic Form!  I want to focus on A’s point in leading B to the conclusion that a craftsman is not a craft.  I take it that the last paragraph above is also part of A’s dialogue, since Diogenes has said that Epicharmus will speak about the good and Forms, and Epicharmus has not, so far at least, spoken of the good.

A establishes that flute-playing is not a flute player (or grammatically, the reverse is likely as well).  The path that leads to this conclusion, or what we are to take from this conclusion, however, are less than clear to me.  Perhaps the idea is that, keeping in mind the language of ‘paradigm’ used to describe the Forms in the first paragraph, we could force a sharp distinction as to the origin of the flute-player’s craft.  What I mean is that, from the untutored perspective, it appears that the flute-player looks to another flute-player to learn his craft.  However, this would be fruitless if what he is looking at is not flute-playing, while A’s interlocutor has already agreed that a flute-player is not a flute-playing.  Therefore, it must be the case that the would-be flute-player is observing something.  This something is the paradigm of the Platonic Form of flute-playing, to which he must turn to see flute playing not as something perceivable, but entirely intelligible.

In addition, there might be an emphasis on the priority of the Form as against its particular instantiations.  That is, ‘flute-playing’ comes before a flute-player, even though one might mistakenly think that flute-playing is entirely dependent on a flute-player.  But in fact, it is the flute-player who must turn to the already existing, eternal, intelligible Form of flute-playing, as the paradigm from which he learns.

Is there perhaps some other line of thought that Epicharmus, the erstwhile Platonist, is conveying?

REFERENCES:

[1] Ἔτι φησὶν ὁ Ἄλκιμος καὶ ταυτί· “φασὶν οἱ σοφοὶ τὴν ψυχὴν
τὰ μὲν διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἰσθάνεσθαι οἷον ἀκούουσαν, βλέπουσαν,
τὰ δ’ αὐτὴν καθ’ αὑτὴν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι μηδὲν τῷ σώματι χρωμένην·
διὸ καὶ τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ νοητά. ὧν ἕνεκα
καὶ Πλάτων ἔλεγεν ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς συνιδεῖν τὰς τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὰς (5)
ἐπιθυμοῦντας πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὰς καθ’ αὑτὰς διελέσθαι τὰς ἰδέας,
οἷον ὁμοιότητα καὶ μονάδα καὶ πλῆθος καὶ μέγεθος καὶ στάσιν
καὶ κίνησιν· δεύτερον αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ
(13.) δίκαιον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὑποθέσθαι. τρίτον τῶν ἰδεῶν συνιδεῖν
ὅσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλας εἰσίν, οἷον ἐπιστήμην ἢ μέγεθος ἢ δεσποτείαν
(ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τὰ παρ’ ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ μετέχειν ἐκείνων ὁμώ-
νυμα ἐκείνοις ὑπάρχει· λέγω δὲ οἷον δίκαια μὲν ὅσα τοῦ δικαίου,
καλὰ δὲ ὅσα τοῦ καλοῦ). ἔστι δὲ τῶν εἰδῶν ἓν ἕκαστον ἀίδιόν τε (5)
καὶ νόημα καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἀπαθές. διὸ καί φησιν
ἐν τῇ φύσει τὰς ἰδέας ἑστάναι καθάπερ παραδείγματα, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα
ταύταις ἐοικέναι τούτων ὁμοιώματα καθεστῶτα. ὁ τοίνυν Ἐπί-
χαρμος περί τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν οὕτω λέγει· (10)

(14.) {—} ἆρ’ ἔστιν αὔλησίς τι πρᾶγμα;

{—} πάνυ μὲν ὦν.

{—} ἄνθρωπος ὦν αὔλησίς ἐστιν; {—} οὐθαμῶς.

{—} φέρ’ ἴδω, τί δ’ αὐλητάς; τίς εἶμέν τοι δοκεῖ;
ἄνθρωπος; ἢ οὐ γάρ;

{—} πάνυ μὲν ὦν.

{—} οὐκῶν δοκεῖς οὕτως ἔχειν <κα> καὶ περὶ τἀγαθοῦ;

τὸ μὲν (5)
ἀγαθόν τι πρᾶγμ’ εἶμεν καθ’ αὕθ’, ὅστις δέ κα
εἰδῇ μαθὼν τῆν’, ἀγαθὸς ἤδη γίγνεται.
ὥσπερ γάρ ἐστ’ αὔλησιν αὐλητὰς μαθὼν
ἢ ὄρχησιν ὀρχηστάς τις ἢ πλοκεὺς πλοκάν,
ἢ πᾶν γ’ ὁμοίως τῶν τοιούτων ὅ τι τὺ λῇς, (10)
οὐκ αὐτὸς εἴη κα τέχνα, τεχνικός γα μάν.

 

Aristotle’s Case Against Vegetarianism: Predator and Prey

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If it is a given that man is an animal, as is so famously articulated in Aristotle’s famous dictum that man is a social animal, then there should be no good reason to exclude ideas which, in general, are meant to apply to man as an animal, from animals.  So in the case of vegetarianism: if there is an argument suitably argued against vegetarianism for animals qua animals then it will apply to man insofar as he is an animal as well.

This is the case in an interesting passage from the first book of Aristotle’s Politics.

For some animals, when they are created, at the outset bring forth with them in the process of creation (τοῖς γεννωμένοις) so much nourishment as is adequate until the time when the animal itself is able to provide for itself; for example those animals which have larvae or eggs. As many animals as give birth to live young, they have nourishment in themselves for a given time, the substance called milk.  So that clearly one must think that [there is nourishment] for the things which have been created (γενομένοις), plants on account of animals and the other animals for the sake of humans.  The tame animals are for the use and nourishment of mankind, while the wild ones, if not all, most of them, are on account of nourishment and help, in order that clothes and other tools come to be from these.  And therefore, if nature does nothing in vain or without a purpose, it is necessary that nature made all of these on account of humans (Translation mine, Aristotle, Politics, 1256b10-22) [1]

Aristotle, not uncharacteristically, is running together lines of thought, arguments and assumptions.  He begins from the idea that in nature when an animal is in the process of being former, it is supplied by nature with some form of physical sustenance, such as an egg providing not only a type of shelter but also some nutrition for the growing embryo.  To Aristotle, this is a universal feature for animal life; even in the case of animals which give birth to live young, their mothers are capable of lactation to provide this same sustenance in a different manner.  Thus, the thinking goes, when an animal is past the initial stage of life, nature would likewise still provide it with nourishment as when it has reached the point of maturity.

Latent within this passage is the idea that once nature has delivered an animal into its full physical maturity, it will have come to possess capabilities to procure food by its own means.[2]  Thus, there is still a need for food, but the initial form of food, such as a lactating mother, is not longer present for the animal.  The animal feels the urge to continue feeding, and in Aristotle’s mind, it has a natural instinct to seek those things which will best suit its appetite.  Among those things are both plants and animals.  Thus vegetarianism is ruled out, albeit Aristotle does need some detail work in explaining the nuances of this idea in full.

Lastly, there is the point made about nature doing nothing in vain.  What does he mean in applying that thought in this case?  (1) Either that nature does not bring an animal into maturity to just let it die since it has no way to get food (e.g. a human baby dies because it cannot find food); but this would be absurd.  (2) Or nature does not bring an animal into existence for it not be used in the proper way (i.e. cows are made for hamburgers, for leather, and for milk) (3) Or both, to put it somewhat directly, the predator and prey are made for a purpose, and both fulfill their roles.

REFERENCES:

[1]  καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν τὰ μὲν συνεκ- (10)
τίκτει τῶν ζῴων τοσαύτην τροφὴν ὥσθ’ ἱκανὴν εἶναι μέχρις
οὗ ἂν δύνηται αὐτὸ αὑτῷ πορίζειν τὸ γεννηθέν, οἷον ὅσα
σκωληκοτοκεῖ ἢ ᾠοτοκεῖ· ὅσα δὲ ζῳοτοκεῖ, τοῖς γεννωμένοις
ἔχει τροφὴν ἐν αὑτοῖς μέχρι τινός, τὴν τοῦ καλουμένου γά-
λακτος φύσιν. ὥστε ὁμοίως δῆλον ὅτι καὶ γενομένοις οἰη- (15)
τέον τά τε φυτὰ τῶν ζῴων ἕνεκεν εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα
τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάριν, τὰ μὲν ἥμερα καὶ διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν
καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφήν, τῶν δ’ ἀγρίων, εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ
τά γε πλεῖστα τῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἄλλης βοηθείας ἕνεκεν, ἵνα
καὶ ἐσθὴς καὶ ἄλλα ὄργανα γίνηται ἐξ αὐτῶν. εἰ οὖν ἡ (20)
φύσις μηθὲν μήτε ἀτελὲς ποιεῖ μήτε μάτην, ἀναγκαῖον
τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἕνεκεν αὐτὰ πάντα πεποιηκέναι τὴν φύσιν.

[2]  Unsurprisingly, Aristotle will include hunting among the means.